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1 Introduction 
A crucial part of the economic environment is characterized by net-
works of supply chains (SCs) that, in a nutshell, steer the provision of 
supplies (e.g. trade goods, services) from points of origin to points of 
consumption. An SC is built on various entities (e.g. companies) at dif-
ferent functional stages (e.g. production, distribution) that are, from 
the perspective of a specific entity, either located in its upstream (sup-
ply side) or downstream (demand side) (Arnold et al. 2008; Pfohl 
2010; Christopher 2011). The focus of this research contribution is on 
SCs which are part of a critical infrastructure (CI)1 network in a com-
munity or society. A CI network comprises different sectors such as 
food, water, health care, or energy. As the well-functioning of these 
sectors is essential to guarantee public safety, CI networks have been 
described as “backbones” of the society or community they belong to 
(Kröger 2008). In the following, the term public safety critical SCs  
(P-SCs) is used to express the relevance of these SCs for public safety. 
Well-functioning P-SCs must ensure both the security and the availabil-
ity of public safety critical supplies to be provided for the population. 
Regarding the first, for example, a cryptosporidium (which refers to a 
type of parasite) outbreak caused a failure of the water treatment sys-
tem - as a functional stage of the water P-SC - in Milwaukee, USA, in 
1993. The outbreak resulted in contaminated water that was con-
sumed by 800,000 people for two weeks causing 54 deaths (Hoxie et 
al. 1997; Yates 2014). Regarding the second, for example, a strike of 
30,000 tanker drivers in Greece in 2010 interrupted the distribution of 
fuel - as a functional stage of the energy P-SC - to the gas stations. Una-
vailable fuel also restricted the distribution within food P-SCs and trig-
gered short-term food shortages in several regions of Greece (Die Welt 
                                               
1 The European Commission defines CIs as “physical and information technology facilities, 
networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious 
impact on the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of citizens or the effective 
functioning of governments in the European Union (EU) countries” (European Commis-
sion 2004). 
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2010). The Greek government intervened by instructing the military to 
manage the delivery of fuel to hospitals, power plants, airports, and 
harbors (manager magazin 2010). 
The focus of this research contribution is on the latter task of P-SCs to 
guarantee the availability of public safety critical supplies for the popu-
lation. In this regard, a well-functioning SC in general (including P-SCs) 
requires a balance of demand and supply from the perspective of any 
included entity (Oke & Gopalakrishnan 2009). A mismatch of demand 
and supply might cause an SC disturbance which, in turn, might lead to 
an unavailability of supplies (Jüttner et al. 2003; Rice 2003; Knemeyer 
et al. 2009). Triggering events of an SC disturbance might have an in-
ternal or external source. For example, IT-related events are frequently 
internally caused; market events or natural disasters, in turn, refer to 
external sources (Natarajarathinam et al. 2009). Internal and external 
sources can overlap. The range of consequences of an SC disturbance 
depends on the triggering event. It might be possible that just business 
processes of one or several entities are disturbed. Alternatively, it is 
imaginable that a disturbance cascades through the functional stages 
of the overall SC network in a spatial and/or temporal dimension 
(Rose & Lim 2002; Merz 2011).  
In the case that a triggering event disturbs one or more P-SCs, public 
safety is threatened as the sound provision of public safety critical 
supplies and, thus, the satisfaction of a population with basic needs is 
not guaranteed. Such a P-SC disturbance might even be amplified when 
the triggering event additionally impacts further CI sectors (e.g. una-
vailable roads as part of the transportation infrastructure) or when it 
cascades through interrelated P-SC networks (e.g. strikes of tanker 
drivers affecting distributions within food and health care P-SCs). The 
past has shown that disasters2 in particular have been responsible for 
causing large-scale P-SC disturbances. For example, climate change 
                                               
2 There is a distinction between natural and man-made disasters. While the first arise due 
to natural or physical phenomena (e.g. geophysical, hydrological, climatological, biologi-
cal), the latter are caused by humans (e.g. terrorism, war, industrial, nuclear or transporta-
tion accidents) (Bournay 2005; ICDRM/GWU 2010; IFRC 2015). 
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causes more and more natural disasters, such as heat waves, droughts, 
wildfires, and floods. Moreover, population growth, urbanization, and 
concentration have exposed more people and assets to disasters in 
general. Because of the significant increase in disasters in the past dec-
ades, the twenty-first century has been termed the “century of disas-
ters” by the Financial Times which included disaster management in 
the top 10 challenges facing science in June 2011 (Cookson 2011).  
Both developing countries and industrial nations have been affected by 
disaster-caused P-SC disturbances in the past. In the aftermath of the 
tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia in 2004, for example, humanitarian 
aid was required to compensate the unavailability of food supplies in 
the Maldives. As the Maldives consist of a number of relatively small 
islands, the availability of food supplies depends on the functioning of 
imports which were, however, disrupted due to the tsunami. Humani-
tarian organizations were obliged to fly in food supplies to compensate 
the P-SC disturbance (Samii & Van Wassenhove 2010). Unavailable 
food supplies could also be observed in Syria since 2012. The civil war 
which started in 2011 caused severe interruptions within the produc-
tion and distribution of foodstuff which resulted in a near collapse of 
the food P-SC network (Neue Züricher Zeitung 2012; Zeit online 2014). 
In the USA, disturbances of water and health care supplies occurred in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The destruction of 170 
drinking water facilities caused severe disturbances of water supplies 
in the city of New Orleans. Additionally, several large hospitals were 
destroyed or rendered inoperable (The White House 2006). 
1.1 Preventive and reactive disaster management 
An event that might cause a P-SC disturbance poses a risk for the per-
sons responsible within this P-SC. Typically, risks are assessed in a 
quantitative manner by predicting the occurrence probability of an 
event and its possible impact (Bertsch 2008; ICDRM/GWU 2010; 
Comes 2011). Basically two stereotypical categories of risks can be 
distinguished: high probability low impact risks and low probability 
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high impact risks. Disasters refer to the latter category which might 
affect entities in major ways (Chopra & Sodhi 2004; Kleindorfer & Saad 
2005; Oke & Gopalakrishnan 2009). However, risk management mainly 
focusses on the development of preventive plans to protect against 
high probability low impact risks as these are the ones which recur 
(e.g. demand variabilities) (Chopra & Sodhi 2004).  
The reason for this asymmetry in treatments of risk lies in the charac-
teristics of disasters. While high probability low impact risks are pre-
dictable to a certain degree, disasters might be unpredictable and un-
controllable (Charles et al. 2010; Johnson 2013). According to Sowinski 
(2003), the challenge of managing disasters is that one does not know 
when and where they will occur and who will be affected. This lack of 
knowledge also refers to the estimation of their caused consequences 
(e.g. extent of damage). Taleb et al. (2009) underline the mistake of 
executives of risk management to think that low probability high im-
pact risks can be managed by predicting them. This is not possible as a 
practically unlimited number of possible specifications of disasters 
exist (e.g. types and characteristics of the event, caused consequences). 
Hence, standard instruments/tools of risk management (e.g. statistical 
analyses) to forecast the occurrence of specific P-SC disturbances are 
futile if they continue to try to predict something that cannot be pre-
dicted (Taleb et al. 2009). 
However, also reactively estimating the consequences of a disaster to 
manage a P-SC disturbance is challenging. This is because the post-
disaster situation cannot typically be analyzed in a deterministic man-
ner. Limited information and, thus, knowledge about consequences 
and causes, as well as continuous changes of the situation might hinder 
the development of reactive plans by crisis management. The rise of 
modern information and communication technology (ICT) systems has 
led to a high availability of information which stems from various 
sources and can provide helpful guidance in decision situations (Turoff 
et al. 2009; Yates & Paquette 2011). However, the information availa-
ble is very heterogeneous in terms of format, quality, and uncertainty, 
or may even be completely lacking (Wybo & Lonka 2003; Comes et al. 
2011). Additionally, the disaster itself as well as the information about 
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it may evolve dynamically. Decision-makers are under pressure to 
make their decision quickly, which may cause cognitive overload to 
occur and biases to be reinforced (Maule et al. 2000; Ariely & Zakay 
2001; Comes et al. 2012). Despite these challenges, decision-makers of 
crisis management must respond quickly in the immediate aftermath 
of an occurring disaster (which is denoted disaster response) while 
acknowledging that their current decision will impact future decisions.  
Reactive crisis management must process a range of logistical decision 
problems to maintain the provision of public safety critical supplies in 
the case of a disaster-caused P-SC disturbance. The characteristic of an 
arising logistical decision problem required depends on the extent of 
the disturbance. Basically two stereotypical severity levels can be dis-
tinguished in this regard: a destruction or disruption of a disturbed P-
SC. An example of a disaster-caused P-SC destruction could be ob-
served in the aftermath of the earthquake in Nepal in 2015. According 
to the United Nations, food shortages were faced by 1.5 million people 
(The Independent 2015). The United Nations World Food Programme 
intervened to deliver foodstuff to Nepal including areas that were 
hardest to reach. To compensate the destructed P-SC network, one 
logistical decision problem that occurred referred to the establishment 
of field logistics hubs (World Food Programme 2015). In turn, a disas-
ter-caused P-SC disruption was faced by New York City, USA, in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Food retail companies were 
forced to close several flooded stores (e.g. in Brooklyn) or to manage 
physical challenges occurring within the stores. In lower Manhattan, 
food retail companies had to deal with the logistical decision problem 
of distributing foodstuff to the stores under the restriction of several 
closed bridges and tunnels. This caused delays of countless deliveries 
of foodstuff (The Atlantic Citylab 2013). 
1.2 Objectives and structure 
The main objective of this research contribution is to develop a post-
disaster decision support system (DSS) that provides aid for decision-
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makers of reactive crisis management to solve logistical decision prob-
lems in order to manage P-SC disturbances (disruptions and destruc-
tions). In literature, DSSs are described as software-based tools assist-
ing the decision-making process (Pearson & Shim 1995; Mattiussi 
2012). The usage of such a DSS requires efforts of preventive risk man-
agement. Rather than predicting disasters to proactively reduce disas-
ter risks, one major objective of preventive risk management must be 
the implementation/customization of a DSS to a specific decision situa-
tion that is able to estimate and manage consequences of the disaster 
ex post. This can be understood as an innovative measure of disaster 
risk reduction. In fact, the threat of mismanaging consequences in dis-
aster response is mitigated as a tool is available that aids decision-
makers reactively. To achieve the main objective, varying require-
ments must be fulfilled from the (methodological) decision theoretic 
perspective and the (conceptual) perspective of managing P-SC dis-
turbances. 
In the extreme, a decision situation in the aftermath of a disaster 
equals, from a decision theoretic perspective, a decision situation un-
der ignorance and complexity. A state of ignorance is triggered by fun-
damental uncertainty due to limited information about the current 
decision situation. Complexity refers, in the context of disasters, mainly 
to dynamic developments affecting the decision situation (e.g. second-
ary disasters occurring over time). Under these conditions, uncertainty 
cannot be appropriately handled by sound statistical analyses alone 
(e.g. based on historical data from past disasters). Innovative ap-
proaches are therefore needed to aid decision-makers in handling ig-
norance and complexity arising in a disaster-caused decision situation.  
The requirement of decision-making in general is that a made decision 
must lead to an appropriate result under the varying circumstances 
which might confront the decision situation. This ability is addressed 
by the concept of robustness. Basically, the concept has been linked to 
different fields of research such as robust optimization as a domain of 
operations research (OR) (e.g. Kouvelis & Yu 1997; Ben-Tal et al. 2009; 
Schöbel 2011) or supply chain management (SCM) (e.g. Snyder 2003; 
Wallace & Choi 2011; Vlajic et al. 2012). To guarantee an optimal pro-
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vision of public safety critical supplies for the population in the case of 
a P-SC disturbance, the robustness of a decision recommendation as 
the output of a DSS is an important requirement in particular. This is 
because the current state of the disaster-affected environment might 
not be known or even in a constant flux due to the ignorance and com-
plexity which arises.  
The DSS should address two groups of relevant decision-makers. In-
ternal decision-makers refer to the entities (e.g. companies) of the dis-
turbed P-SC itself. Their crisis management must be able to strengthen 
or restore their own affected business processes to manage the P-SC 
disturbance. With respect to the example stated above, food retail 
companies have managed the distribution of foodstuff to their stores in 
New York City in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012. External 
decision-makers are located outside the disturbed P-SC. They might be 
entities (e.g. companies) of further P-SCs or of SCs of other branches, or 
(independent) public authorities which intervene when a P-SC dis-
turbance cannot be handled by the internal decision-makers. For ex-
ample, the United Nations World Food Programme provided Nepal’s 
earthquake-affected population with foodstuff in 2015 (humanitarian 
aid). As varying logistical decision problems might arise and must be 
processed by reactive crisis management, it is important that the DSS 
is generic and adaptive in nature and to be useable by both groups of 
decision-makers in different decision situations (e.g. arising in a specif-
ic country) and logistical decision problems (e.g. resource allocation 
planning). The implementation/customization of the DSS to a decision 
situation must be the task of preventive risk management.  
To fulfill these requirements, the decision support system ReDRiSS 
(Reactive Disaster and supply chain Risk decision Support System) is 
developed. The remainder of this research contribution is organized 
into eight chapters. Chapter 2 and chapter 3 provide the methodologi-
cal and conceptual background by presenting theory and models that 
are relevant to operating in the interface of decision-making under 
uncertainty and complexity and reactive crisis management of disas-
ter-caused P-SC disturbances. ReDRiSS is developed in chapter 4. To 
verify its applicability, two case studies are presented in chapter 5 and 
1.2 Objectives and structure 
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chapter 6 that differ in the type of the P-SC disturbance (destruction 
and disruption) and the responsible decision-makers (external and 
internal decision-makers). Findings are concluded in chapter 7. The 
structure of the research contribution is highlighted in Figure 1-1; the 
rationale of each chapter is briefly outlined in the following para-
graphs. 
 
Figure 1-1: Structure 
Chapter 2 provides the methodological background of the research by 
discussing uncertainty (risk and ignorance) and complexity from a 
decision theoretic perspective. Section 2.1 presents definitions and 
classifications of uncertainty in general as well as the theoretic deci-
sion-making process under uncertainty. One way to handle (non-
quantifiable) uncertainty is provided through scenario techniques. The 
application of scenario-based approaches is highlighted from two per-
spectives: decision theory and mathematical programming. Section 2.2 
Theory and models
Methodological background: decision theoretic considerations 
of uncertainty and complexity (chapter 2)
Conceptual background: decision support for 
supply chain crisis management in disaster situations (chapter 3)
Methodology development
Development of the decision support system ReDRiSS to manage 
disaster-caused P-SC disturbances (chapter 4)
Case studies
Humanitarian logistics of non-governmental organizations in the 
aftermath of an earthquake in Haiti (chapter 5)
Business continuity management of a food retail company in the city of 
Berlin, Germany, to prevent food supply disruptions (chapter 6)
Interpretation
Conclusions and outlook (chapter 7)
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focusses on decision situations under complexity. After providing defi-
nitions in this regard, the respective decision-making process is out-
lined. To assist decision-makers, DSSs have become an important field 
of research. Section 2.3 therefore highlights the general objectives and 
rationale of DSSs. 
The objective of chapter 3 is to provide the conceptual background of 
this research. In section 3.1, definitions and terminologies of logis-
tics/SCM and disaster theory are given. Section 3.2 discusses the role 
of SCM in a disaster situation. Thereby, possibilities to manage disas-
ter-caused SC disturbances are discussed as well as the relevance of 
different SC strategies to hedge against such disturbances. Decision-
makers of reactive SC crisis management must make decisions to miti-
gate consequences of a disturbance. Section 3.3 discusses the scope of 
decision-making in this regard and the relevance of uncertainty and 
complexity in the aftermath of a disaster. Research articles dealing 
with methods of operations research (OR) and management sciences 
(MS) to support decision-making in a disaster situation in general and 
in SCM in particular are finally reviewed. Based on the findings, re-
search objectives are revealed in section 3.4. 
Chapter 4 presents ReDRiSS which is developed to reactively manage a 
disaster-caused P-SC disturbance. Therefore, the scope of ReDRiSS is 
outlined in section 4.1 from the perspective of preventive SC risk man-
agement and reactive SC crisis management. With respect to the in-
sights of chapter 2 and 3, the requirements that must be met by  
ReDRiSS are listed. In section 4.2, the parts and processing steps that 
specify ReDRiSS are summarized. ReDRiSS consists of four parts whose 
rationales and mathematical descriptions are presented in-depth in the 
forthcoming sections: implementation and application of a two-stage 
scenario technique (section 4.3), stress test (section 4.4), and robust-
ness measurement (section 4.5). Chapter 4 closes with a summary and 
discussion in section 4.6. 
Chapter 5 applies ReDRiSS in a case study that focusses on humanitari-
an logistics in Haiti. The case study considers destructions of P-SCs of 
the CI sector “health care” that are caused by an earthquake. To com-
1.2 Objectives and structure 
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pensate these destructions, humanitarian relief SCs must be estab-
lished. This is the task of an association of different non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) (external decision-maker). The logistical deci-
sion problem of facility location planning arises in terms of opening 
health care facilities in Haiti that are needed to store medicine or med-
ical equipment. Section 5.1 introduces the field of humanitarian logis-
tics and outlines the relevance of facility location planning. In section 
5.2, the implementation of ReDRiSS according to the decision situation 
is discussed. ReDRiSS is applied in section 5.3 and the results are pre-
sented and interpreted in section 5.4. Chapter 5 closes with a summary 
and discussion of the findings in section 5.5.  
Chapter 6 presents a case study where ReDRiSS is used by a company 
as a reactive measure of business continuity management (BCM) to 
manage its disrupted critical business processes. The case study focus-
ses on disruptions of food P-SCs in Berlin, Germany. In fact, a food re-
tail company (internal decision-maker) is considered whose critical 
business processes refer to the smooth operation of its stores. A flu 
pandemic that spreads in the middle-eastern part of Europe causes a 
large-scale staff absence which forces the food retail company to close 
several stores. The logistical decision problem arises of allocating the 
available staff members to the stores. Thereby, decision-making is con-
fronted with an unknown and fluctuating purchasing behavior of dis-
eased customers. Section 6.1 introduces the field of BCM and the rele-
vance of ReDRiSS in this regard. ReDRiSS is adapted to the depicted 
decision situation in section 6.2. Its application is outlined in section 
6.3 and the results are presented in section 6.4. In section 6.5, the find-
ings of the case study are summarized and discussed.  
Chapter 7 synthesizes the main aspects of the developed decision sup-
port methodology and reveals the major contributions of the research. 
Section 7.1 includes a critical appraisal regarding the achievement of 
the pursued research objectives (see section 3.4). The cases of applica-
tion of ReDRiSS and the requirements that must be thereby fulfilled are 
discussed in section 7.2. Chapter 7 closes with a presentation of the 
possible fields of future research in section 7.3.  
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Chapter 8 summarizes the most important findings of the research.  
The eight chapters are complemented by two appendences. Appendix 
A and appendix B provide input and result data sets of the case studies 
in chapter 5 and chapter 6. 
Parts of this research have been published using contributions of the 
author: (Comes, Schätter, Schultmann 2013; Schätter, Schultmann, 
Comes 2013; Schätter, Meng, Wiens, Schultmann 2014; Comes, Schät-
ter, Schultmann 2014; Schätter, Wiens, Schultmann 2015; Schätter, 
Hansen, Herrmannsdörfer, Wiens, Schultmann 2015). They are not 
explicitly referenced in the following.  
  
2 Decision theoretic considerations of 
uncertainty and complexity 
The objective of the following chapter is to provide the methodological 
background of this research. Therefore, the terms uncertainty and 
complexity are discussed from a decision theoretic perspective. The 
Oxford dictionary defines uncertainty as “the state of being uncertain” 
where uncertain stands for “not able to be relied on; not known or 
definite” (Stevenson 2010; Liberatore et al. 2013). In a decision situa-
tion, uncertainty is related to unknowingness about its characteristics 
in terms of the state of the underlying decision environment3. A state of 
knowledge and, thus, certainty is achievable when relevant infor-
mation describing these characteristics becomes available. Conse-
quently, uncertainty is related to a lack of knowledge that is caused by 
a lack of information. Complexity is an interrelated concept to uncer-
tainty that may characterize a decision situation or, more generally, a 
system under consideration. A complex system is associated with an 
uncertain future and the difficulty of predicting the properties of the 
system (Flach 2012; Hollnagel 2012). The forthcoming sections discuss 
the fields of decision-making under uncertainty (section 2.1) and com-
plexity (section 2.2) by providing definitions, classifications, and con-
cepts of their management. Moreover, the field of decision support sys-
tems (DSS), which aim at assisting decision-makers in handling uncer-
tainty and complexity, is introduced (section 2.3). 
2.1 Decision situations under uncertainty 
This section considers decision situations under uncertainty. At first, 
definitions and classifications are provided. Secondly, the decision-
making process under uncertainty is highlighted. A common measure 
                                               
3 The decision environment includes all relevant elements of an environment that might 
influence the decision-making. 
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to operationalize the decision-making process in a decision situation 
under uncertainty is to apply scenario-based approaches. Finally, these 
approaches are discussed from two methodological perspectives: deci-
sion theory and mathematical programming. 
2.1.1 Definitions and classifications 
The state of a decision situation depends on the availability of infor-
mation that can be either deterministic or subject to uncertainty 
(Bertsch 2008). In fact, decision situations might arise under certainty, 
risk, or ignorance (Knight 1921; Rosenhead et al. 1972; Luce & Raiffa 
1989; Kouvelis & Yu 1997; Snyder 2003; Comes 2011). While the first 
assumes that all relevant aspects of the decision situation are known, 
the latter two imply that several aspects are affected by uncertainty. To 
understand the difference of the two possible specifications of uncer-
tainty – risk and ignorance – let 𝑎1, 𝑎2 ∈ 𝐴 be two alternatives (decision 
options) of a set of alternatives 𝐴 that may be used to handle a decision 
situation. The decision is made under (Luce & Raiffa 1989): 
- certainty, when 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 invariably lead to the deterministic 
outcomes 𝑥(𝑎1) and 𝑦(𝑎2). 
- risk, when 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 lead to a set of probabilistic outcomes 𝑋(𝑎1) 
and 𝑌(𝑎2). Each outcome 𝑥(𝑎1) ∈ 𝑋(𝑎1) occurs with a known 
probability 𝑝(𝑥(𝑎1)) ∈ [0,1] and each outcome 𝑦(𝑎2) ∈ 𝑌(𝑎2) 
occurs with a known probability 𝑝(𝑦(𝑎2)) ∈ [0,1] where 
∑𝑝(𝑋(𝑎1)) = ∑𝑝(𝑌(𝑎2)) = 1. 
- ignorance, when 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 lead to a set of indeterministic out-
comes 𝑋(𝑎1) and 𝑌(𝑎2) in the sense that the probability of each 
𝑥(𝑎1) ∈ 𝑋(𝑎1) and 𝑦(𝑎2) ∈ 𝑌(𝑎2) is unknown.  
A decision situation under certainty is characterized by available and 
complete information that covers all relevant aspects of the decision 
situation in a deterministic manner (Scholl 2001). The outcome of each 
alternative is known (Rommelfanger & Eickemeier 2002). An (uncer-
tain) decision situation under risk is characterized by information that 
is principally complete because there is a probability distribution per 
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possible outcome at the decision-makers’ disposal (Zimmermann 
2000). This information is, however, not sufficient to characterize the 
decision situation deterministically. As outcomes depend on random 
influences (Wiens 2013), decision-makers must manage a “qualitative” 
lack of information in a decision situation under risk (Zimmermann 
2000). In an (uncertain) decision situation under ignorance, probabil-
ity distributions cannot be used (Wiens 2013) as just the set of possi-
ble outcomes of alternatives is known (Rommelfanger & Eickemeier 
2002). Decision-makers are confronted with a “quantitative” lack of 
information in this case (Zimmermann 2000). 
The term uncertainty has been widely discussed in literature which is 
associated with a large variety of suggested classifications (Sluijs et al. 
2005; Bertsch 2008). A classification that has been particularly refer-
enced by authors operating in the field of model-based decision-
making (where uncertainty is handled by a model) follows the so-
called “location” of uncertainty (Bertsch et al. 2007; Bertsch 2008; 
Comes 2011). This classification outlines the sources/types of uncer-
tainty that are relevant in the context of scientific analyses. In fact, it is 
distinguished between uncertainty of the decision-makers (preferen-
tial uncertainty) and uncertainty that arises in the process of methodo-
logical knowledge production (data uncertainty, model uncertainty).  
- Preferential uncertainty refers to indefinite preferences of the 
decision-makers (e.g. regarding objectives) (Bertsch et al. 2007; 
Bertsch 2008; Comes 2011). It occurs because preference-
related information is insufficient, unknown, or simply not com-
municated by the decision-makers. Triggers of preferential un-
certainty might be, inter alia, subjective judgment, disagreement 
between decision-makers, and linguistic impression (Morgan & 
Henrion 2007). In model-based decision-making, it is suggested 
to treat preferential uncertainty parametrically by repeating the 
analysis (of the model) for different values of the uncertain pref-
erential parameters (e.g. Monte Carlo methods, sensitivity anal-
yses) (Bertsch 2008).  
- Model uncertainty is a feature of the model itself and affects the 
translation of input information into results (Draper 1995; 
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Comes 2011). It comprises the two sub-types model structure un-
certainty and model technical uncertainty. The first is about mod-
el abstractions, formulations, and constraints and concerns all 
elements that are required to formulize the model. The latter re-
fers to operational uncertainty when computing the model. It 
impacts, for example, values of the model’s parameters or gener-
ated results of decision variables (French 1995; Walker et al. 
2003; Morgan & Henrion 2007; Comes 2011). As they are inher-
ently embedded within any model that simplifies the reality, no 
standard approaches exist for the management of model uncer-
tainty (Bertsch 2008). 
- Data uncertainty (or uncertainty of the decision-analytic model 
input) affects information that describes the considered decision 
situation and the variables that drive changes within this situa-
tion (Walker et al. 2003; Comes 2011). According to Zimmer-
mann (2000), sources of data uncertainty refer to a lack of in-
formation, abundance of information, conflicting evidence, ambi-
guity, measurement, and belief. In general, information that is 
affected by data uncertainty is not appropriate to describe, pre-
scribe, or predict the system, its behavior and further character-
istics in a deterministic manner (Zimmermann 2000). An in-
depth classification of data uncertainty is to distinguish between 
foreseen uncertainty and unforeseen uncertainty (De Meyer et al., 
2002). While the first is principally identifiable and manageable 
by sufficient analyses, the challenge of handling the latter is that 
one is not even aware of its existence. Unforeseen uncertainty 
arises due to interaction of elements of the decision situation 
that are not anticipatable although each single element might be 
basically foreseeable (De Meyer et al., 2002). Methods to treat 
data uncertainty are outlined in the forthcoming sections.  
Another possibility to classify uncertainty is to focus on the “nature” of 
uncertainty (Walker et al. 2003). This classification has been especially 
used by authors operating in the field of risk analysis (Bedford & Cooke 
2001; Paté-Cornell 2002; Bertsch 2008; Merz 2011; Senge et al. 2014).  
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- Aleatory uncertainty refers to inherent variations of the decision 
situation which affect, inter alia, external input data, parameters, 
or model structures (Walker et al. 2003). Exemplary sources 
causing aleatory uncertainty are the randomness of nature, spe-
cific types of human behavior, social, economic, and cultural dy-
namics, and technical surprise (Walker et al. 2003). Neither re-
search nor development can provide sufficient knowledge to re-
duce aleatory uncertainty (Hora 1996; Walker et al. 2003; 
Bertsch 2008; Senge et al. 2014).  
- Epistemic uncertainty is associated with unknowingness about 
the decision situation which arises because of limited or inaccu-
rate information, measurement errors, imperfect models, and 
subjective judgements (Walker et al. 2003). It is described as a 
systematic type of uncertainty that can be eliminated by suffi-
cient study (Hora 1996; Walker et al. 2003; Senge et al. 2014). 
Hence, epistemic uncertainty indicates how much could be prin-
cipally controlled if required (Bedford & Cooke 2001; Comes 
2011). 
2.1.2 The decision-making process under uncertainty 
Decision-making always implies that decision-makers deliberately 
select an alternative that fits to their objectives and take this alterna-
tive as decision (Rommelfanger & Eickemeier 2002). The rationale of 
making such a selection is denoted the decision-making process. Differ-
ent concepts have been proposed in literature to operationalize the 
decision-making process. One concept that has been particularly refer-
enced by authors operating in the field of DSSs is the intelligence-
design-choice (IDC) model of Simon (1977) (see Figure 2-1) (Hall 2008; 
Pick 2008; Mattiussi 2012; Mattiussi et al. 2014). 
 
Figure 2-1: Simon's IDC model (adapted from Simon 1977; Hall 2008) 
Intelligence Phase
Problem Classification
Problem Definition
Design Phase
Alternative Generation
Alternative Evaluation
Choice Phase
Alternative Negotiation
Alternative Selection
Alternative Determination
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The IDC model describes the decision-making process consisting of 
three phases that are cyclically-ordered: intelligence, design, and 
choice (Mattiussi 2012). In the following these phases are briefly 
summarized based on the considerations of Hall (2008). 
- The intelligence phase firstly identifies, defines, and classifies a 
decision problem which principally arises when a deviation of a 
desired state and a current state is observed in the considered 
system. It is imaginable that the decision problem is either of a 
unique manner, similar to other known problems, or routine. 
The second task of the intelligence phase is to gather appropri-
ate, timely, and relevant information that is required for anal-
yses. 
- The design phase concentrates on the generation and evaluation 
of alternatives. Any alternative should be respected that is able 
to solve the decision problem. Thus, decision-makers obtain a 
breadth of alternatives which they can choose from. The evalua-
tion of alternatives requires that decision-makers separate what 
must necessarily be achieved from what can potentially be 
achieved.  
- The choice phase steers the process of negotiating alternatives 
and selecting one alternative that should be implemented as de-
cision. Therefore, it is important to carefully compare, analyze, 
and contrast evaluated alternatives by respecting the prefer-
ences of the decision-makers. 
The application of the decision-making process is challenging when the 
decision situation is affected by uncertainty. As highlighted by Kouvelis 
& Yu (1997), decision-making under uncertainty requests for the ac-
ceptance of uncertainty, strong efforts to structure and to understand 
uncertainty, and the integration of uncertainty into the decision-
making reasoning. With respect to the IDC model and the classification 
of uncertainty by its “location” (see section 2.1.1), uncertainty might 
affect any phase. In the intelligence phase, data uncertainty (e.g. caused 
by a lack of information) might be particularly crucial when the deci-
sion problem is unique. In this case, decision-makers are unable to 
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draw on past relevant experiences (Hall 2008). Data uncertainty might 
additionally affect the design phase when generating and evaluating 
alternatives under an uncertain state of the underlying decision envi-
ronment. Decision-makers are forced to evaluate alternatives rather by 
their instinct than through a sound analysis (Hall 2008). The choice 
phase might be complicated by preferential uncertainty in terms of, for 
example, unclear preferences of objectives of the decision-makers. All 
phases might be additionally affected by model uncertainty. 
As outlined in the previous section, preferential uncertainty is typically 
handled parametrically whereas model uncertainty should be accepted 
as being inherently embedded within each model simplifying the reali-
ty (Bertsch 2008). In turn, widespread measures to handle data uncer-
tainty have been proposed in literature which refer to approaches of 
probability theory, fuzzy-based approaches, and scenario-based ap-
proaches (Comes 2011). Their applicability depends on whether the 
(uncertain) decision situation is affected by risk or by ignorance. 
- Approaches of probability theory quantify data uncertainty by a 
probability measure 𝑃 ∈ [0,1] in a decision situation under risk. 
Basically two approaches can be distinguished in probability 
theory. According to the frequentist approach, 𝑃 is objective and 
refers to the long-term frequency of occurrence to which an un-
certain element of the decision situation is characterized by a 
specific feature when the process is repeated for an infinite 
number of times. In the Bayesian approach, 𝑃 is subjective and 
specified according to one’s current information and, thus, 
knowledge (Walley & Fine 1982; French 1986; Fienberg 2006; 
Morgan & Henrion 2007; French et al. 2009). 
- Fuzzy-based approaches quantify data uncertainty in a decision 
situation under risk where distributional information is impre-
cise. In fact, fuzzy sets allow the modelling of vague information, 
e.g. to quantify expressions such as “strongly influencing” or 
“much larger than” (Comes 2011). Major drawback of fuzzy-
based approaches is that decision-makers are forced to make 
multiple assumptions on probabilities which often exceed their 
capabilities (Zadeh 1975; Lempert et al. 2002; Comes 2011).  
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- Scenario-based approaches allow the handling of data uncertain-
ty that is not necessarily quantifiable. Therefore, they have prov-
en to be an appropriate measure in a decision situation under ig-
norance4 (Bunn & Salo 1993; Comes 2011). The DSS which is de-
veloped in the course of this research contribution (see chapter 
4) uses scenarios for data uncertainty handling. Therefore, sce-
nario-based approaches are highlighted in-depth in the next sec-
tion. 
2.1.3 Scenario-based approaches to handle data uncertainty 
Scenarios offer the possibility to explore plausible descriptions of a 
decision situation and its possible developments (Schoemaker 1993; 
Walker et al. 2003; Comes 2011). They help to overcome cognitive 
biases such as overconfidence or misjudgments of probabilities when 
applying approaches of probability theory or fuzzy-based approaches 
(Goodwin & Wright 2009; Comes 2011). The set of constructed scenar-
ios should contain likely and unlikely events (Hites et al. 2006) to im-
prove prediction and understanding of causal links of the decision sit-
uation (Harries 2003; Wright & Goodwin 2009). In the forthcoming 
sections, a scenario typology and an overview of scenario construction 
techniques is provided. Moreover, scenario-based approaches that op-
erationalize the handling of data uncertainty in the decision-making 
process are outlined from two perspectives: decision theory by deci-
sion rules and mathematical programming by scenario-based optimiza-
tion models. 
2.1.3.1 Scenario typology and scenario construction techniques 
Originally, scenarios arise from the field of future studies where they 
are used to systematically explore future trends. Amara (1981) high-
lights three major assumptions that must be achieved by scenarios in 
this regard: as the future is unpredictable, one needs to ask the ques-
tion “what is possible/feasible?”; as the future is not predetermined, 
                                               
4 Scenario-based approaches can be additionally applied in a decision situation under risk 
where distributional information is available. 
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one needs to ask the question “what is probable?”; as choices have an 
impact on the future, one needs to ask the question “what is desira-
ble?”. Börjeson et al. (2006) transfer these assumptions of future stud-
ies into a generic scenario typology that has been referenced by vari-
ous authors dealing with decision-making (e.g. Höjer et al. 2008; 
Nowack et al. 2011; De Smedt et al. 2013). In fact, authors distinguish 
between predictive scenarios, explorative scenarios, and normative 
scenarios. 
- Predictive scenarios describe most probable events within the de-
cision situation that are expected by the scenario designers (Bör-
jeson et al. 2006). They comprise the sub-types forecast scenarios 
and what-if scenarios (Börjeson et al. 2006). The first anticipates 
what will happen if the most likely event within the decision sit-
uation unfolds; the latter explores impacts of probable near-
future events (Makridakis et al. 1997; Börjeson et al. 2006; Höjer 
et al. 2008).  
- Explorative scenarios capture a widespread range of possible 
events within the decision situation (Börjeson et al., 2006). They 
comprise the sub-types external scenarios and strategic scenarios. 
The first focus on external factors that are beyond the control of 
the scenario designers; the latter describe consequences of a 
possible decision when events unfold in the decision situation 
(Börjeson et al. 2006).  
- Normative scenarios include preferable events within the deci-
sion situation (Börjeson et al. 2006). They comprise the sub-
types preserving scenarios and transforming scenarios. The first 
cover an efficient achievement of a specific objective; the latter 
focus on an objective in the future which is unreachable if the 
ongoing event continues (Höjer 2000). By backtracking from the 
respective objective, constructed scenarios reveal necessary 
changes to achieve this objective (Börjeson et al. 2006).  
Table 2-1 summarizes the scenario typology of Börjeson et al. (2006) 
including all sub-types and key questions that must be answered dur-
ing their construction.  
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Table 2-1: Scenario typology (Börjeson et al. 2006) 
Type of scenario Key question 
Predictive scenarios What will happen? 
- Forecast scenarios 
What will happen, on the condition that the likely 
development unfolds? 
- What-if-scenarios 
What will happen, on the condition of some specified 
events? 
Explorative scenarios What can happen? 
- External scenarios 
What can happen to the development of external 
factors? 
- Strategic scenarios What can happen if we act in a certain way? 
Normative scenarios How can a specific target be reached? 
- Preserving scenarios 
How can the target be reached, by adjustments to 
current situation? 
- Transforming scenarios 
How can the target be reached, when the prevailing 
structure blocks necessary changes? 
Although there is no consensus on how to define and classify scenario 
construction techniques (Börjeson et al., 2006), scenarios have become 
an important measure in decision-analytic settings. When used to han-
dle data uncertainty in a decision situation, the quality of constructed 
scenarios may influence the quality of a recommended decision. Hence, 
there is a need for an appropriate scenario construction process 
(Stewart et al., 2013).  
A large variety of terms regarding scenario construction techniques 
exist, e.g. scenario thinking, scenario planning, scenario generation, or 
scenario analysis (Bradfield et al. 2005). Many techniques develop 
scenarios in a descriptive story-like form. Wright & Goodwin (2009) 
apply scenarios to develop a range of plausible futures as pen-pictures 
by focusing on key data uncertainty and certainty. Comes et al. (2012) 
use story-like scenarios to follow up data uncertainty and to achieve a 
deeper understanding of relevant interdependencies of a certain deci-
sion problem. Scenario construction is also possible using the Delphi 
method where experts’ opinions are integrated. The method assumes 
that judgments of a group of experts are more valid than judgments 
from individuals (Linstone & Turoff 1975). According to Bañuls & 
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Turoff (2011), key characteristics of the Delphi method are that the 
process is repetitive, maintains the participants’ anonymity, provides 
controlled feedback, and represents a group statistical response. An-
other way to construct scenarios is using scenario trees. This method is 
widely used for financial optimization in terms of discrete approxima-
tions to a continuous distribution (Geyer et al., 2013). Further “soft” 
scenario construction techniques are surveys as well as interviews and 
workshops to include different actors as scenario designers into the 
scenario construction process (e.g. decision-makers, stakeholders, and 
experts) (Börjeson et al. 2006).  
Bishop et al. (2007) offer an overview of scenario construction tech-
niques which are listed below. For in-depth information and examples 
regarding these techniques, reference is made to the contribution of 
Bishop et al. (2007) and to a summary which is provided by Comes 
(2011). 
- Judgement techniques construct scenarios in contribution with 
experts and stakeholders. 
- Baseline scenario techniques construct one scenario by extrapo-
lating analyzed prevailing trends to the future. 
- Elaborations of fixed scenarios detail and shape a set of prede-
termined basic scenarios. 
- Event sequences explore event chains with associated probabili-
ties. 
- Backcasting defines an envisioned future and investigates paths 
resulting in the desired end state. 
- Dimensions of uncertainty constructs scenarios based on most 
important sources of data uncertainty. 
- Cross impact analysis describes plausible futures combined with 
quantified probabilities. 
- Modelling techniques quantify interdependencies between most 
relevant variables which are partly used to calculate the value of 
an objective function. 
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2.1.3.2 Decision rules 
One task of the decision-making process is the evaluation of alterna-
tives that might solve the considered decision problem. The challenge 
of this evaluation is that the state of the underlying decision environ-
ment is not definite in a decision situation under uncertainty (risk, 
ignorance). When using scenarios to capture data uncertainty, the 
evaluation of alternatives requires testing their outcomes in any con-
structed scenario. Therefore, decision theory provides a variety of de-
cision rules whose applicability depends on whether the uncertain de-
cision situation arises under risk or ignorance. In a decision situation 
under risk, the occurrence probability of each scenario and, thus, of 
each outcome is assumed to be known. Probabilities are not available 
in a decision situation under ignorance where it is just ensured that 
one scenario and outcome will be realized (Rommelfanger & Eickemei-
er 2002). 
Let 𝐴 = {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑖 , … , 𝑎𝐼} be a finite set of available alternatives and 
𝑆 = {𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑗 , … , 𝑠𝐽} a finite set of constructed scenarios. The function 
𝑔: 𝐴 × 𝑆 → 𝐸 assigns an outcome 𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗) ∈ 𝐸 to each tuple 
(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗) ∈ 𝐴 × 𝑆, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽 (Scholl 2001; Rommelfanger & 
Eickemeier 2002). In the following it is exemplarily assumed that the 
objective of the decision problem is to maximize the outcome of 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 
when it is applied to a scenario 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. A decision rule follows a decision 
criterion 𝜙(𝑎𝑖) that is calculated per 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 to steer the evaluation of 
its set of outcomes {𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽}. An alternative is evaluated 
best that reaches the top (minimal or maximal) score of the set 
{𝜙(𝑎𝑖) |𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼}. 
Decision rules under risk  
In a decision situation under risk, the occurrence probability 𝑝𝑗 ∈ [0,1] 
of each scenario 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 is assumed to be available. All decision rules 
that are highlighted in the following assume that the alternative 𝑎∗ ∈ 𝐴 
is selected which reaches the maximal score regarding the calculated 
decision criterion; in fact, 𝑎∗ = (𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴:𝜙(𝑎𝑖) = max{𝜙(𝑎𝑖)|𝑖 =
1,… , 𝐼}).  
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The 𝜇 criterion (see [2-1]) prescribes the calculation of the expected 
value of a set of outcomes {𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽} per 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴. An alterna-
tive is evaluated best when it achieves the highest expected value. 
 
𝜙(𝑎𝑖) = 𝜇(𝑎𝑖) =∑𝑝𝑗 ∙ 𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
) [2-1] 
The decision rule assumes that outlier outcomes are compensated by 
the expected value due to the law of the large numbers. This, however, 
requires the availability of a necessarily large set of scenarios. In this 
regard, a major point of criticism is that it cannot be excluded that an 
alternative that achieves a high expected value leads to a worse result 
in hindsight than an alternative that is specified by a low expected val-
ue (Pfohl & Braun 1986; Scholl 2001).  
To eradicate this drawback, various advanced decision rules have been 
suggested that respect the specific characteristics of the underlying 
distributional information (regarding the set of outcomes). The (𝜇, 𝜎) 
criterion integrates the statistical measure of variance (see  
[2-2]) into the evaluation process; the (𝜇, 𝜌) criterion uses the semivar-
iance (see [2-3]) by explicitly considering negative and, thus, undesired 
deviations from the expected value (Schneeweiß 1966; Scholl 2001).  
 
𝜎2(𝑎𝑖) =∑𝑝𝑗 ∙
𝐽
𝑗=1
(𝜇(𝑎𝑖) − 𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗))
2
 [2-2] 
 
𝜌2(𝑎𝑖) =∑𝑝𝑗 ∙
𝐽
𝑗=1
(max{0, 𝜇(𝑎𝑖) − 𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)})
2
 [2-3] 
The formulation of the decision criterion 𝜙(𝑎𝑖) depends in this case on 
the risk preferences of the decision-makers. For example, let them 
choose between alternatives that achieve the same expected values. 
With respect to the (𝜇, 𝜎) criterion, risk averse (risk seeking) decision-
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makers prefer the alternative that is characterized by the lowest (high-
est) variance.  
The Hodge-Lehmann criterion (see [2-4]) assumes that probabilities 
are unreliable and decision-makers do not completely trust in distribu-
tional information. As, however, such information is still available and 
should not be neglected within the evaluation process (Rommelfanger 
& Eickemeier 2002), the Hodge-Lehmann criterion suggests a com-
promise of the 𝜇 criterion and the maximin criterion (see decision rules 
under ignorance, [2-6]). In fact, a reliability parameter 𝜆 ∈ [0,1] is in-
troduced which describes a weighting parameter. This parameter is 
under the control of the decision-makers and specifies the relative 
importance of the expected value of outcomes (𝜇 criterion) compared 
to the worst outcome that is achieved by an alternative across all sce-
narios (maximin criterion). When decision-makers trust in the reliabil-
ity of the underlying distributional information, they follow the ex-
pected value (𝜆 → 1). If they do not trust in this information, they ra-
ther base their decision on the worst outcome (𝜆 → 0) (Rommelfanger 
& Eickemeier 2002; Wiens 2013). 
 𝜙(𝑎𝑖) =  𝜆 ∙ 𝜇(𝑎𝑖) + (1 −  𝜆) ∙ min{𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽} [2-4] 
Decision rules under ignorance 
The occurrence probability 𝑝𝑗 ∈ [0,1] of a scenario 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 is assumed to 
be unavailable in a decision situation under ignorance. Varying deci-
sion rules have been suggested that are applicable when distributional 
information is lacking. The following decision rules assume the selec-
tion of the alternative 𝑎∗ ∈ 𝐴 whose score of the calculated decision 
criterion is maximal: 𝑎∗ = (𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴:𝜙(𝑎𝑖) = max{𝜙(𝑎𝑖)|𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼}). 
The Laplace criterion (see [2-5]) prescribes the calculation of the sum 
of all outcomes per alternative across all scenarios. Although the deci-
sion rule is seen as applicable in a decision situation under ignorance, 
distributional information is inherently assumed in terms of equal 
probabilities (Scholl 2001; Rommelfanger & Eickemeier 2002). 
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𝜙(𝑎𝑖) =∑𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 [2-5] 
The maximin criterion (see [2-6]) determines the worst (minimal) out-
come per alternative across all scenarios. That alternative is evaluated 
best whose worst (minimal) outcome is best (maximal) in comparison 
of all other alternatives (Scholl 2001; Rommelfanger & Eickemeier 
2002). The opposite pole of the maximin criterion is the maximax crite-
rion (see [2-7]). Here, the best (maximal) outcome is determined per 
alternative across all scenarios and decision-makers choose the alter-
native that achieves the best (maximal) of these best outcomes (Scholl 
2001; Rommelfanger & Eickemeier 2002). Decision-makers who select 
the maximin criterion behave in a rather pessimistic manner and aim 
at hedging against everything that is likely enough to happen (specified 
by the set of scenarios). In turn, decision-makers choosing the maxi-
max decision rule are characterized as optimistic.  
 𝜙(𝑎𝑖) = min{𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽} [2-6] 
 𝜙(𝑎𝑖) = max{𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽} [2-7] 
The possibility to trade-off the maximin and the maximax criteria and, 
thus, the degree of optimism and pessimism of the decision-makers’ 
behavior is provided by the Hurwicz criterion (see [2-8]). An opti-
mism/pessimism parameter 𝜆 is introduced which specifies the rela-
tive importance of the maximin criterion and the maximax criterion. In 
the two extreme cases of 𝜆 = 0 and 𝜆 = 1, the Hurwicz criterion corre-
sponds to the maximin and maximax criterion (Scholl 2001; Rom-
melfanger & Eickemeier 2002).  
 𝜙(𝑎𝑖) = (1 −  𝜆) ∙  min{𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽} + 𝜆
∙  max{𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽} [2-8] 
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An additional compromise decision rule that has been outlined above 
(see decision rules under risk), but that can also be applied in a deci-
sion situation under ignorance, is the Hodge-Lehmann criterion (see  
[2-4]). The criterion assumes equal occurrence probabilities of the 
scenarios (𝑝𝑚 = 𝑝𝑛, ∀𝑚, 𝑛 ∈ 𝐽).  
Further decision rules exist that follow the indicator of regret. The 
regret indicates the (absolute or relative) deviation of the outcome an 
alternative achieves in a scenario from the best outcome in this scenar-
io that is reached by any other alternative (Scholl 2001). The higher 
the regret, the more the outcome of an alternative deviates from the 
scenario-optimal outcome and the worse the alternative performs in 
this scenario. Both regret-based decision rules that are outlined below 
prescribe to select the alternative 𝑎∗ ∈ 𝐴 whose score regarding the 
calculated decision criterion is minimal: 
𝑎∗ = (𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴:𝜙(𝑎𝑖) = min{𝜙(𝑎𝑖)|𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼}).  
The absolute minimax-regret criterion (see [2-9]) and relative minimax-
regret criterion (see 2-10]) determine the worst (maximal) absolute or 
relative regret per alternative across all scenarios. An alternative is 
evaluated best whose worst (maximal) regret is best (minimal) across 
all alternatives (Scholl 2001; Rommelfanger & Eickemeier 2002).  
 𝜙(𝑎𝑖) = max{max{𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼} − 𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽} [2-9] 
 
𝜙(𝑎𝑖) = max {
max{𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼} − 𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)
max{𝑔(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)|𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼}
|𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽} [2-10] 
2.1.4 Scenario-based optimization models 
Decision rules are applied to evaluate a finite set of alternatives. The 
field of operations research (OR) defines alternatives by the mathemat-
ical formulation of an optimization model that is used to solve a deci-
sion problem. Alternatives refer to the decision variables included in 
such a model and differ in their specifications. Optimization models 
consist of objective functions that must be either minimized or maxim-
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ized (to solve the decision problem) and feasible solutions (alterna-
tives) which are defined by constraint functions. Feasible alternatives 
are evaluated or, more generally, the optimization model is solved by 
using an algorithm (exact algorithm, heuristic).5 Optimization models 
can be classified by distinguishing between (Neumann & Morlock 
2002; Domschke & Drexl 2007; Rader 2010): 
- Linear and nonlinear optimization models: while the first com-
prises linear objective and constraint functions, the latter as-
sumes that at least one function is nonlinear. Integer and mixed-
integer optimization models allow that all or several decision var-
iables take integer values. Binary and mixed-binary optimization 
models prescribe that all or several decision variables take bina-
ry values. 
- Single- and multi-objective optimization models: while the first in-
cludes one objective function, the latter respects multiple objec-
tive functions simultaneously.  
- Polynomial-time hard (P-hard) and non-deterministic polynomial-
time hard (NP-hard) optimization models: depending on its size, 
an optimization model might be solvable in polynomial time (P-
hard) or not (NP-hard). 
The application of an optimization model in a decision situation under 
uncertainty (risk or ignorance) requires the consideration of data un-
certainty affecting the model’s parameters (included across all objec-
tive functions and constraint functions) (Kouvelis & Yu 1997; Goerigk 
& Schöbel 2013) (see section 2.1.1). Data uncertainty handling is an 
important topic of OR literature. Even small perturbations of fixed 
parameter specifications can cause computed solutions to become 
completely meaningless from a practical viewpoint when they are tak-
en as decisions (Ben-Tal et al., 2009).  
                                               
5 For in-depth information regarding classifications of optimization models, algorithms, 
and heuristics, reference is made to Neumann & Morlock (2002) and Domschke & Drexl 
(2007).  
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The following highlights the rationale of optimization models that pro-
cess scenarios to represent data uncertainty. Such models are denoted 
scenario-based optimization models (Dembo 1991). A scenario is in this 
regard defined as a vector in ℝ𝑛 which includes one discrete specifica-
tion of the 𝑛 uncertain parameters where the 𝑖𝑡ℎ coordinate of the vec-
tor specifies the value for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ uncertain parameter (Hites et al. 
2006). The combination of one discrete specification per parameter 
describes a scenario (regardless whether this parameter is modeled 
discretely or continuously) (Snyder 2006). Each scenario is used to 
specify a deterministic sub-model (sub-formulation) of the actual op-
timization model. The challenge when solving a scenario-based optimi-
zation model is that an alternative which is feasible in one of the sub-
models (in terms of fulfilling the constraint functions) might not be 
feasible in the further sub-models. Moreover, it is not guaranteed that 
an alternative exists that is both feasible and the optimal solution in 
each sub-model (Hites et al., 2006). To solve a scenario-based optimi-
zation model, it must be distinguished whether the uncertain decision 
situation arises under risk or ignorance. Scenarios can be processed in 
a decision situation under risk by stochastic optimization models and in 
a decision situation under ignorance by robust optimization models 
(Snyder 2006). 
Stochastic optimization models 
In a decision situation under risk it is assumed that probability distri-
butions describing possible specifications of the uncertain parameters 
are known (Rosenhead et al. 1972; Kouvelis & Yu 1997; Snyder 2006). 
Scenario-based optimization models can therefore be solved in a sto-
chastic manner. To solve (scenario-based) stochastic optimization 
models, a deterministic equivalent of an optimization model is typically 
formulated. In fact, there is a distinction between deterministic equiva-
lents of the objective functions and of the constraint functions (Kall & 
Wallace 2003; Snyder 2006; King & Wallace 2013).  
Possibilities to formulate such deterministic equivalents have been 
summarized by Scholl (2001). Regarding the objective functions, the 
deterministic equivalent might be, inter alia, based on the expected 
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value, variance, or semivariance. The determination of a deterministic 
equivalent of the constraint functions is required as the intersection of 
feasible alternatives across all sub-models may be small. Different ap-
proaches have been suggested in this regard which do not necessarily 
request for a feasibility of an alternative across all sub-models. Fat 
solution models postulate that an alternative must be feasible in any 
scenario which implies the threat of an empty or small solution space 
(alternatives that are feasible in all sub-models). Chance-constraint 
models allow violations of constraint functions by pre-defining proba-
bilities to which an alternative must be feasible in each constraint func-
tion. Recourse models allow balancing out violations. For in-depth in-
formation of these possibilities, reference is made to Scholl (2001). 
After defining the deterministic equivalent of objective and constraint 
functions, the optimization model can be solved numerically. 
Following the considerations of Ben-Tal et al. (2009), three require-
ments must be fulfilled to solve scenario-based optimization models in 
a stochastic manner: 
- stochastic data must be available to specify each uncertain pa-
rameter 
- therefore, it must be possible to point out the associated proba-
bility distribution or at least a “narrow” family of distributions 
which the “true” parameter specification belongs to  
- the decision-makers must accept and, thus, trust in probabilistic 
guarantees  
Ben-Tal et al. (2009) highlight the restrictive character of these re-
quirements. Even when it is possible to achieve stochastic data, it is 
difficult to properly identify the underlying distributions as this re-
quires a rather unrealistic number of observations in many cases (Ben-
Tal et al. 2009). This is associated with the considerations of Thiele 
(2010) who claims that the accurate estimation of scenario probabili-
ties is difficult in practice. Finally, determining probability distribu-
tions is far away from a trivial exercise and distributional assumptions 
are frequently inappropriate in a system which consists of many ele-
ments (Kouvelis & Yu 1997). 
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Robust optimization models 
The concept of robustness has gained importance in the OR literature 
as a “counterpart” to optimality (Bertsimas & Sim, 2004). A robust 
solution performs sufficiently well across all scenarios instead of being 
the generic optimal solution in any scenario. Thus, the robust solution 
can to a certain degree be understood as immune to data uncertainty 
(Bertsimas & Sim, 2004). The strived degree of robustness depends on 
the risk preferences of the decision-makers. Typically, “robustness” is 
associated with the assumption of risk averse decision-makers (Goe-
rigk & Schöbel 2013). Robust optimization models have become an ap-
propriate measure in the case that no distributional information is 
available as the decision situation is affected by ignorance (Rosenhead 
et al. 1972; Kouvelis & Yu 1997; Snyder 2006).  
Following the considerations of Kouvelis & Yu (1997), the rationale of 
robust optimization can be generalized by three basic tasks. This is 
firstly the definition of scenarios representing data uncertainty, second-
ly the selection of a degree of robustness according to the risk prefer-
ences of the decision-makers, and thirdly the formulation and solution 
of the so-called robust counterpart (see also Goerigk & Schöbel 2013; 
Ben-Tal et al. 2009). Particularly the second task, the selection of the 
degree of robustness, is crucial as it determines how conservative a 
finally generated robust solution will be. The degree of conservatism 
shows how much optimality needs to be “given up” to ensure robust-
ness (Bertsimas & Sim 2004). Frequently, the maximin and minimax-
regret criteria have been used in this regard (Kouvelis & Yu 1997; 
Snyder 2006; Ben-Tal et al. 2009). For an extensive review of concepts 
that can be used to specify the degree of robustness, reference is made 
to Goerigk & Schöbel (2013).  
In the following, the rationale of robust optimization is exemplarily 
summarized when the degree of robustness follows the maximin crite-
rion which is described as strict robustness or classical robustness in 
literature (Kouvelis & Yu 1997; Ben-Tal et al. 2009; Goerigk & Schöbel 
2013). Let therefore again 𝑆 = {𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑗 , … , 𝑠𝐽} be a finite set of scenar-
ios, 𝐴 = {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑖 , … , 𝑎𝐼} be the total set of (not necessarily feasible) 
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alternatives, 𝑓 an objective function, and 𝐺 a set of constraint func-
tions. The optimization model is exemplarily given in the form of a 
maximization problem.  
1. Determine for each 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 the set of feasible alternatives 𝐵(𝑠𝑗) ⊆ 𝐴 
that fulfil the constraint functions in the sub-model regarding 𝑠𝑗: 
 𝐵(𝑠𝑗) = {∀𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴: 𝐺(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗) is fulfilled} [2-11] 
2. Determine the intersection of feasible alternatives 𝐵(𝑆) across all 
scenarios of 𝑆. 
 𝐵(𝑆) = ⋂ 𝐵(𝑠𝑗) = {𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛, … , 𝛼𝑁}
𝑗=1,…,𝐽
 [2-12] 
3. Determine the minimal (worst) objective function value in each 
scenario 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 that is achieved by any alternative 𝛼𝑛 ∈ 𝐵(𝑆) and 
denote this alternative 𝛼𝑠𝑗: 
 𝑓
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑠𝑗 = min(𝑓(𝛼𝑛, 𝑠𝑗)|𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁) [2-13] 
 𝛼𝑠𝑗 = (𝛼𝑛 ∈ 𝐵(𝑆): 𝑓(𝛼𝑛, 𝑠𝑗) = 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑠𝑗 ) [2-14] 
4. Determine the scenario 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 in which the calculated minimal 
(worst) objective function value is maximal (best) compared to all 
other scenarios. The underlying alternative is the strictly robust al-
ternative 𝛼𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 .  
 𝛼𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 = (𝛼𝑠𝑗: 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑠𝑗 = max{𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑠1 , … , 𝑓
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑠𝐽 }) [2-15] 
2.2 Decision situations under complexity 
In the previous section it was highlighted that at least one possible set 
of outcomes of an alternative is available in a decision situation under 
2.2 Decision situations under complexity 
34 
ignorance. The forthcoming sections focus on decision situations 
where this assumption is not necessarily fulfilled. This is because the 
decision situation or, more generally, the system under consideration 
is faced by complexity. In the following, complexity and complex sys-
tems are defined, properties of complex systems are presented, and 
the decision-making process under complexity is outlined. 
2.2.1 Complex systems 
The term of complexity has been defined in different fields, ranging 
from biology to philosophy and mathematics (Grisogono 2006; Grau-
win et al. 2012; Hollnagel 2012). Most authors agree in a close rela-
tionship between complexity and uncertainty. Flach (2012) states that 
a system is complex if its future is uncertain. Hollnagel (2012) associ-
ates complexity with a difficulty of predicting properties of the system.  
To define complex systems from the perspective of decision-making 
(where the decision situation equals a complex system), the Cynefin 
framework of Snowden & Boone (2007) can be used (see Figure 2-2). 
The term “Cynefin” has a Welsh origin and implies that multiple factors 
in the environment exist and people’s experiences influence them in 
ways which they cannot understand (Snowden & Boone 2007). Follow-
ing the Cynefin framework, a decision situation may refer to one of 
four types of systems “simple”, “complicated”, “complex”, and “chaotic”. 
Simple and complicated systems imply an ordered system state, com-
plex and chaotic systems imply an unordered system state. 
 
Figure 2-2: Cynefin framework (adapted from Snowden & Boone 2007) 
DISORDER
COMPLEX
(probe, sense, respond)
SIMPLE
(sense, categorize, respond)
COMPLICATED
(sense, analyze, respond)
CHAOTIC
(act, sense, respond)
UNORDERED
ORDERED
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Cause-effect relations of the system’s elements are clear and behave in 
a predictive manner in a simple system. The system offers stability for 
decision-makers because elements are described as “known knowns”. 
This implies that the best decision is self-evident or can be devised 
more or less easily. All involved decision-makers are on the same level 
of understanding. An example of a simple system is a bicycle. Processes 
that govern the system’s behavior are known and understood. It is 
possible to predict the system’s reaction to a cause such as pushing the 
pedals or moving the handlebars. Decision-making in a simple system 
must particularly “categorize” to facilitate straightforward manage-
ment and monitoring (Snowden & Boone 2007). 
It is possible to identify the best decision by analyses in a complicated 
system. This decision is, however, not directly available for the deci-
sion-makers. Although aspects of the system are knowable, as cause-
effect relations of the system’s elements are clear, not all of them are 
known yet. Decision-makers are confronted with “known unknowns”. 
An example of a complicated system is the mail delivery system. While 
the delivery points, speed of the postman and other parameters are 
known, the optimal route might not be directly obvious but requires 
further examination. Decision-making in a complicated system is de-
scribed as time-consuming as decision-makers particularly need to 
“analyze” (Snowden & Boone 2007).  
It is not possible to identify the best decision by analyses in a complex 
system. This is because it is characterized by dynamics and unpredicta-
bility. Decision-makers are not just confronted with “known un-
knowns” but with “unknown unknowns”. Elements of the system are 
not just misunderstood; it is even difficult to be aware of their exist-
ence at all as events become clear in retrospect. The elements of a 
complex system may, especially over time, constrain each other. This 
causes difficulties in predicting or forecasting what is currently hap-
pening or what will happen in future. An example of a complex system 
is a supply chain network. Various software systems are applied by 
suppliers, carriers, distributors, second carriers, and customers to or-
ganize information flows (Ireland et al., 2014). To optimize the SC net-
work, relevant information occurring at different stages of the SC must 
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be shared by the supply chain partners. Because of the various soft-
ware systems, this is, however, a difficult venture. As additionally 
manual processes are required to transfer information, the manage-
ment of the network of supply chain partners (to optimize the whole 
supply chain) is prone to uncertain or lacking information. The net-
work can be therefore understood as a complex system (Ireland et al., 
2014). Decision-making in a complex system must primarily “probe” in 
the system to carefully observe its response to possible actions. Subse-
quently, actions can be adapted to attain a satisfactory result (Snow-
den & Boone 2007). The decision-making process under complexity 
should be inspired by pattern-based management (Snowden & Boone 
2007) whose rationale is outlined in section 2.2.3. 
The search of the best decision is even described as pointless in a cha-
otic system. It is characterized by constant shifts and turbulences. Ele-
ments of a chaotic system do not follow any knowable rules and are 
therefore “unknowable”. The events in New York City on September 
11th 2001 illustrate a chaotic system. Because of simultaneously occur-
ring individual elements such as the attacks themselves, the behavior 
of victims and further affected people, and the behavior of individual 
rescuers, the situation was not immediately comprehensible. Decision-
making in a chaotic system requires that decision-makers directly “act” 
to firstly establish some sense of order (Snowden & Boone 2007). 
2.2.2 Properties of complex systems 
Although widespread properties of complex systems have been dis-
cussed in literature, no unique list exists (Grisogono 2006; Grauwin et 
al. 2012; Hollnagel 2012). The following provides a substantial over-
view of properties that might characterize a complex system. Proper-
ties are assigned to the categories elements and interactions, dynamic 
nature, and irreducible uncertainty. 
Elements and interactions  
According to Flach (2012), a complex system is characterized by a high 
dimensionality of its elements in terms of variables, states and behav-
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iors. It is not described as “monolithic” but comprises multiple inter-
acting systems. A complex system can be therefore understood as a so-
called system of systems which implies that the system’s elements are 
systems on their own which participate in the larger system (Ireland et 
al. 2014). Elements (or sub-systems) might be agents which follow 
their own intentions and possess some degree of free will (Ramalin-
gam et al. 2008). This might be a challenge for decision-making as the 
decision-making process of agents is often a complex system itself. 
Complex systems are typically described as open systems. As opposed 
to closed systems, there is no impermeable or sharp boundary be-
tween the systems’ elements and their environments. Open systems 
are faced by a permeable boundary. Interconnections arise between 
elements and the environment and modifications within the environ-
ment may interact with the elements’ behaviors (Manson 2001; Gri-
sogono 2006; Flach 2012). Hence, the behavior of the complex system 
is more than just a linear aggregation of the elements’ behaviors (Gri-
sogono 2006). Non-linear interactions imply that minor changes to 
elements can produce disproportionally major consequences (Snow-
den & Boone 2007). Roughly speaking, non-linear interactions lead to a 
disproportional response of an element in comparison to the size of 
the triggers. Large triggers can have no or negligible effects whereas 
small triggers may cause severe effects on the elements. Because of the 
interconnectedness of elements, non-linear behavior on an individual 
scale can translate to non-linear behavior on a system-wide scale.  
In this regard, complex systems may be characterized by critical states. 
Under normal circumstances, a system is more or less stable to dis-
turbances and either responds in a linear fashion or even compensates 
the disturbance and returns to a stable state (Helbing & Lämmer 
2008). In the case that the system is at a critical state, a minor disturb-
ance can be enough to set a process in motion that will move it to a 
different state. This is expressed by the term phase transition which 
can leads to failure cascades (Helbing & Lämmer 2008). A phase transi-
tion is the non-linear behavior on the system scale exactly at the criti-
cal state where the system responds to a tiny disturbance with a very 
large phase transition (Helbing & Lämmer 2008). 
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Dynamic nature 
A complex system is described as in a constant flux where it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to gain an accurate picture of the system’s state at 
one distinct point of time (Flach 2012). Dynamic changes cause the 
system’s state to be greater than the sum of its elements and solutions 
cannot be imposed but rather arise from the circumstances (Snowden 
& Boone 2007). Moreover, although each system possesses a “history” 
which is coherent in retrospect, hindsight does not necessarily lead to 
foresight in a complex system. This is because conditions constantly 
change and equal initial conditions will not necessarily result in equal 
end states (Snowden & Boone 2007). A complex system will rarely 
return to the exact state again and history will not repeat itself exactly 
in the same way.  
With respect to the dynamic nature of a complex system, the collective 
property of elements in terms of emergence has been mentioned by 
various authors (Mikulecky 2001; Grisogono 2006; Urry 2006; Snow-
den & Boone 2007; Grauwin et al. 2012). There is some disagreement 
in literature about the exact meaning of this property. Basically, two 
definitions can be distinguished. Firstly, emergence may refer to the 
appearance of phenomena that arise from an interaction of individual 
elements. These phenomena are not apparent when studying a single 
element but only emerge when one studies the system as a whole (e.g. 
movements of swarms of fish) (Grisogono 2006). Secondly, emergence 
is the discovery, appearance, or occurrence of previously unknown 
properties, patterns or events over time (so-called dynamic emergence) 
(Mikulecky 2001; Grisogono 2006; Cavallo 2010). In this regard, a spe-
cific property of emergence is the so-called self-organized criticality 
(e.g. Bak et al. 1987; Bak 1990). This property implies that a system 
naturally moves towards critical states or tipping points without any 
special interference. Such a movement is repeated sequentially and the 
system thus moves sooner or later towards another unstable state. 
Over the course of time, self-organized criticality has been proposed to 
be present in a wide range of systems that have been denoted “com-
plex” such as, inter alia, in earthquakes or turbulences in liquids (Bak 
1990).  
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Irreducible uncertainty 
It is difficult to draw a perfect picture of the complex system’s current 
state. As a result of the previously presented properties, a real-world 
complex system is typically subject to irreducible uncertainty because 
of occurring unforeseeable “unknown unknowns” (Snowden & Boone 
2007). As opposed to “known unknowns” which typically characterize 
a complicated system (see section 2.2.1) and which can be handled by 
sufficient analyses, “unknown unknowns” cannot be reduced or incor-
porated into the choice of strategy (Snowden & Boone 2007). This is 
because the level of uncertainty itself is not known or it is not possible 
to be aware of its existence at all. Moreover, there remains a possible 
source for unanticipated large impact events in terms of so-called 
Black Swan events. Such events lie outside the realm of regular expec-
tation because nothing in the past can convincingly point to their pos-
sibility. Furthermore, they carry extreme impacts (Taleb 2007; John-
son 2013). In some cases, a disaster can be a Black Swan event where 
the caused situation is characterized as unpredictable and not at all 
controllable (Johnson 2013) (see chapter 3).  
With respect to irreducible uncertainty, the Butterfly Effect6 has been 
described as an additional property of complex systems. The property 
highlights the importance of past events for the system’s current and 
future states and goes back to the work of the meteorologist Edward 
Lorenz in 1963. He discovered that small variations in the initial condi-
tions of a system can create immensely different outcomes in the long 
run (Lorenz 1963). The term Butterfly Effect is a metaphor for a but-
terfly flapping its wings at one place and causing a large disturbance at 
some time in the future and in a completely different place. An example 
is a weather event that is caused in the atmosphere and that triggers a 
hurricane in the long run. Butterfly Effects are, thus, associated with 
the sensitivity to initial conditions (Schmidt 2011). 
                                               
6 This property has been also described in “chaos theory” which underlines the blurred 
boundary between complex and chaotic systems. 
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2.2.3 The decision-making process under complexity 
Grisogono (2006) outlines five restrictions that must be respected 
when making a decision in a complex system. The restrictions are 
compliant to the considerations of further authors of the field of com-
plexity science (e.g. Snowden & Boone 2007; Helbing & Lämmer 2008). 
First, complex systems are faced with networked causalities which 
lead to the unavailability of cause-effect relations. This implies that 
making a decision in a complex system might trigger varying conse-
quences (in terms of outcomes). In this regard Cavallo (2010) under-
lines the irreversibility of a complex system: an early system state can-
not return to an earlier state by retracing the processes that led to the 
current state. Second, a large number of alternatives might exist when 
making a decision. Therefore, generating one best alternative in a rea-
sonable amount of time is challenging. Third, the complex system’s 
behavior is coherent. This implies, fourth, that recurring patterns and 
trends in the complex system are not fixed. Something that worked 
yesterday may not do so tomorrow. Fifth, predictability is limited and 
it is difficult to precisely determine all consequences (in terms of out-
comes) of a given alternative (Grisogono 2006).  
According to the second and fifth restrictions, there might be the ab-
sence of an alternative that provides a “global optimum” (best state) of 
the complex system. Decision-making must rather choose between 
different alternatives leading to “local optima” (frustrated states) (Hel-
bing & Lämmer 2008). A selected alternative might not realize the best 
state but just improve the ability of dealing with the complex system. 
Hence, it is difficult to control a complex system by deciding which 
alternative is the most beneficial one. The selection of an alternative 
requires knowledge about the future state of the complex system given 
the assumption that a specific alternative was taken as action. Thus, 
decision-making is confronted with the challenge of forecasting hypo-
thetic situations. Limitations in facilitating such forecasts lead to a hin-
dered ability of making good decisions. In conclusion, decision-making 
needs to move from deterministic and reductionist approaches to 
more adaptive and holistic ways (Snowden & Boone 2007; Ramalin-
gam et al. 2008; Cavallo 2010). 
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Snowden & Boone (2007) propose a decision-making process that 
follows the rationale of pattern-based management. The term origi-
nates from information sciences where patterns are concise represen-
tations of data that are rich in semantics (Maddalena 2005). They re-
sult from the application of techniques of data reduction to produce 
knowledge artifacts (e.g. clusters or rules) such as data mining, pattern 
recognition, and knowledge extraction (Maddalena 2005). When ad-
dressing the field of model-based decision analysis, pattern-based 
management is defined as the opposite of fact-based management 
(Snowden & Boone 2007). Rather than conducting different analyses, 
pattern-based management requests for a three step process of prob-
ing, sensing, and responding. Probing in a complex system is important 
to observe emergent patterns by creating environments or experi-
ments that encourage interactions between the system’s elements and 
that facilitate instructive patterns to emerge rather than looking for 
facts (Snowden & Boone 2007). According to Gartner (2008), pattern-
based management comprises the three pillars pattern seeking to ex-
plore in new ways and beyond traditional places, pattern modelling to 
analyze identified patterns, and pattern adapting to capture the bene-
fits. These steps should be interconnected in a cyclical manner (see 
Figure 2-3). 
 
Figure 2-3: Process of pattern-based management 
Hence, the decision-making process under complexity must include 
elements of interaction, communication, and reflection of decision-
makers. Falling back into a command-and-control management should 
be avoided (Snowden & Boone 2007). Creative and innovative ap-
proaches are required to explore the potential of “unknown un-
knowns”. However, the human mind is insufficiently equipped to store 
and process all the information necessary to forecast the complex sys-
tem’s future behavior. Computable models of the complex system are 
helpful to cope with unstable behaviors and emergent patterns (Hook-
Pattern seeking Pattern modelling Pattern adapting
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er 2011). The complex system itself must therefore be quantified, data 
must be accessible, and processes must be representable by a comput-
able algorithm (Cavallo 2010; Schmidt 2011). 
2.3 Decision support systems 
Predicting consequences (in terms of outcomes) of alternatives is diffi-
cult in a decision situation that is affected by uncertainty (risk, igno-
rance) and/or complexity (Vahidov & Kersten 2004). The need for 
computable models to assist decision-makers arises (Hooker 2011). In 
this regard, research of decision support systems (DSS) has considera-
bly intensified in recent years (Burstein & Holsapple 2008). The fol-
lowing sections define DSSs, highlight their basic components, and 
provide an overview of types of DSSs. 
2.3.1 Characteristics of decision support systems 
A DSS is defined as a computer technology solution that supports deci-
sion-makers in solving a decision problem (Shim et al. 2002). Holsap-
ple (2008) states that a DSS is a computer-based system that repre-
sents and processes knowledge in a way that allows the decision-
making process to be more productive, agile, innovative, and reputa-
ble. Mattiussi (2012) defines a DSS as a software-based tool that assists 
the decision-making process by interacting with decision-makers and 
databases while implementing standardized or specific algorithms to 
solve the decision problem. The quality of decisions received by apply-
ing a DSS should be higher than without. Nevertheless, the objective of 
a DSS is to aid decision-makers within the decision-making process 
rather than replacing it (Er 1988). Making and implementing a deci-
sion is still the task of the decision-makers. 
An early approach to characterizing DSSs is provided by Blanning 
(1979). The author suggests that a DSS must perform at least one of 
these tasks: data selection, data aggregation, parameter estimation in a 
probability distribution, simulation of decisions, equalization of deci-
sions, or optimization of decisions. Many DSSs process more than one 
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task. It is, thus, important to define the tasks a specific DSS should pro-
cess and to map the relationships between these tasks and the respon-
sibility of decision-makers who implement the DSS (Blanning 1979).  
Shim et al. (2002) highlight three components a DSS should consist of. 
This is firstly a sophisticated data management capability with access 
to internal and external data, information, and knowledge (“a data-
base”). The second component concentrates on model management to 
steer modeling functions (“a model”). Thirdly, a DSS should integrate 
powerful dialogue management that facilitates interactive queries, 
reporting, and graphing functions (“a user interface”). The interplay of 
these components improves the effectiveness of decision support. As 
highlighted in Figure 2-4, the three components must operate in an 
environment of factors which might influence them. As many factors as 
possible should be taken into consideration because a segmented ap-
proach cannot provide an understanding of the relationships between 
a system and the DSS environment (Pearson & Shim 1995). This con-
sideration should be the task of the DSS development process (Pearson 
& Shim 1995). The DSS development process must respect three as-
pects (Gachet 2003). Firstly, the development time should be as short 
as possible. Secondly, a DSS should have a high pre-customization. This 
implies that it should be tailored for a specific decision situation in-
cluding the underlying decision problem, decision environment, and 
decision-makers. Thirdly, the DSS must be characterized by a high cus-
tomizability so that it can be adjusted to a changing decision environ-
ment. 
 
Figure 2-4: Environment of a decision support system (Pearson & Shim 1995) 
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Decision-makers never had more access to decision-relevant infor-
mation than today (e.g. “big data”). This information access is not al-
ways beneficial as causing the pre-decision (before starting the actual 
decision-making process) of what information is useful to deal with the 
decision situation (Djamasbi 2007). Particularly in decision situations 
where speed is a crucial factor (e.g. in disaster management, see chap-
ter 3), decision-makers are forced to make decisions under tremen-
dous time pressure by just receiving a narrow window of time where 
they must test/check a number of alternatives. A DSS is targeted at 
structuring information to reduce uncertainty and complexity of the 
decision situation (Sojda 2007). Instead of necessarily providing a per-
fect solution for the decision-makers, a DSS rather aims at obtaining a 
good solution in an acceptable amount of time. Moreover, a DSS must 
complement the ability and expertise of the decision-makers by 
providing information in an efficient manner to guide decision-makers 
towards their objectives (Hall 2008). Although technological advances 
allow a DSS to become more proactive and autonomous, support still 
depends on the decision-makers who use it (Hall 2008). 
2.3.2 Types of decision support systems 
DSSs have been developed in various directions so that one cannot talk 
about a homogenous field of application or research. Many different 
branches have emerged with specific characteristics and tools. Accord-
ing to Arnott & Pervan (2008), seven sub-fields of DSSs can be distin-
guished: personal decision support systems (PDSS), group support 
systems (GSS), negotiation support systems (NSS), intelligent decision 
support systems (IDSS), knowledge management-based decision sup-
port systems (KMDSS), data warehousing (DW), and enterprise report-
ing and analysis systems. PDSS and GSS differ in the number of users 
applying the DSS: while GSS are used by groups, PDSS are developed 
for single decision-makers. The objective of an NSS is to assist deci-
sion-makers in negotiation situations. An IDSS focuses on artificial 
intelligence techniques to solve decision problems. Both, a KMDSS and 
a DW provide a data infrastructure for decision support. In addition, 
KMDSSs ensure access to organizational and individual knowledge to 
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support the decision-making process. Enterprise reporting and analy-
sis systems mostly assist the top-management level of organizations by 
delivering a tailored amount of information (Arnott & Pervan 2008). 
A further possibility to classify DSSs is provided by Power (2008) and 
referenced by further authors dealing with DSSs such as Mattiussi 
(2012). In fact, DSSs are differentiated by their function which implies 
five types of DSSs. They are summarized in the following based on the 
considerations of Power (2008). Model-driven DSSs use quantitative 
models such as optimization or simulation models to analyze a deci-
sion situation. They are rather based on limited data and parameters 
provided by the decision-makers while a large data base is not re-
quired to operate a model-driven DSS. The management of such large 
databases is the scope of data-driven DSSs to process internal, external, 
and real-time data. Examples of data-driven DSSs are data warehouses 
and file systems. Network and communication technology are domi-
nant architectural components in communication-driven DSSs (e.g. 
groupware, video conferencing). Their major objective is to facilitate 
decision-relevant collaboration and communication (Power 2008). 
Document-driven DSSs refer to computer storage and processing tech-
nologies to provide document retrieval and analysis. An example of a 
document-driven DSS is a database that includes, inter alia, scanned 
documents, images, or videos. Knowledge-driven DSSs recommend ac-
tions to decision-makers. They are typically person-computer systems 
that are characterized by a specialized problem-solving expertise in 
terms of knowledge about a decision problem, skills of understanding a 
decision problem and/or skills of solving a decision problem. The high-
lighted types of DSSs might overlap to a certain degree. 
2.4 Summary 
Chapter 2 provided the methodological background of this research. 
Section 2.1 introduced the field of decision situations under uncertain-
ty by presenting definitions and classifications of as well as concepts to 
deal with uncertainty. The relevance of scenario-based approaches to 
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handle decision situations under risk and ignorance has been dis-
cussed from the two perspectives of decision theory and mathematical 
programming. Decision rules are measures to operationalize the eval-
uation of alternatives as tasks of the decision-making process. Scenar-
io-based optimization models formulate objective and constraint func-
tions to solve a decision problem. The advantage of both measures is 
that they bring a high analytic accuracy into the decision-making pro-
cess. Section 2.2 focused on the field of decision situations under com-
plexity. The section highlighted the fact that complex systems are not 
uniformly defined in literature and provided a substantial list of possi-
ble properties. It became obvious that the decision-making process 
under complexity requests for handling these properties using innova-
tive approaches. These must be especially able to capture the dynamic 
behavior and the irreducible uncertainty of elements that are interact-
ing within a complex system. Hence, the need for DSSs arises to aid 
decision-makers in decision situations under uncertainty and/or com-
plexity. Therefore, section 2.3 outlined the field of DSSs by presenting 
key components and types. 
The focus of this research contribution is on disaster-caused decision 
situations (see chapter 3). Assigning an occurring decision situation 
unambiguously to one of the categories of decision situations provided 
in this chapter – risk, ignorance, or complexity – is hard to achieve 
from a practical viewpoint. In fact, it might be possible that elements of 
the decision situation refer to different categories. For example, histor-
ical data from similar past events (e.g. distributional information) 
might be available to handle several elements (in the sense of risk). 
The behavior of further elements might be unknown (in the sense of 
ignorance), interrelated, or dynamically changing (in the sense of com-
plexity). As opposed to decision situations under ignorance, dynamic 
developments lead to an incomplete set of alternatives available in a 
decision situation under complexity. This is, however, an assumption 
that the highlighted analytical approaches (from the fields of decision 
theory and mathematical programming) operationalizing the decision-
making process are functioning well.  
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This research develops a DSS that integrates an interdisciplinary sce-
nario-based methodology by combining approaches from both fields. 
Thereby, the objective is to take into consideration uncertainty in 
terms of risk and ignorance as well as dynamic developments in the 
decision environment characterizing a decision situation under com-
plexity.
  
3 Decision support for supply chain 
crisis management 
A disaster is defined as a large-scale event that threatens public safety 
of a community or society (Oloruntoba & Gray 2006; Kovács & Tatham 
2009; Tandler & Essig 2013). Apart from the direct impacts of a disas-
ter, it might disturb the functioning of all supply chains (SCs) operating 
in the affected community or society (Natarajarathinam et al. 2009). 
This chapter provides the conceptual background of the research by 
discussing implications of decision support to aid decision-makers in 
managing disaster-caused SC disturbances. Thereby, the focus is on SCs 
whose functioning is essential to guarantee public safety. Those are 
SCs that refer to any critical infrastructure (CI) as being responsible for 
the supply of food, water, health care, and energy. In section 3.1, defini-
tions are given from the perspectives of supply chain management 
(SCM) and disaster research. Subsequently, general directives and con-
cepts of SCM in the context of disasters are outlined in section 3.2. 
When the focus is on the reactive decision-making in the aftermath of a 
disaster, supply chain crisis management (SCCM) (as a subdivision of 
SCM) bears responsibility to protect public safety. Therefore, section 
3.3 outlines the rationale of decision-making in SCCM and reviews ex-
isting decision support approaches in literature to determine the re-
search objectives of the subsequent analysis. 
3.1 Definitions 
This section provides definitions from the fields of logistics/SCM and 
disaster research. Those terms are unambiguously used in literature 
and they provide the notational basis for section 3.2 where the direc-
tives of SCM in disaster situations are outlined. 
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3.1.1 Logistics and supply chain management 
The Council of Logistics Management (CLM) defines logistics as the 
“process of planning, implementing, and controlling the efficient, cost-
effective flow and storage of raw-material, in-process inventory, fin-
ished goods, and related information from point of origin to point of 
consumption for the purpose of conforming to customer require-
ments” (Cooper et al. 1997; Pfohl 2010). Logistical operations ensure 
that the right supplies (e.g. trade goods, services) are delivered in the 
right quantities with the right qualities to the right locations at the 
right time (Beamon & Balcik 2008; Pfohl 2010; Bowersox et al. 2012). 
Supplies are managed by a network of different entities (e.g. organiza-
tions, plants) and functional stages (see below) (Sheperd & Günter 
2006; Beamon & Balcik 2008). This network, stretched from the points 
of origin to the points of consumption, and its included entities and 
functional stages, is denoted the supply chain (SC).  
Supply chain management (SCM) considers multi-relationships across a 
possibly large number of involved entities and integrated value-added 
processes of an SC (Christopher, 2011). Each entity refers to a specific 
functional stage in the SC regarding the categories suppliers (e.g. raw 
material supplier; general: tier n to tier 1 supplier), manufacturers, 
customers (e.g. wholesalers; general: tier 1 to tier n customers), and 
end customers. From the perspective of a specific entity, functional 
stages are either located in the upstream (supply side) or in the down-
stream (demand side) (Arnold et al. 2008; Pfohl 2010; Christopher 
2011).  
Different flows are involved in an SC and need to be coordinated by 
SCM. Beside physical flows organizing the spatial-temporal transfor-
mation of goods, there are information flows to manage physical flows, 
and financial flows such as credits, payment schedules, and consign-
ment arrangements (Kleindorfer & Van Wassenhove 2004; Van Was-
senhove 2006). Information flows proceed in the opposite direction to 
physical flows and have become a crucial challenge for SCM, particular-
ly because of an increased global interconnectedness of entities. In-
formation and communication technology (ICT) systems to gather and 
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process information have become an essential element of SCM to man-
age physical flows and logistical operations systematically within an 
entity or across entities (Arnold et al. 2008). 
Logistics systems can be classified by the phases that become relevant 
for an entity. Procurement logistics refers to the entity’s upstream ac-
tivities of acquiring goods (e.g. raw material, semi-finished goods). 
Production logistics is located inside an entity to manage the stream of 
goods from procurement warehouses (e.g. raw material) to production 
processes, the interim storage of goods (e.g. semi-finished goods), and 
the stream of produced goods to distribution warehouses (e.g. finished 
goods). Distribution logistics comprises downstream activities to pro-
vide customers with produced goods. Sales logistics handles down-
stream transactions (e.g. demand forecasts). It is not mandatory that 
an entity operates in all logistics systems. While a trading company just 
disregards production logistics, a service company exclusively focusses 
on procurement logistics (e.g. the provision of working materials) (Ar-
nold et al. 2008; Pfohl 2010). 
Logistical decision problems (planning tasks) that arise in SCM can be 
classified depending on the logistics system and planning horizon or 
management level they refer to (Günther & Tempelmeier 2011). Stra-
tegic decisions are concerned with the design of an SC and have a long-
term focus, tactical decisions concentrate on the planning of the SC 
network with a mid-term focus, and operational decisions deal with 
the execution of logistical operations with a short-term focus (Hertel et 
al. 2011). An overview of logistical decision problems is provided by 
the SC planning matrix in Table 3-1 (Rohde et al. 2000; Fleischmann et 
al. 2004; Kannegiesser 2008). 
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Table 3-1: Supply chain planning matrix 
 
Strategic  
decisions 
Tactical  
decisions 
Operational  
decisions 
Procurement 
logistics 
- material programme 
- supplier selection 
- cooperation 
- personnel planning 
- material require-
ments planning 
- contracts 
- personnel planning 
- ordering materials 
Production 
logistics 
- plant location 
- production system 
- master production 
scheduling 
- capacity planning 
- lot-sizing 
- machine scheduling 
- shop floor control 
Distribution 
logistics 
- physical distribution 
planning 
- distribution  
planning 
- warehouse  
replenishment 
- transport planning 
Sales  
logistics 
- product programme 
- strategic sales  
planning 
- mid-term sales 
planning 
- short-term sales 
planning 
3.1.2 Terminologies of disaster research 
Disaster research is intuitively associated with the anticipation that 
something “bad” happens. The potential or the actual occurrence of 
such an event is implied by the term hazard which is defined as a 
“threatening event or probability of occurrence of a potentially damag-
ing phenomenon within a given time period and area” (IFRC 2015). A 
hazard can be caused by a force, a physical condition or an agent; pos-
sible consequences might be injury and death of affected people, dam-
age to property, the environment, CI, agriculture, and disturbances of 
business operations (DHS 2010; ICDRM/GWU 2010). Hazards can be 
classified by natural hazards and man-made hazards. Causes of natural 
hazards are natural or physical phenomena (e.g. geophysical, hydrolog-
ical, climatological, biological) that trigger a rapid or slow onset event 
(IFRC 2015). Man-made hazards are caused by humans (e.g. terrorism, 
war, industrial, nuclear or transportation accidents) (Bournay 2005; 
ICDRM/GWU 2010; IFRC 2015). 
Further classifications of hazards can be found in literature. For in-
stance, man-made hazards are frequently split into technological and 
intentional hazards (ICDRM/GWU 2010; Kõlves et al. 2013). Techno-
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logical hazards are produced by man-made technology or unplanned 
and non-malicious actions; intentional hazards are created by threat-
ened or executed actions with the intention to harm people or organi-
zations (ICDRM/GWU 2010). With respect to the summary provided 
by Merz (2011), natural hazards can be classified by (classic) natural 
hazards (e.g. tectonic or climatic events) and socio-natural hazards 
(e.g. events caused by the climate change). As opposed to technological 
and intentional hazards, natural hazards are not avoidable in advance 
as they are not man-made. Their occurrence is, thus, to a certain de-
gree random in terms of aleatory uncertainty (see chapter 2) (Schen-
ker-Wicki et al. 2010).  
Hazard is one element that is required to operationalize the decision 
theoretic definition of risk (as it has been outlined in chapter 2) for 
disaster research. Basically, risk aims at preventively indicating and 
assessing if and to what extent a hazard may occur and threaten a sys-
tem (Hamani & Boudjema 2013). It refers to the product of the occur-
rence probability of a hazard and its possible impact (Bertsch 2008; 
ICDRM/GWU 2010; Comes 2011).  
The occurrence probability is typically captured by the historical fre-
quency of an occurring hazard in the past where it affected a specific 
region at a specific time with a specific intensity (Bogardi & Birkmann 
2004; Villagrán de León 2006; Merz 2011). Potential consequences 
depend on a system’s vulnerability which indicates its sensitivity when 
it is hit by a hazard (Tobin & Montz 1997; Gall 2007; Merz 2011). 
Hence, risk can be understood as a function of the two elements hazard 
and vulnerability (UNDP 2004). There is abundant literature discuss-
ing definitions and features of the term vulnerability. This research 
contribution refers to the definition of vulnerability as a “characteristic 
of design, location, security posture, operation, or any combination 
thereof, that renders an asset, system, network, or entity susceptible to 
disruption, destruction, or exploitation” (DHS 2010; ICDRM/GWU 
2010). A brief example highlights the importance of vulnerability on 
the determined degree of risk: a weak earthquake in a metropolitan 
area may rather lead to severe consequences than a strong earthquake 
in an uninhabited city. This is because the metropolitan area is more 
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vulnerable to earthquakes than the uninhabited place (Schenker-Wicki 
et al. 2010).  
Further extensions of the quantitative risk formulation have been pro-
posed in literature. They respect additional aspects such as exposure, 
elements at risk, coping capacity, or resilience (Crichton 1999; Granger 
et al. 1999; Villegas et al. 2006; Bertsch 2008; Merz 2011). The quanti-
tative risk definition does not neglect these aspects as they are implic-
itly contained within the term vulnerability (Merz 2011). Various au-
thors rather suggest using the concept of risk to understand how a 
certain system behaves under scrutiny and interacts with its environ-
ment than as an instrument that just generates a certain number indi-
cating “the risk” (Haimes et al. 2002; Comes 2011). 
When actually occurring, a hazard can trigger a disaster which is de-
fined as “a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the func-
tioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and 
economic or environmental losses that exceed the community’s or 
society’s ability to cope using its own resources” (IFRC 2015). It is pre-
dominantly assumed in literature that a disaster is a large-scale haz-
ardous event (Oloruntoba & Gray 2006; Kovács & Tatham 2009; Tan-
dler & Essig 2013). A disaster can, thus, be understood as a combina-
tion of a hazard, vulnerability, and the insufficiency to preventively 
reduce potential negative consequences of risks (IFRC 2015). Normal 
conditions of the affected system are disturbed in this case which 
causes negative consequences on public safety that exceed the capacity 
of adjustment of the affected community or society (WHO/EHA 2002). 
The capacity comprises all strengths and resources (e.g. physical, insti-
tutional, social, economic, personal) that are available to reduce conse-
quences of the disaster situation (UNISDR 2004b).  
According to the definition and classification of hazard, literature dis-
tinguishes between natural disasters and man-made disasters (Nata-
rajarathinam et al. 2009). Rutherford & de Boer (1982) even suggest 
various ways to classify disasters: the duration of development in the 
cause of disaster (e.g. short, relatively long, or long), the extent of the 
disaster area (e.g. radius [km]), the number of casualties (e.g. number 
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of death or injured people), the pathology (e.g. type of injuries), and 
the time until aid is provided. 
The welfare of a community or society and, therefore, public safety 
depends to a great extent on the well-functioning of SCs that are re-
sponsible for the supply of basic needs of the population. An occurring 
disaster might affect thousands of people’s lives and all SCs that are 
included in the community or society (Natarajarathinam et al. 2009). 
Dysfunctional SCs are in particular then crucial for public safety when 
these SCs are part of the CI network. Definitions of CI have been pri-
marily proposed by national governments and international institu-
tions (Abou El Kalam et al. 2009). The European Commission defines 
CIs as “physical and information technology facilities, networks, ser-
vices and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious 
impact on the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of citi-
zens or the effective functioning of governments in the European Un-
ion (EU) countries” (European Commission 2004). The European 
Commission distinguishes between CI sectors of energy, ICT, finance, 
health care, food, water, transportation, production, storage and 
transport of dangerous goods, and government (European Commission 
2004). National governments and international institutions support 
programs and activities for the protection of CI sectors (European 
Commission 2004; BMI 2011). This is because the frequency of disas-
ter-caused CI disturbances has increased in recent years (Kleindorfer 
& Saad 2005; Helbing et al. 2006). 
Although any CI sector is denoted a critical “infrastructure”, several 
sectors are not “infrastructures” in the proper meaning of the word; 
rather, they are SCs that are responsible for the delivery of “essential 
products or services” (European Commission 2004). These SCs are 
denoted public safety critical SCs (P-SCs) in this research contribution. 
When P-SCs are disturbed (disrupted or destructed), the vital welfare 
of people in the affected community or society is threatened (Braubach 
2011; Lin et al. 2011; Herlin & Pazirandeh 2012). P-SCs mainly arise 
within the CI sectors food, water, health care, and energy. Parts of a  
P-SC might be highly interconnected to parts of further CI sectors such 
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as built assets (e.g. roads referring to the CI sector of transportation 
are required for distribution logistics of a food P-SC), ICT (e.g. as any P-
SC is based on information flows) and social infrastructure (e.g. per-
sonnel to operate medical facilities). Moreover, a specific role is given 
to the CI sector energy. Although disturbances of energy SCs will not 
directly impact public safety, the supply of food, water, and health care 
SCs can only function when the provision of energy supplies is intact. 
3.2 Supply chain management in the context of 
disasters 
This research contribution focusses on disaster-caused disturbances of  
P-SCs. The concept of disaster operations management (DOM) provides 
assistance to handle (possible and actual) consequences of a disaster 
prior to (preventively) or in the aftermath (reactively) of its occur-
rence. In the following sections, general implications of managing SC 
disturbances are highlighted. Therefore, the interface of SCM and DOM 
is analyzed and SC strategies are provided that are beneficial to 
achieve an increased resistance against disturbances. 
3.2.1 Management of supply chain disturbances 
An SC disturbance implies a failed functioning of any of its entities. 
From the perspective of the SC, consequences might arise locally 
where just one entity is affected or globally where various entities of 
the SC are impacted simultaneously. In the latter case, the disturbance 
propagates through interrelated SC networks (Craighead et al. 2007; 
Ziegenbein 2007; Merz 2011). Natarajarathinam et al. (2009) intro-
duce three dimensions of an SC disturbance: the disturbance of one 
entity of the SC, the disturbance of the SC as a whole, and the disturb-
ance of varying SCs on a regional level. An SC disturbance is basically 
characterized by a (temporal) interruption of any flow within or across 
entities. This triggers a mismatch between supply and demand (Rice 
2003; Jüttner et al. 2003; Knemeyer et al. 2009; Merz 2011). On the 
supply side, failures of suppliers in the upstream might cause a dissat-
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isfaction of customer demands (e.g. problems in transportation and 
inventory, insufficient product qualities). A disturbance on the demand 
side leads to failures of customer processes in the downstream such as 
fluctuations in demand or instable sales prices (Zsidisin 2003; Tang 
2006; Merz 2011; Srinivasan et al. 2011).  
An SC disturbance might be caused by different sources. Natarajarathi-
nam et al. (2009) distinguish between external and internal sources. 
External sources are located outside the SC and can be, inter alia, disas-
ters, or market, economy, or political issues. Internal sources are locat-
ed inside the SC and refer to employee-, criminal-, infrastructure-, IT-, 
or finance-related events. Sources might overlap across both catego-
ries; an exact assignment is frequently just possible ex-post (in the 
aftermath of the SC disturbance) (Natarajarathinam et al. 2009). SCM 
becomes relevant at two points in time to handle an SC disturbance. 
Firstly, SCM is required prior to the disturbance by developing preven-
tive measures that mitigate risks caused by internal and external 
sources. Secondly, SCM must reactively handle consequences of an 
already occurring SC disturbance. Hence, two subdivisions of SCM 
must be respected: supply chain risk management (SCRM) in the fore-
run and supply chain crisis management (SCCM) in the aftermath of an 
SC disturbance. 
Concepts of risk management include, in varying disciplines, different 
steps that are ordered in a cyclical manner. In a nutshell, the first step 
typically refers to measures of risk identification. Identified risks are 
quantified by risk assessment or risk analysis. Finally, risk mitigation 
treats, controls, and communicates the assessed risks. Back loops exist 
between all steps to continuously evaluate and update findings 
(Hölscher 1999; Rosenkranz & Missler-Behr 2005; Zsidisin & Ritchie 
2008; DHS 2010; ICDRM/GWU 2010). Risk management aims at reduc-
ing risk, transferring responsibilities of risk, controlling risk to a ra-
tional level, or (temporarily) accepting risk (DHS 2010; ICDRM/GWU 
2010). The objective of risk management can never be the total avoid-
ance of all risks. This would require the elimination of either or both 
occurrence probabilities themselves or caused negative consequences 
which is, however, not possible. With respect to an SC disturbance, risk 
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can be defined in an event-oriented manner. In fact, SCRM is described 
as the process of identifying triggering events of a possible SC disturb-
ance and of assessing their occurrence probabilities (Heckmann et al. 
2015). Depending on the classification of internal and external sources 
of an SC disturbance, internal SC risks and external SC risks can be 
distinguished. An additional category refers to network-related risks 
which concentrate on interactions of entities included within the SC 
(Jüttner et al. 2003; Natarajarathinam et al. 2009). 
Whereas SCRM deals with the proactive handling of risks regarding an 
SC disturbance, the objective of SCCM is to reactively implement 
measures that mitigate consequences of an SC disturbance ex-post. A 
crisis is a situation that features severe threat, uncertainty, and sense 
of urgency. It is defined as the “turning point that leads to an unstable 
situation in which an abrupt or decisive change is imminent” (Rosen-
thal & Pijnenburg 1991; ICDRM/GWU 2010). An SC crisis arises “when 
one or more supply chain member’s activities are interrupted, result-
ing in a major disruption of the normal flow of goods or services” (Na-
tarajarathinam et al. 2009). In the following, SC disturbances are con-
sidered where the source of the crisis is external in terms of a natural 
or man-made disaster. When a crisis is caused by such a disaster, its 
handling requests for a change from routine management towards a 
management that explicitly takes into account strong uncertainty and 
complexity of the situation (ICDRM/GWU 2010). 
The concept of disaster operations management (DOM) provides a 
framework for handling disasters in the forerun and aftermath of their 
occurrences. Disaster operations represent activities that are needed 
before, during, and after a disaster in order to diminish its impact 
(Altay & Green 2006; Galindo & Batta 2013). DOM is defined as the 
sequence of operations to prevent or to reduce negative consequences 
resulting from a disaster (Hoyos et al. 2015). It comprises the four 
phases mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (McLoughlin 
1985; Altay & Green 2006; Natarajarathinam et al. 2009; Galindo & 
Batta 2013). Nomenclatures of these phases are not uniformly defined 
in literature. For example, Van Wassenhove (2012) substitutes the 
phase of preparedness with preparation and recovery with reconstruc-
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tion; Crondstedt (2003) uses the term of prevention instead of mitiga-
tion. However, implications of the four phases are the same across 
authors: while mitigation and preparedness refer to preventive 
measures, response and recovery focus on the reactive handling of a 
disaster in its aftermath. In combination with the distinction of SCRM 
and SCCM as highlighted above, SCRM focusses on mitigation and pre-
paredness while SCCM operationalizes response and recovery in the 
case of a disaster-caused SC disturbance (see Figure 3-1) (Natarajara-
thinam et al. 2009).  
 
Figure 3-1: Phases and concepts to manage a disaster-caused supply chain  
disturbance 
In the mitigation phase, the focus of SCRM is on the identification and 
assessment of possible (external) risks. The objective is to develop 
measures that help to reduce and/or eliminate the identified risks (Na-
tarajarathinam et al. 2009). So-called “soft” measures are important 
such as the analysis of lessons learned from experiences of past disas-
ters. This is important to create safer SCs in future (ICDRM/GWU 2010; 
Kumar & Havey 2013). A disaster can be already impending in the pre-
paredness phase. SCRM must therefore prepare measures that can be 
conducted in the immediate aftermath of the disaster’s occurrence, the 
response phase (NFPA 2004; Van Wassenhove 2012). Specific prepar-
edness measures refer to, inter alia, the resourcing of capabilities and 
capacities (e.g. pre-positioned resources) or the development and set-
ting up of ICT systems and business continuity plans (DHS 2010; 
ICDRM/GWU 2010; Van Wassenhove 2012; Kumar & Havey 2013). An 
important measure of SCCM in the response phase is the conduction of 
an immediate impact analysis. Based on the results of this analysis, 
Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
Supply chain risk management Supply chain crisis management
Disaster operations management
Disaster
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measures that have been developed by SCRM can be adapted and ap-
plied quickly (Natarajarathinam et al. 2009; ICDRM/GWU 2010; Cay-
maz et al. 2013). The recovery phase specifies measures to re-establish 
the former situation (Rosenthal & Pijnenburg 1991). The focus of 
SCCM is thereby the long-term reparation and restoration of the dis-
turbed SC to regain pre-disaster conditions (Natarajarathinam et al. 
2009; ICDRM/GWU 2010). 
3.2.2 Strategies for supply chain disturbances 
To create SCs that are able to withstand disturbances, at least to a cer-
tain degree, various strategies have been proposed in literature. Alt-
hough these strategies are inconsistently interpreted among authors 
(Klibi et al., 2010), they basically aim at protecting an SC from negative 
consequences of an SC disturbance (Husdal 2010). In the following, the 
three major strategies of robustness, flexibility, and resilience are briefly 
introduced.  
The term robustness has been defined in different fields of research 
(Bundschuh et al., 2006; Qiang et al., 2009). In SCM, the strategy of 
robustness addresses the ability of an SC to withstand internal or ex-
ternal shocks (Snyder 2003; Wallace & Choi 2011; Vlajic et al. 2012). It 
is defined as an “SC configuration that provides an attractive outcome 
while considering many sources of uncertainty” (Mo & Harrison 2005; 
Vlajic et al. 2012). The level of robustness is determined by the weak-
est entity of the SC (Kleindorfer & Saad 2005). Most authors underline 
the feature of a robust SC to perform in a stable manner despite uncer-
tain conditions of its environment (Rice 2003). Robustness measure-
ment is typically based on key outcome indicators such as, inter alia, 
cost, service level, or lead time. Stable values of these key outcome 
indicators confirm robustness (Vlajic et al. 2012). One prominent 
measure to design a robust SC is to embed redundancies into the SC. 
Redundancies are reserves or back-up options (e.g. multiple sourcing, 
large inventory stocks) to continue logistical operations while manag-
ing an SC disturbance (e.g. large inventory stocks) (Sheffi 2005; Stew-
art et al. 2009; Charles et al. 2010; Klibi et al. 2010) As stated by Sheffi 
(2005), however, redundancies just provide some “breathing room” for 
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the SC during a disturbance, are an expensive measure (e.g. cost of 
additional stocks), and therefore only temporarily useful. 
The strategy of flexibility describes the ability of an SC to manage 
changes in its environment (Correa 1994; De Toni & Tonchia 2005; 
Wallace & Choi 2011). SC flexibility is defined as “the possibility to 
react to disturbances with few consequences in time, effort, cost, or 
outcome” (De Toni & Tonchia 2005; Charles et al. 2010). The strategy 
may address any logistics system (procurement, production, distribu-
tion, and sales flexibility) which takes into account varying outcome 
measures (e.g. quality, product, cost, and service flexibility) (Slack 
1992; De Toni & Tonchia 2005; Charles et al. 2010). Beamon & Balcik 
(2008) distinguish between range flexibility and response flexibility. 
The former specifies to what extent logistical operations can be 
changed; the latter considers losses in time and cost that go along with 
these changes. Furthermore, state flexibility and action flexibility can 
be differentiated (Mandelbaum 1978; De Toni & Tonchia 2005). State 
flexibility is the ability of the SC to remain working despite changes. 
The objective is to maintain a stable functioning of the SC. Action flexi-
bility refers to the ability of taking action during changes.  
Adaptability is the feature of a flexible SC to manage medium- or long-
term disturbances (e.g. for several months) (Sheffi 2004; Charles et al. 
2010; Gatignon et al. 2010). An adaptable SC is able to “meet structural 
shifts in markets [and to] modify SC strategies, products and technolo-
gies” (Lee 2004). In turn, agility is the feature of a flexible SC to re-
spond quickly and smoothly to short-term disturbances (e.g. for sever-
al hours, days, or weeks) (Lee 2004). An agile SC is able to “thrive and 
prosper in an environment of constant and unpredictable change” 
(Maskell 2001; Sheffi 2004; Oloruntoba & Gray 2006; Van Wassenhove 
2012).  
The term resilience has been defined multidisciplinarily (Bhamra et al., 
2011). Its conception originates from material sciences where a resili-
ent material recovers its original shape after a deformation (Sheffi 
2005). Transferred to SCM, the strategy of resilience implies the ability 
of an SC “to return to its original state or move to a new, more desira-
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ble state after being disturbed” (Christopher & Peck, 2004). A resilient 
SC is able to recover from a large disturbance (e.g. long-term, severe 
consequences) (Sheffi 2005). To establish a resilient SC, two capabili-
ties are required: the SC must firstly be robust and secondly be flexible 
in terms of adaptability (Rice 2003; Sheffi 2005; Charles et al. 2010; 
Vlajic et al. 2012).  
In summary, robustness is the ability of a disturbed SC to quickly re-
gain stability, flexibility is the ability to appropriately react to an SC 
disturbance, and resilience is the ability to survive an SC disturbance 
(Husdal 2010). From a comprehensive perspective, flexibility and resil-
ience can be understood as specific features of robustness itself (Scholl 
2001). In fact, flexibility describes the short-term, resilience the long-
term feature of a robust SC. The distinction between the strategies lies 
in the detail: a robust SC endures a disturbance without severe impacts 
because of existing redundancies (Ku 1995; Husdal 2004); a flexible 
(agile, adaptable) SC accommodates a disturbance by modifying cours-
es or targets which requires the willingness of SCM to change tracks 
and being open to deviation from the initial course (Husdal 2004; 
Husdal 2009); a resilient SC even survives a large-scale disturbance 
and is able to return to the original state or to move towards a new 
desirable state over time (Husdal 2008; Husdal 2009). 
3.3 Decision-making in supply chain crisis 
management 
The scope of this research contribution is on the reactive management 
of disaster-caused P-SC disturbances. SCCM must therefore process 
varying logistical decision problems (see section 3.1.1) to quickly help 
affected P-SCs to recover from the shock by handling arising uncertain-
ty and complexity of the decision situation. The following section dis-
cusses uncertain and complex properties that might characterize a 
disaster situation. Subsequently, the scope of decision-making in SCCM 
is outlined. The section closes with a literature review regarding exist-
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ing concepts and approaches of decision support in disaster-caused 
decision situations. 
3.3.1 Uncertain and complex properties of disaster situations 
SCM is basically confronted with inherent and exogenous uncertainty. 
Inherent uncertainty is embedded into any SC (e.g. P-SCs). This is be-
cause the SC is characterized by interrelations of entities and function-
al stages which requires the management of multiple information 
flows (van der Vorst & Beulens 2002). Triggers of inherent uncertainty 
are, inter alia, unclear or non-communicated objectives of entities, 
non-existing control actions, or the unpredictability of consequences of 
available control action alternatives. To handle inherent uncertainty, 
SC strategies must be modified such as the configuration of the SC (van 
der Vorst & Beulens 2002). Exogenous uncertainty is related to external 
sources of SC disturbances such as changes in markets, products, or 
technology (van der Vorst & Beulens 2002). According to Sowinski 
(2003), exogenous uncertainty is particularly crucial when it is caused 
by a disaster whose occurrence is rare and random. It is difficult to 
predict when and where it will happen and who will be affected. This 
highlights the criticality of a disaster-caused SC disturbance: while 
inherent uncertainty is predictable to a certain degree (e.g. fluctuations 
on the demand or supply side of an SC follow roughly regular patterns 
of occurrence), exogenous uncertainty is associated with strong uncer-
tainty and unpredictability (van der Vorst & Beulens 2002; Charles et 
al. 2010).  
The criticality of exogenous uncertainty for disaster-caused decision-
making in SCCM to manage P-SC disturbances has been addressed by 
various authors in the past few years (de la Torre et al. 2012; Das & 
Hanaoka 2013; Liberatore et al. 2013; Rennemo et al. 2014). Exoge-
nous uncertainty is basically associated with indefinite consequences 
of the disaster (Liberatore et al. 2013). Sparse or lacking information 
(e.g. regarding the state of the environment) causes unknowingness 
about the behavior of the demand side and the supply side of a P-SC. 
On the demand side, exogenous uncertainty results in unknown spatial 
demand distributions (e.g. demand locations in remote areas) or de-
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mand mixes and volumes (e.g. product specifications and quantities) 
(de la Torre et al. 2012; Rennemo et al. 2014). On the supply side, ex-
ogenous uncertainty refers to indefinite logistical operations of pro-
curement and distribution, e.g. delays of supplies or increased product 
prices due to product scarcities or non-available suppliers (de la Torre 
et al. 2012; Liberatore et al. 2013).  
The higher the degree of exogenous uncertainty, the more difficult it is 
to predict the consequences on CI sectors (Liberatore et al. 2013). In 
particular cascading effects are crucial in this regard as interdepend-
encies between CI sectors do not often become obvious before a cer-
tain CI sector is disturbed. In recent years, indirect consequences of 
disasters have increased (Kleindorfer & Saad 2005). While in the past, 
the impact of a disaster occurred mostly locally, it might now propa-
gate through highly interconnected CI sectors (Rinaldi et al. 2001). For 
example, the functioning of P-SCs especially depends on the intactness 
of the CI sector of transportation (de la Torre et al. 2012; Liberatore et 
al. 2013; Rennemo et al. 2014). Transportation infrastructures com-
prise all nodes and edges in the transportation network (e.g. roads, 
railroads, airports, ports) as well as all transportation modes of public 
and economic mass transits and long-distance traffic (Fletcher 2002; 
European Commission 2004). Exogenous uncertainty implies unclear 
states and conditions of any part of this infrastructure (Hamedi et al., 
2012). As most logistical operations within and across P-SCs depend 
on functioning transportation infrastructures, their states in a disaster 
situation determine to a significant degree how robust, flexible, or re-
silient P-SCs can be (Madhusudan & Ganapathy 2011).  
Cascades of consequences are prominent: while the disaster causes an 
increase in demands for public safety critical supplies, P-SCs may be 
hampered by direct and indirect impacts that result from the impair-
ment of physical and information flows or by damaged interrelated CI 
sectors (Merz 2011). Consequences of a disaster on P-SCs are, thus, 
hard to predict (The World Bank 2010). To increase predictability in a 
disaster situation, ICT systems (as a CI sector itself) are needed to pro-
vide the right information in the right format at the right time to the 
right people (e.g. decision-makers) (Fletcher 2002). From the IT per-
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spective, ICT systems gather, synthesize, and interpret information; 
from the communication perspective, ICT systems transmit this infor-
mation to responsible persons (e.g. decision-makers) (Leidner et al., 
2009). It is expected that information in a disaster situation, if availa-
ble, is heterogeneous in terms of format, quality, and quantity (Comes 
et al. 2011). ICT systems must prepare information arising from multi-
ple sources by filtering and structuring valid information and com-
municating this information to decision-makers (Turoff et al. 2009).  
Sparse or lacking information triggers a lack of knowledge about the 
current state of the environment, developments of this state, and 
cause-effect chains (Helbing et al. 2006). Disasters are characterized by 
uncertain and unpredictable surroundings (e.g. location, consequenc-
es) where logistical activities must be performed in rapidly changing 
environments (Natarajarathinam et al. 2009; Rennemo et al. 2014). 
Time pressure, particularly in the response phase, means that deci-
sions have to be made near real time which forestalls the possibility of 
further investigations or waiting until more or better information is 
available. This challenge is also amplified by dynamic developments of 
the environment in the disaster-affected community or society. An 
example is the dynamic development of the socioeconomic behavior 
(e.g. population movements) that might trigger demand fluctuations 
over time and hamper demand estimations (de la Torre et al. 2012; 
Rennemo et al. 2014). Moreover, it is often unclear if the disaster’s 
cause (e.g., a natural hazard) will be unique or if it will cause further 
replicas or secondary disasters (Hoyos et al. 2015).  
In summary and with respect to the considerations of chapter 2, exog-
enous uncertainty might trigger a decision situation under ignorance 
which depends on the actual extent of available information in a disas-
ter situation. Dynamic developments caused by cascading effects of P-
SCs and CI sectors, socioeconomic changes, and secondary disasters 
might even complement such a decision situation by properties that 
evolve to a complex system (Prelipcean & Boscoianu 2011). 
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3.3.2 Scope of decision-making in supply chain crisis management 
Managing disaster-caused P-SC disturbances might be the task of SCCM 
of both for-profit P-SCs and public P-SCs (Natarajarathinam et al. 
2009). Organizations (e.g. food retail companies of the food sector) and 
public authorities (e.g. public hospitals of the health care sector) bear 
responsibility to protect public safety in the affected community or 
society. SCCM is in both cases forced to make reactive decisions in the 
aftermath of a disaster to ensure the intactness of public safety critical 
supplies. The following discusses the scope of decision-making in a 
disaster situation from two perspectives: decision-makers that refer to 
an internal entity of the disturbed P-SC and those that are located out-
side this P-SC. 
Internal decision-makers are organizations and public authorities of the 
disturbed P-SC themselves. SCCM must implement measures that 
strengthen or restore their own disturbed business processes. Organi-
zations are often buffeted by events that have not been registered as 
real possibilities prior to their occurrence and which might have a con-
siderable impact on their fortunes (Feduzi & Runde 2014). However, 
as stated by Benoit (1997), an organization’s survival during a disaster 
(triggered by any source) depends greatly on its speed of response. In 
recent years, organizations have increasingly strengthened their ef-
forts in establishing departments of business continuity management 
(BCM)7 (von Rössing 2005). BCM originates from disaster recovery 
planning (DRP). While several authors use the concepts of BCM and 
DRP synonymously (e.g. Watters & Watters 2014), further sources 
understand DRP as the part of BCM that concentrates on IT failures 
(e.g. Elliot et al. 2010). The major objective of BCM is to keep business 
processes within an organization alive while considering effects of an 
SC disturbance (Hiles & Barnes 2010). BCM can be understood as the 
subdivision of SCRM that explicitly concentrates on the development of 
measures to hedge against SC disturbances. Examples of preventive 
BCM measures are, inter alia, supplier audits, changes of the supplier 
strategy to multiple sourcing, and an increase in safety stocks (Naujoks 
                                               
7 Further information on BCM is provided in the case study in chapter 6. 
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2003; Zsidisin 2003). Despite its proactive scope, BCM also becomes 
relevant in SCCM. An example is the development of business continui-
ty plans (for pre-defined cases) that are preventively developed by 
SCRM and reactively conducted by SCCM (BSI 2008).  
External decision-makers are organizations and public authorities that 
are located outside the disturbed P-SC. They might be entities of fur-
ther P-SCs or of SCs of other branches, or (independent) public author-
ities. In difference to organizations of the private sector, public author-
ities are obliged to intervene due to their jurisdictions to ensure public 
safety. External decision-makers assume responsibility in the case that 
a P-SC disturbance (and therefore public safety) cannot be handled 
internally by the affected entities themselves. For example, further P-
SCs of the same CI sector and whose functioning is still intact might 
overtake supply responsibilities of a disturbed P-SC. Alternatively, it 
might be possible that SCs of other branches make their own infra-
structures accessible (e.g. warehouses) to establish logistical replace-
ment structures. Coordinating the establishment of these structures 
might be additionally the task of public authorities. In this regard, hu-
manitarian logistics8 has become a prominent field where especially 
disaster-caused P-SC disturbances in terms of destruction are ad-
dressed. The objective of humanitarian logistics is to maintain the pro-
vision of public safety critical supplies to disaster-affected people (Van 
Wassenhove 2012). In humanitarian logistics, developed preventive 
measures of SCRM are essential for a successful reactive SCCM. This is 
particularly the case as logistical replacement structures must be es-
tablished quickly to compensate the destructed P-SCs (Balcik & Bea-
mon 2008).  
Logistical decision problems that must be processed by SCCM of both 
internal and external decision-makers can principally arise on any 
management level. For example, a strategic decision might refer to the 
distribution structure of warehouse locations, a tactical decision might 
be the planning of personnel, and an operational decision might deal 
with modifications of transportation routes. In real-world disaster 
                                               
8 Further information on humanitarian logistics is provided in the case study in chapter 5. 
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situations, most common logistical decision problems focus on re-
source allocation which comprises all activities of locating resources 
(Hoyos et al. 2015). An overview of logistical decision problems in 
disaster response is provided by Rennemo et al. (2014). The authors 
highlight the importance of resource allocation problems, facility loca-
tion and routing problems, vehicle routing and tour covering problems, 
network flow problems, and single commodity allocation problems. 
Regardless of the type of decision-makers, a disturbed P-SC must be 
strengthened or replaced under the restriction that it functions under 
uncertain and complex conditions of the underlying environment. In 
this regard, the highlighted SC strategies in section 3.2.2 gain im-
portance. In disaster response, decision-making must facilitate a ro-
bust and flexible provision of public safety critical supplies. This provi-
sion must be intact although the environment might still be affected by 
dynamic shifts. Therefore, robustness in the sense of state flexibility 
(see section 3.2.2) must be established to guarantee that P-SCs remain 
working despite changes (Mandelbaum 1978; De Toni & Tonchia 
2005). 
3.3.3 Literature review: decision support based on operations  
research and management sciences 
The suitability of methods of operations research (OR) and manage-
ment sciences (MS) to support decision-makers in SCCM and DOM has 
been widely discussed in literature. Altay & Green (2006) synthesize 
views of different OR-related communities (e.g. The Association of 
European Operational Research Societies (EURO) or the US counter-
part of EURO, INFORMS) and define OR/MS as “a scientific approach to 
aid decision-making in complex systems”. OR/MS methods refer to 
classical analytical techniques such as mathematical programming, 
simulation, and probability and statistics, but also to OR/MS related 
areas like decision theory, system dynamics, multi-criteria decision-
making, and expert systems (Altay & Green 2006; Galindo & Batta 
2013). As the importance of OR/MS methods for decision support 
across all phases of DOM (mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
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recovery) and both subdivisions of SCM (SCRM and SCCM) has in-
creased in recent years, various reviews/surveys focusing on the inter-
face of both fields have been contributed. The large number of articles 
found by those reviews underlines the momentum that research in 
that topic has gained (Hoyos et al. 2015).  
Altay & Green (2006) point out the increasing need for studying 
OR/MS issues in DOM. The authors investigate 109 peer-reviewed 
research articles. They do not explicitly address decision situations 
arising in SCM but provide a broad view on disaster research (e.g. in-
cluding decisions of evacuation plans). Results of the review show that 
most articles use mathematical programming to support decision-
making (30%), followed by probability and statistics (19%), simulation 
(11%), and decision theory and multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) 
(10%). Articles mainly focus on the pre-disaster period (mitigation: 
44%, preparedness: 21%, response: 24%, recovery: 11%). The authors 
use a classification scheme to distinguish between articles of theory, 
model, and application. Theory articles (27%) present reflections, 
frameworks, or principles about a specific area; models (58%) refer to 
articles that develop analytical models; applications (15%) embed 
models into an applicable product such as DSSs. Altay & Green (2006) 
outline major future research directions. The first refers to the specific 
conditions of disaster situations. Although good planning is important 
in such situations, some room for improvisation due to the unusual 
challenges should be left. A change from routine management is re-
quired to successfully provide decision support. This can be achieved 
by developing or combining interdisciplinary techniques that take into 
account the inherent structure of disaster situations where knowledge 
is incomplete and uncertainty cannot be easily resolved. Moreover, the 
authors conclude that most articles concentrate on external decision-
makers (according to the distinction introduced in section 3.3.2). 
Therefore, future research must strengthen the focus on BCM (internal 
decision-makers) by considering company-level post-disaster logistical 
decision problems. 
An extension of the contribution of Altay & Green (2006) is provided 
by Galindo & Batta (2013). The authors review 155 papers of OR/MS 
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research in DOM. They refer to the classification scheme developed by 
Altay & Green (2006). Their results show that mathematical program-
ming (33%) is still the most frequently applied methodology. Simula-
tion (18%) and decision theory and MAUT (18%) remain relatively 
stable compared to the former review. A significant decrease can be 
observed regarding probability and statistics (6%). Research on the 
pre-disaster period is still the major scope of research. While between 
each 23% and 33% of research concentrates on mitigation, prepared-
ness, and response, just 3% considers disaster recovery. Findings re-
garding the distinction of theory, model, and application confirm the 
trend shown by Altay & Green (2006): while about 76% of articles 
concentrate on models, the amount of application articles, including 
DSSs, is very small (5%). A significant change affects the considered 
type of disaster which is more generic (70%) compared to the previous 
review (38%). Authors recommend future research of application 
studies that provide tools for taking theoretical and analytical research 
into practice. They explicitly highlight the need for supporting deci-
sion-making in quick and efficient ways by intensifying research on 
DSSs regarding all phases of DOM. As articles again mainly address 
external decision-makers, a lack of research regarding BCM in disaster 
situations is revealed. 
The interface of SCM and DOM is addressed by the survey of Nataraja-
rathinam et al. (2009). The authors explore research trends of manag-
ing SCs in times of crisis prior to and in the aftermath of an SC disturb-
ance. They investigate 118 peer-reviewed articles in 48 journals that 
concentrate on OR/MS and SCM research. As opposed to the previously 
outlined review articles, authors respect all internal and external 
sources that might impact an SC. Although disasters are the main (ex-
ternal) source of SC disturbances (63% of reviewed articles), also arti-
cles focusing on internal sources (e.g. financial issues) are identified 
(17%). SC disturbances caused by a combination of both internal and 
external sources is the scope of 20% of articles. Research mainly focus-
ses on disturbances that affect the whole SC (41%) or that occur re-
gionally (41%). Findings show that research is typically about proac-
tive approaches and, thus, rather on the phases of mitigation and pre-
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paredness than on response and recovery. 69% of articles consider SC 
disturbances from an analytical or conceptual perspective; just 22% 
suggest an application (e.g. DSSs). Moreover, authors highlight a lack of 
applications that are targeted at strengthening SC robustness. 
Hrisridis et al. (2010) consider the management and analysis of data in 
disaster situations. They explicitly address challenges of DSSs to be 
operable in disaster situations. Decision models are typically devel-
oped to handle specific needs of decision-making. This is, however, 
critical in disaster management where one single model might not be 
sufficient. Authors therefore outline the need for research to combine 
or to aggregate individual decision models (Meissner et al. 2002). 
Moreover, Hrisridis et al. (2010) highlight the dynamic property of 
disaster situations (Schneid & Collins 2000). It is necessary to adapt 
decision models to the dynamic needs of disaster management. This is 
associated with the challenge of making decisions under the restriction 
of uncertain data and varying sources of uncertainty. Future research 
should develop DSSs that are appropriate to process time-evolving and 
uncertain data. The relevance of DSSs in disaster situations is con-
firmed by Schryen et al. (2015). The authors highlight the need for 
improving communication using transparent and easily understanda-
ble decision support tools (Comfort 2007). This is particularly crucial 
when supporting decision-makers in the response phase where re-
sponse plans must be executed (Mendonca et al. 2007). 
Rennemo et al. (2014) review measures of OR/MS that have been ap-
plied in disaster response. Authors explicitly focus on external deci-
sion-makers (e.g. of humanitarian logistics). An important requirement 
of decision-making is uncertainty handling. Results of the survey show 
that uncertainty is mainly handled in a stochastic manner. This refers 
to varying logistical decision problems such as, inter alia, facility loca-
tion and covering tour problems (e.g. Balcik & Beamon 2008), resource 
allocation and vehicle routing problems (e.g. Van Hentenryck et al. 
2010), and network flow and facility routing problems (e.g. Mete & 
Zabinsky 2010). The relevance of stochastically processing uncertainty 
has also been addressed by Hoyos et al. (2015). The authors build on 
the contributions of Altay & Green (2006) and Galindo & Batta (2013). 
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They review 101 articles that use an OR/MS model with some stochas-
tic component to improve the decision-making process in DOM. Re-
sults show that mathematical programming with stochastic compo-
nents is the most popular methodology in this domain (48%), followed 
by probability and statistical models (20%) and expert systems (12%). 
Particularly models of two-stage and scenario-based stochastic pro-
gramming can be found, for example processing facility location prob-
lems (e.g. Chang et al. 2007) or distribution problems (e.g. Tricoire et 
al. 2012). Further articles develop, inter alia, two-stage, dynamic, and 
scenario-based stochastic programming models for the prepositioning 
and allocation of facilities and commodity distribution after a disaster 
event (Rawls & Turnquist 2012). Integrating stochastic components 
into decision theory can be, furthermore, found in terms of Bayesian 
probabilistic networks, analytical hierarchy process (AHP), multi-
criteria decision-making and multi-attribute evaluation. An example is 
the contribution of Frey & Butenuth (2011) who apply a dynamic 
Bayesian network to assess the functionality of infrastructural objec-
tives in the aftermath of an occurring natural disaster. Hoyos et al. 
(2015) conclude a lack of research focusing on scenario planning as a 
measure to cope with non-quantifiable uncertainty. Most models as-
sume distributional information without any previous analysis. This 
might trigger mistakes when applied in disaster response. Moreover, 
Hoyos et al. (2015) highlight the need for combining models in a mul-
tidisciplinary manner (e.g. by combining methods of mathematical 
programming and decision theory). 
Yao et al. (2009) provide an approach that handles uncertainty non-
stochastically through a scenario-based robust optimization model to 
support decision-making in transportation planning. Their focus is on 
demand uncertainty and they use the strictly robust counterpart to 
develop a robust solution. A related approach is suggested by Ben-Tal 
et al. (2011). They apply a scenario-based robust optimization model 
to dynamically assign emergency response and evacuation traffic flow 
problems with a pre-defined time dependent (dynamic) demand un-
certainty. 
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Most articles on SCCM and DOM take the perspective of external deci-
sion-makers (Sahebjamnia et al. 2015). A topical review of academic 
and practitioner journals in the field of humanitarian logistics is pro-
vided by Kovács & Spens (2007). They conclude that the importance of 
logistics is still underestimated in disaster operations from a generic 
viewpoint. Based on this paper, Caunhye et al. (2012) review optimiza-
tion models of emergency logistics to identify research gaps and to 
suggest future research directions. The authors consider different de-
cision problems. With respect to facility location problems, they pro-
pose to switch the focus from pre-disaster positioning to post-disaster 
modelling that takes into account the dynamic and uncertain disaster 
environment. Moreover, the authors address the limitation of optimi-
zation models in general. One aspect in this regard refers to the availa-
bility of information. Even if such information is available, optimization 
models may take too long to solve to optimality. Authors underline that 
it is rather essential to make models more practical. A further review 
of humanitarian logistics is provided by Liberatore et al. (2013). They 
find out that mostly stochastic programming is applied within decision 
models to process uncertainty. However, these studies are not typically 
integrated within systems or tools that are appropriate to provide de-
cision support for practitioners. The authors therefore recommend 
intensifying the development of DSSs that are able to manage uncer-
tainty.  
As stated by various authors (e.g. Altay & Green 2006; Natarajarathi-
nam et al. 2009; Galindo & Batta 2013), there is a lack of decision sup-
port aiding internal decision-makers. As explicitly discussed by Galin-
do & Batta (2013), there are virtually no articles available that are re-
lated to BCM in times of disasters. The focus is rather on developing 
models for helping the affected population in general. Just little atten-
tion is paid to business disturbances. A limited number of articles de-
velops models for business continuity and recovery planning (Saheb-
jamnia et al. 2015). These articles, however, rather focus on the de-
scription of general frameworks of BCM in DOM than on the 
development of decision support models. Bryson et al. (2002), for ex-
ample, discuss disaster recovery alternatives of organizational crisis 
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management in general. Sahebjamnia et al. (2015) develop an integrat-
ed BCM and DRP framework that includes all strategic, tactical, and 
operational decision levels with different time frames, and various 
elements at each level. 
3.4 Summary and research objectives 
Chapter 3 provided the conceptual background of this research. The 
scope is on P-SCs whose functioning is an essential element to protect 
public safety of a disaster-affected society or community. Section 3.1 
introduced the fields of logistics/SCM and disaster research by defin-
ing relevant terminologies and concepts. Section 3.2 discussed general 
implications of SCM in the case that a disaster causes an SC disturb-
ance. This included the consideration of the subdivisions of SCM (SCRM 
and SCCM) as well as their assignment to the phases of DOM (mitiga-
tion, preparedness, response, and recovery). Major strategies towards 
SC disturbances – robustness, flexibility, and resilience – have been 
highlighted. Section 3.3 discussed implications of decision-making in 
SCCM. Therefore, the importance of uncertainty and complexity in the 
aftermath of an occurring disaster was discussed and the scope of re-
sponsible decision-makers of SCCM was outlined. The section closed 
with a literature review regarding existing approaches of OR/MS to 
provide decision support in disaster-caused decision situations.  
Following the considerations of this chapter, four research objectives 
(RO1-RO4) arise which are outlined in the following paragraphs: 
- RO1: Development of a DSS that takes analytical advantage of 
OR/MS models by integrating them into an applicable decision 
support tool. 
- RO2: Development of a reactive DSS for SCCM that aids decision-
makers in the disaster response phase by providing a robust de-
cision recommendation. 
- RO3: Development of an innovative scenario-based approach 
that allows the processing of uncertainty and complexity in a 
disaster-caused decision situation. 
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- RO4: Development of a DSS that is generic in nature, is able to 
adapt to varying logistical decision problems, and supports ei-
ther internal or external decision-makers.  
The high number of articles dealing with OR/MS research in DOM in 
general and at the interface of SCM and DOM as illustrated by the liter-
ature review in section 3.3.3 underlines the importance of this field of 
research. Authors state that articles mainly concentrate on the discus-
sion of theories and framework as well as on the development of very 
decision problem-specific OR/MS models. There is a lack of applica-
tions to be used by decision-makers (Altay & Green 2006; Natarajara-
thinam et al. 2009; Galindo & Batta 2013). As explicitly concluded by 
Galindo & Batta (2013), this lack mainly affects the unavailability of 
DSSs. Authors recommend that future research should develop tools 
that take theoretical and analytical OR/MS research into the practical 
field. Hence, the research objective RO1 is to develop a DSS that takes 
the analytical advantage of OR/MS models by integrating them into an 
applicable decision support tool.  
Most articles that concentrate on the interface of OR/MS models and 
SCM consider the pre-disaster phases (Natarajarathinam et al. 2009). 
This is particular true for facility location problems (Caunhye et al. 
2012). Research objective RO2 is to develop a reactive DSS for SCCM 
that aids decision-makers in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the 
response phase. In fact, the DSS should be able to manage P-SC dis-
turbances. Therefore, it must be able to provide a robust decision rec-
ommendation when processing a specific logistical decision problem. 
This is an important prerequisite for a robust P-SC design. Because of 
dynamics affecting disaster situations, robustness is to be understood 
in the sense of state flexibility to guarantee that P-SCs work despite 
changes in the environment (Mandelbaum 1978; De Toni & Tonchia 
2005). The lack of applications that respect the need for robust SCs (in 
general) to hedge against SC disturbances has been highlighted by Na-
tarajarathinam et al. (2009). 
The crucial challenge of decision-making in the immediate post-
disaster period is that an occurring decision situation might be affected 
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by uncertainty and complexity. Decision support tools must be able to 
process uncertain data of varying sources (Hrisridis et al. 2010). 
Schneid & Collins (2000) underline the dynamic behavior of the disas-
ter situation (as the dominant property of a complex system in this 
regard) which must be appropriately respected by a DSS (Hrisridis et 
al. 2010). Various authors address the limitations of existing optimiza-
tion models focusing on disaster situations (Caunhye et al. 2012; Lib-
eratore et al. 2013). When stochastic optimization models are applied 
to handle uncertainty, probability distributions are needed to specify 
uncertain parameters. This is, however, rarely the case from a practical 
viewpoint (Ben-Tal et al. 2011). Non-stochastic robust optimization 
models might be useful to bypass this problem. Nevertheless, issues 
might be caused when the disaster situation is faced by dynamic de-
velopments. The consideration of dynamic parameters (e.g. demand 
uncertainty over time) has been addressed by few articles (e.g. Ben-Tal 
et al. 2011). Authors assume that dynamics can be treated in a predict-
able manner. In disaster situations it is possible that dynamic devel-
opments change the state of the decision environment from scratch 
(e.g. caused by secondary disasters, changes of the socioeconomic and 
cascading effects of P-SCs and CI sectors). Such disaster-caused dynam-
ic developments have been described as unpredictable (Johnson 2013). 
Hence, there is a need for innovative approaches to respect dynamic 
developments and, thus, complexity by decision-making in disaster 
situations. 
Altay & Green (2006) and Hoyos et al. (2015) highlight the future re-
search needed for combining interdisciplinary techniques that take 
into account the inherent structure of disaster situations where 
knowledge is incomplete and uncertainty cannot be easily resolved. As 
stated by Galindo & Batta (2013), the use of scenarios might be a useful 
measure for uncertainty handling. Hoyos et al. (2015) underline a lack 
of research in this regard. The major challenge of applying scenario 
techniques in a disaster situation is that strong uncertainty might trig-
ger an overwhelming number of possible scenarios (Hoyos et al. 2015). 
Models of OR/MS frequently use scenario-based approaches, such as 
stochastic or robust optimization models. Regarding the first, the 
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drawback refers to the unavailability of distributional information (see 
above). Robust optimization models, in turn, construct scenarios by 
defining uncertainty sets. In the case that a disaster situation is affect-
ed by complexity in terms of disaster-caused dynamic developments 
(see above), the uncertainty space and, thus, the scenario space (over-
all number of scenarios) might not be visible. Therefore, research ob-
jective RO3 focusses on the development of an innovative scenario-
based approach that allows the processing the relevant aspects of un-
certainty and complexity in a disaster-caused decision situation. To be 
applicable in the response phase, such an approach must be embedded 
into a system that is transparent and easily understandable by nature 
(Comfort 2007; Schryen et al. 2015). 
Current OR/MS research in DOM and SCM mainly addresses external 
decision-makers (according to the distinction between internal and 
external decision-makers of section 3.3.2). As summarized by Galindo 
& Batta (2013), there are virtually no articles that relate to BCM in 
times of disaster and, thus, take the perspective of internal decision-
makers. Various authors underline the future research to strengthen 
the focus on BCM in terms of solving company-level post-disaster logis-
tical problems (Altay & Green 2006). When addressing the post-
disaster management of P-SC disturbances, both internal and external 
decision-makers might bear responsibility. From the perspective of 
SCCM, logistical decision problems that arise in a disaster situation 
might be similar. Therefore, research objective RO4 is to develop a DSS 
that is generic in nature. This implies that the DSS should be able to 
adapt to varying logistical decision problems. Rather than in-depth 
analyzing the differences between internal or external decision-
makers, the focus of the DSS should be on the similarities affecting 
both categories of decision-makers: the excessive demand to respect 
uncertainty and complexity characterizing the disaster-affected deci-
sion environment while making a decision. 
  
4 The decision support system 
ReDRiSS 
The previous chapters introduced the fields of decision-making under 
uncertainty (risk, ignorance) and complexity (chapter 2) and decision 
support for SCCM in the case of a disaster-caused P-SC disturbance 
(chapter 3). These chapters provided the methodological and concep-
tual basis to develop the Reactive Disaster and supply chain Risk deci-
sion Support System ReDRiSS. Section 4.1 outlines preliminary consid-
erations of the development process. Parts and processing steps of  
ReDRiSS are summarized in section 4.2 and discussed in the sections 
4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. The chapter closes with a summary and discussion in 
section 4.6. 
4.1 Preliminary considerations 
The following sections outline the scope of ReDRiSS by discussing the 
decision situations it focusses on and its relevance for the management 
of disaster-caused P-SC disturbances. Subsequently, requirements that 
must be fulfilled by ReDRiSS are listed. 
4.1.1 Scope of ReDRiSS 
ReDRiSS addresses the post-disaster management of P-SC disturb-
ances. While its application should support reactive SCCM, its estab-
lishment (customization to a specific decision situation) is a measure 
of preventive SCRM which decision-makers can proactively invest in. 
The following paragraphs briefly highlight the scope of ReDRiSS from 
two perspectives.  
Scope of ReDRiSS 1: decision situations 
The insights of chapter 2 and 3 allow the distinction between three 
stereotypical decision situations arising in SCCM. Decision situations of 
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category 1 occur on an everyday level and are characterized by a high 
occurrence probability (e.g. seasonal demand fluctuations). The deci-
sion-makers are still aware of this due to the experience and 
knowledge they have gained from previous situations. This knowledge 
is associated with the availability of statistical data with a high degree 
of validity. To be a useful measure in such decision situations, a DSS 
must be able to handle uncertainty in terms of risk by processing this 
statistical data (“stochastic uncertainty”). Decision situations of cate-
gory 2 are characterized by a low occurrence probability. The situa-
tions can be described as “extreme” because the impact might be se-
vere (e.g. an IT failure). Nevertheless, negative consequences are pre-
dictable to a certain degree and can be captured by applying 
appropriate measures such as scenario techniques. To assist decision-
makers in handling decision situations of category 2, a DSS must be 
able to process uncertainty in terms of ignorance (“scenario-based 
uncertainty”). Decision situations of category 3 are also characterized 
by a low occurrence probability. As opposed to situations of category 2, 
however, the feature of being “extreme” is exceeded as parts of the 
situation are unpredictable (e.g. a power blackout for several weeks 
due to a heat wave). According to the considerations of chapter 2, such 
decision situations are characterized by properties of a complex sys-
tem. Table 4-1 summarizes the directives of the stereotypical decision 
situations. 
Table 4-1: Categories of decision situations 
Decision  
situation 
Objective of SCCM Scope of decision support 
Category 1 
Management of decision situa-
tions arising on an everyday level 
Management of uncertainty in 
terms of risk 
Category 2 
Management of “extreme” and 
predictable decision situations 
Management of uncertainty in 
terms of ignorance 
Category 3 
Management of “extreme” and 
unpredictable decision situations 
Management of complexity 
The objective of ReDRiSS is to support reactive SCCM in the case of a 
disaster-caused P-SC disturbance. As it has been discussed in chapter 
3, the major challenge is thereby to respect the consequences in the 
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environment caused by the disaster. ReDRiSS includes a scenario tech-
nique that primary analyzes uncertainty in terms of ignorance due to 
sparse or lacking exogenous information arising in disaster response 
(in terms of a category 2 decision situation). In addition, the scenario 
technique allows to systematically exploring the most crucial disaster-
relevant property of a complex system: dynamic developments in the 
environment (in terms of a category 3 decision situation). Widespread 
possibilities of such (unpredictable) dynamic developments exist 
which can never be respected completely by decision-making. There-
fore, ReDRiSS focusses on dynamic developments that are related to 
the main disaster. This includes secondary disasters in the aftermath of 
the main disaster (e.g. earthquake aftershocks) and socioeconomic 
changes (e.g. demand fluctuations due to population movements) (Pre-
lipcean & Boscoianu 2011; Hoyos et al. 2015). 
Scope of ReDRiSS 2: managing P-SC disturbances 
When a ship on the high seas encounters a severe storm, basically four 
developments of the situation are imaginable. First, the ship is strong 
enough to withstand the storm without any difficulty (best case); sec-
ond, the ship sinks and everyone on board dies (worst case); third, the 
structure of the ship is severely affected, but when all available capa-
bilities and capacities are used, the ship can get through the storm 
relatively unscathed; fourth, the ship sinks, but a lifeboat is rapidly 
made ready and rescues (at least temporarily) passengers and crew. 
This metaphor can be transferred to a decision situation where a disas-
ter affects P-SCs. In the best case, P-SCs remain functional without dif-
ficulty; in the worst case, P-SCs collapse and trigger negative conse-
quences for public safety. In terms of the third and fourth possibility 
described in the metaphor, the development of the situation toward 
the worst case is avoidable when the right measures are implemented. 
Of course, these four risk cases can, in addition, occur simultaneously 
or they may switch over time. For example, it is imaginable that a P-SC, 
despite being not seriously affected in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster, is disrupted or delayed because interconnected CI sectors and 
P-SCs fail and consequences cascade through the network. 
4.1 Preliminary considerations 
82 
Two severity levels in the consequences to disturbed P-SCs can be dis-
tinguished: disruptions and destructions of P-SCs. In the case of the first 
severity level, the scope of SCCM is to develop adaptation strategies 
whose implementation strengthens the functioning of disrupted P-SCs 
to avoid a supply interruption. Public safety has not been directly af-
fected; the objective is rather to prevent the society or community 
from belated consequences. In the case that the second severity level 
occurs, SCCM needs to reestablish P-SCs rapidly. Compensation strate-
gies are required to temporarily bypass unavailable P-SCs with re-
placement structures (compensating P-SCs) that take over their func-
tionalities. As the disaster has already triggered severe consequences, 
the objective of compensation strategies is to reduce further deteriora-
tion of the situation and to avoid a supply vacuum. In several situa-
tions, both adaptation strategies and compensation strategies are re-
quired; for example, when non-redundant P-SCs fail and need to be 
replaced while further P-SCs can be strengthened by adaptation strat-
egies.  
The objective of ReDRiSS is to aid SCCM in developing both types of 
strategies. With respect to the considerations of chapter 3, the devel-
opment of compensation strategies addresses its application by exter-
nal decision-makers (e.g. public authorities). The development of adap-
tation strategies aids internal decision-makers in terms of entities of 
the disrupted P-SCs themselves (e.g. an affected organization). To veri-
fy ReDRiSS, two case studies are conducted in the further chapters. The 
first refers to the field of humanitarian logistics where the objective of 
ReDRiSS is to develop compensation strategies (see chapter 5); the 
second concentrates on the field of BCM focusing on adaptation strate-
gies (see chapter 6) (see Figure 4-1). 
 
Figure 4-1: Scope of ReDRiSS 
Consequences of a disturbed P-SC
P-SC destruction triggering a supply vacuum P-SC disruption triggering a supply interruption
Decision support of compensation strategies
(case study in chapter 5)
Decision support of adaptation strategies
(case study in chapter 6)
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Decisions in terms of logistical operations (planning tasks) can be clas-
sified according to the planning horizon (see chapter 3) (Günther & 
Tempelmeier 2011). Strategic decisions concern the strategic design of 
an SC and have a long-term focus, tactical decisions refer to the plan-
ning of the SC network with a mid-term focus, and operational deci-
sions deal with the execution of logistical operations. Specifications of 
adaptation strategies depend on the situational context and the under-
lying logistical decision problem. They can be principally required at 
any management level. Compensation strategies theoretically refer to 
any logistical decision problem as well; as opposed to adaptation strat-
egies, however, the strategic network design of compensating P-SCs 
arises from a higher priority than network planning (tactical) and net-
work operation strategies (operational). This is because time is a criti-
cal restriction in disaster response, and strategic network design strat-
egies are the foundation of replacement structures, including, inter 
alia, strategies for identifying the best locations for temporal distribu-
tion centers or for supplier selections. 
4.1.2 Requirements of ReDRiSS 
To address the research objectives that have been identified in section 
3.4, ReDRiSS must fulfil the requirements listed below. In fact, ReDRiSS 
should 
- be based on a generic structure to be preventively adaptable to 
various decision situations (as the task of SCRM) and to provide 
reactive decision support for SCCM in disaster response 
- be able to support both internal and external decision-makers by 
developing either adaptation strategies or compensation strate-
gies 
- include an innovative scenario-based methodology to respect 
both uncertainty and complexity of the decision situation during 
a disaster situation 
- be holistic in its nature to operationalize all steps of the decision-
making process 
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- achieve a high analytical accuracy by using approaches of OR/MS 
to solve the underlying logistical decision problem 
- be able to respect possible multiple objectives of the decision-
makers and operate according to their preferences 
- focus on the design of robust (adapted or compensated) P-SCs by 
providing a robust decision recommendation according to the 
risk preferences of the decision-makers 
- be transparent and easily understandable to provide a practical 
application for decision-makers 
The achievement of the listed requirements is discussed in the final 
section 4.6. 
4.2 Overview of parts and processing steps 
Figure 4-2 shows the generic rationale of ReDRiSS which comprises 
nine processing steps that are conducted across the four parts (A) im-
plementation, (B) two-stage scenario technique, (C) stress test, and (D) 
robustness measurement. Part A describes the implementation process 
of ReDRiSS in the pre-disaster phases (mitigation or preparedness); 
processing steps therefore refer to preventive SCRM. The application 
process of ReDRiSS to support reactive SCCM in the early post-disaster 
phase (disaster response) comprises processing steps of the parts B, C, 
and D. In the following paragraphs, a general overview of the involved 
parts is provided and the basic actions implied by the processing steps 
are briefly summarized. An in-depth consideration of the processing 
steps is the scope of the forthcoming sections 4.3 (part A and part B), 
4.4 (part C), and 4.5 (part D). 
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Figure 4-2: Parts and processing steps of ReDRiSS 
4.2.1 General overview 
The included parts of ReDRiSS operationalize the decision-making 
process under uncertainty and complexity (see IDC model in section 
2.1.2 and pattern-based management in section 2.2.3). In part A, the 
framework of ReDRiSS is set. Therefore, a requirements profile sum-
marizes the decision situation (e.g. decision-makers, logistical decision 
problem, objectives) and the scope of ReDRiSS to assist the decision-
makers. ReDRiSS integrates an optimization model (as a measure of 
mathematical programming) to solve the considered logistical decision 
problem. The parameters of the optimization model define the decision 
environment. Thereby, the decision environment includes all elements 
of the environment that might influence the solution of the decision 
problem. ReDRiSS constructs scenarios to capture uncertainty and 
complexity regarding the state of the decision environment. The struc-
ture of the scenarios is determined by the parameters of the optimiza-
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tion model. In fact, a scenario includes one specification per parameter. 
In preparation of part B (where the optimization model is applied to 
scenario techniques), the task of part A is to preventively develop a 
specification process per parameter. Hence, part A operationalizes the 
intelligence phase of the IDC model by defining the logistical decision 
problem and it prepares the conduction of the design phase. 
Part B includes a two-stage scenario technique. Exogenous information 
about the state of the disaster-affected decision environment is ex-
pected to be sparse or lacking in disaster response. Therefore, prognos-
tic scenarios (stage 1) are constructed by applying the specification 
processes that have been developed in part A. Prognostic scenarios 
describe different specifications of the uncertain parameters and, thus, 
states of the decision environment. They are used to formulate a num-
ber of deterministic optimization sub-models. Solving these sub-
models provides a set of alternatives (given by the values of the deci-
sion variables of the optimization model). As it is assumed that the 
disaster-affected decision environment might evolve dynamically over 
time (as a major property of a complex system in the context of disas-
ters), hypothetical scenarios are subsequently constructed (stage 2). 
Their objective is to simulate dynamic developments, caused by critical 
events, within the states of the decision environment determined by 
the prognostic scenarios. Hypothetical scenarios are needed to test 
alternatives as they correspond to deteriorated states of the decision 
environment. The criticality of dynamic developments might vary 
across alternatives. Therefore, ReDRiSS provides the opportunity to 
construct a customized set of hypothetical scenarios per alternative. 
Hence, part B refers to the design phase of the IDC model in terms of 
alternative generation under uncertainty. Moreover, the two-stage 
scenario technique operationalizes the process of pattern-based man-
agement: pattern seeking (construction of prognostic scenarios), pat-
tern modelling (generation of alternatives), and pattern adapting (con-
struction of hypothetical scenarios). 
Part C includes a stress test procedure to evaluate alternatives when 
they are applied to both prognostic and hypothetical scenario-specific 
optimization sub-models. The result is a set of outcomes per alterna-
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tive which refer to the objective function values. Part C is interrelated 
to the processing steps of part B. In fact, prognostic scenarios and gen-
erated alternatives are prioritized prior to the construction of hypo-
thetical scenarios. Just prioritized alternatives (denoted promising 
alternatives) and prioritized prognostic scenarios (denoted significant 
scenarios) are further processed into hypothetical scenarios. This is 
important for operational and computational reasons. After the con-
struction of hypothetical scenarios, all promising alternatives are test-
ed across the prognostic and the customized hypothetical scenarios. 
The obtained outcomes provide the input of part D. Hence, part C op-
erationalizes the design phase of the IDC model in terms of alternative 
evaluation. 
The objective of part D is to measure robustness of promising alterna-
tives based on the input provided by part C. Robustness refers to the 
appropriacy of a promising alternative to deal with the varying states 
of the decision environment specified by the prognostic and hypothet-
ical scenarios. Within robustness measurement, it is important to re-
spect the attitude of the decision-makers. This refers to both their 
preferences of objectives and their risk preferences. The result of part 
D is a robustness ranking of the promising alternatives. As this ranking 
directly depends on preferential adjustment screws that are under the 
control of the decision-makers, sensitivity analyses are finally required 
to explore the effects of preferential uncertainty. Part D operationaliz-
es the choice phase of the IDC model in terms of alternative selection 
and action determination. 
It is possible to repeat part B, C, and D and, thus, the process of reactive 
SCCM. This possibility is given when updated exogenous information is 
gathered from the decision environment over time and the deadline by 
which a decision has to be made has not been reached yet. 
4.2.2 Overview of processing steps 
The initiative of decision-makers (of SCRM) is essential to invest in the 
implementation/customization of ReDRiSS to get assistance in a specif-
ic decision situation. In processing step 1 (part A), the decision situation 
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is structured by defining the logistical decision problem and character-
izing the decision environment. Relevant questions that need to be 
answered are: Which actors are involved in different roles? What are 
their respective objectives? What decisions are addressed? Which 
parts of the decision environment characterize its state? The result is a 
requirements profile that summarizes the decision situation and the 
scope of ReDRiSS.  
The requirements profile lays the basis for formulating an optimization 
model in processing step 2 (part A). This optimization model is required 
to solve the reported logistical decision problem. The structure of sce-
narios is associated with this optimization model. In fact, a scenario is 
defined as a vector in ℝ𝑛 which includes the values of 𝑛 uncertain pa-
rameters; the 𝑖𝑡ℎ coordinate of the vector specifies the value of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
uncertain parameter (Hites et al. 2006). Each scenario is, thus, a dis-
crete combination of one specification per parameter. In preparation of 
part B, it is already important to steer both the process of specifying 
each parameter (see processing steps 3 and 6) and the process of solv-
ing each scenario-specific optimization sub-model (see processing step 
4). Moreover, possible sources of exogenous information are deter-
mined that must be activated in disaster response to specify the pa-
rameters. 
Prognostic scenarios are constructed in processing step 3 (part B). The 
parameters of the optimization model are specified by using the identi-
fied exogenous information sources. In disaster response, exogenous 
information is expected to be uncertain as lacking or being incomplete 
so that not all parameters can be specified deterministically. Prognos-
tic scenarios are constructed to overcome this uncertainty. Therefore, 
different specifications of the uncertain parameters are defined based 
on the developed specification processes of part A (see section 4.3.3). 
The reason for denoting scenarios “prognostic” is that they aim at de-
scribing probable and expected states of the decision environment. In 
fact, the construction of prognostic scenarios must follow the question: 
“what is most likely to happen in the uncertain decision environment?”  
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Each prognostic scenario defines one optimization sub-model. Pro-
cessing step 4 (part B) generates alternatives by solving each optimiza-
tion sub-model deterministically. An alternative is defined by specifica-
tions of the optimization model’s decision variables. Either exact solv-
ers or heuristics can be used to generate an optimal alternative or a set 
of Pareto-optimal alternatives per prognostic scenario (see section 
4.3.4). The result is an aggregated set of alternatives which have been 
generated across all prognostic scenarios.9  
In processing step 5 (part C), the generated alternatives are tested. The 
procedure is denoted stress test 1 as the outcome of an alternative (in 
terms of objective function values) is determined when it is applied to 
all prognostic scenario-specific optimization sub-models and in which 
it is not necessarily the optimal solution (“putting alternatives under 
stress”) (see section 4.4.3.1). Based on these outcomes, the regret per 
alternative and prognostic scenario is calculated. The regret refers to 
the outcome of an alternative in a scenario compared to the best out-
come that can be reached in the scenario by any other alternative 
(Scholl 2001). Obtained regret data are used to prioritize the set of 
alternatives toward a set of promising alternatives. These promising 
alternatives achieve minimal regret values across the prognostic sce-
narios (regarding a regret value threshold that has to be defined by the 
decision-makers). Additionally, a set of significant scenarios is generat-
ed per promising alternative. This set includes those prognostic sce-
narios in which the regret values of the promising alternatives are 
maximal (regarding a regret value threshold that has to be defined by 
the decision-makers). A set of significant scenarios, thus, includes the 
“worst case” prognostic scenarios of the considered promising alterna-
tive.10  
                                               
9 Depending on the case of application, it might also be possible to respect all feasible 
alternatives. 
10 Depending on the case of application, it might also be possible to further respect all 
generated alternatives and prognostic scenarios. In such a case, stress test 1 is omitted. 
The set of promising alternatives equals to the generated set of alternatives (processing 
step 4) and the set of significant scenarios equals to the set of prognostic scenarios (pro-
cessing step 3) which is the same for each promising alternative. 
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Hypothetical scenarios are constructed in processing step 6 (part B). 
Their construction follows the question: “what can additionally happen 
to the decision environment when probable and expected states (spec-
ified by prognostic scenarios) unfold and become vulnerable states or 
states of failure?” Hypothetical scenarios aim at revealing complexity 
by simulating critical events in the decision environment (see section 
4.3.5). In fact, a critical event triggers a dynamic development within 
the significant scenarios. With respect to the properties of complex 
systems (see chapter 2), widespread possibilities of such dynamic de-
velopments exist. Their relevance in terms of causing negative conse-
quences on outcomes of promising alternatives varies. Therefore, Re-
DRiSS proposes a methodology to capture dynamic developments by a 
customized set of hypothetical scenarios per promising alternative. 
Each set, thus, includes promising alternative specific critical and un-
expected states of the decision environment.  
In processing step 7 (part C), promising alternatives are tested and 
compared when they are applied in each prognostic scenario and hy-
pothetical scenario (stress test 2, see section 4.4.3.2). When a custom-
ized set of hypothetical scenarios has been generated per promising 
alternative, the alternative is just tested in its customized set. The ob-
jective of stress test 2 is to calculate regret values that can be used for 
robustness measurement in part D. As opposed to stress test 1, the 
regret calculations of this part explicitly concentrate on comparing 
outcomes of promising alternatives. This is because promising alterna-
tives have been assessed as appropriate (compared to all other alter-
natives) when they are applied to (probable and expected) prognostic 
scenarios (see stress test 1). The objective of processing step 7 is to 
provide data that can be analyzed to determine the robustness of prom-
ising alternatives to uncertainty (prognostic scenarios) and complexity 
(hypothetical scenarios). 
Based on the regret data, the objective of processing step 8 (part D) is 
to generate a robustness value per promising alternative. It is assumed 
that decision-makers in the field of DOM are characterized by risk 
aversion (Scholl 2001). Decision-makers are interested in receiving a 
decision recommendation that is robust in terms of hedging against 
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threats that are triggered by an uncertain and complex state of the 
decision environment. The implementation of a robust decision is one 
step towards a robust design of the (adapted or compensated) P-SC. 
Being risk averse, decision-makers might operate in a rather pessimis-
tic manner. This attitude reflects the question how to evaluate regret 
data. ReDRiSS distinguishes between the inter- and intra-scenario de-
grees of pessimism. While the first determines the robustness of alter-
natives when applied to prognostic and hypothetical scenarios, the 
latter adjusts the evaluation process of regret data within each scenar-
io category. Hence, processing step 8 integrates the personal degree of 
pessimism of decision-makers to develop one robustness value per 
promising alternative.11  
The obtained robustness ranking of promising alternatives is influ-
enced by subjective preference parameters and biases of the decision-
makers. To explore effects of preferential uncertainty in this regard, 
sensitivity analyses must be conducted in processing step 9 (part D). 
Their focus is on both varying preferences of objectives (in the case 
that the optimization model is of a multi-objective manner) and risk 
preferences in terms of the inter- and intra-scenario degrees of pessi-
mism. Subsequently, the robust alternative can be provided as a deci-
sion recommendation for the decision-makers. 
4.3 Implementation and application of the two-stage 
scenario technique 
In chapter 2, the relevance of scenarios for uncertainty handling in 
both disciplines of OR/MS, decision theory and mathematical pro-
gramming, has been discussed. ReDRiSS includes a two-stage scenario 
technique in part B to process uncertainty and complexity affecting the 
state of the decision environment. In the following, definitions are pro-
vided and the rationale of implementing and applying the two-stage 
                                               
11 Robustness measurement in ReDRiSS respects the degree of pessimism of the decision-
makers. Although robustness measurement is thereby based on regret data, the concept of 
regret aversion is not addressed. For further information regarding this concept, see Broll 
et al. (2013). 
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scenario technique is summarized and its included processing steps 
are outlined: structuring of the optimization model and of scenarios 
(processing step 2), construction of prognostic scenarios (processing 
step 3), generation of alternatives (processing step 4), and construc-
tion of hypothetical scenarios (processing step 6). 
4.3.1 Definitions 
Let in the following be: 
- 𝑎 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝐽) ∈ Ω a vector of 𝐽 decision variables where Ω is the 
decision space  
- 𝑓(𝑎) = {𝑓1(𝑎),… , 𝑓𝐹(𝑎)} a set of 𝐹 ∈ ℤ objective functions  
- 𝑔(𝑎) = {𝑔1(𝑎), … , 𝑔𝐺(𝑎)} a set of 𝐺 ∈ ℤ constraint functions 
[4-1] highlights the generic formulation of the optimization model as a 
minimization problem (maximization problems are treated respective-
ly). The formulation refers to a single objective optimization model 
when 𝐹 = 1 and to a multi-objective optimization model when 𝐹 ≥ 2 
(Zitzler 1999). An alternative 𝑎 of the decision space Ω is defined by 
the specifications of all decision variables 𝑥𝑗 ∈ {𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝐽}. 
mina 𝑓(𝑎) = (𝑓1(𝑎),… , 𝑓𝐹(𝑎)) [4-1] 
subject to 𝑔(𝑎) = (𝑔1(𝑎),… , 𝑔𝐺(𝑎)) ≤ 0  
 𝑎 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝐽) ∈ Ω  
Let 𝑃𝑎𝑟 = {𝑝𝑎𝑟1, … , 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑝, … , 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑃} be the parameters included within 
𝑓(𝑎) and 𝑔(𝑎). A scenario is a combination of one discrete specification 
per parameter 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑎𝑟. The set of scenarios 𝑆, thus, refers to the 
Cartesian product: 
 𝑆 = 𝑉(𝑝𝑎𝑟1) × …× 𝑉(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑝) × …× 𝑉(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑃) [4-2] 
where 
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 𝑉(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑝) = {𝑣1(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑝), … , 𝑣𝑛𝑝(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑝),… , 𝑣𝑁𝑝(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑝)} [4-3] 
is the set of discrete specifications of 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑎𝑟 and 𝑁𝑝 is the absolute 
number of specifications of this set. The Cartesian product in [4-2] can 
be defined as  
 𝑆 = {{𝑣𝑛1(𝑝𝑎𝑟1), … , 𝑣𝑛𝑃(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑃)}|𝑣𝑛𝑝(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑝) ∈ 𝑉(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑝),
𝑝 = 1,… , 𝑃, 𝑛𝑝 ∈ {1, … ,𝑁𝑝}} 
[4-4] 
Indicator 𝑙 refers to the 𝑙𝑡ℎ set included in 𝑆 which is denoted scenario 
𝑠𝑙 ∈ 𝑆. The total number of scenarios |𝑆| is 
 
|𝑆| = |𝑉(𝑝𝑎𝑟1)| ∙ … ∙ |𝑉(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑃)| =∏𝑁𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1
 [4-5] 
4.3.2 Rationale of the two-stage scenario technique 
Scenario construction in ReDRiSS is associated with the specification of 
the parameters of 𝑃𝑎𝑟. The following types of parameters are distin-
guished: 
- 𝐸𝑉 ⊆ 𝑃𝑎𝑟 is a set of environmental variables which characterizes 
the state of the disaster-affected decision environment. Their 
specifications are prone to uncertainty and complexity. 
- 𝑃𝑉 ⊆ 𝑃𝑎𝑟 is a set of planning variables which highlights planning 
assumptions for decision-making. Their specifications are de-
terministic. 
Note that 𝐸𝑉 ∪ 𝑃𝑉 = 𝑃𝑎𝑟. Let |𝐸𝑉| and |𝑃𝑉| be the absolute numbers 
of environmental variables and planning variables. To ensure that al-
ternatives are generated and tested under the same planning condi-
tions, it is assumed that planning information is available and deter-
ministic. This planning information is captured from the decision-
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makers or the decision environment (e.g. budget, number of ware-
houses). Hence, all constructed (prognostic and hypothetical) scenari-
os contain constant specifications of planning variables. This is an im-
portant requirement when testing alternatives as it ensures that any 
generated alternative is feasible in any scenario-specific optimization 
sub-model from a planning perspective (see section 4.4). Scenarios 
exclusively vary in the specifications of environmental variables that 
characterize the state of the disaster-affected decision environment. 
Thus, the exploration of effects of uncertainty and complexity by  
ReDRiSS is always associated with the specifications of the environ-
mental variables. Thereby, the construction of prognostic and hypo-
thetical scenarios differs in the underlying types of information that 
are processed to determine these specifications.  
Prognostic scenarios are developed to close knowledge gaps caused by 
lacks of exogenous information which is gathered from the decision 
environment in disaster response and that indicates its conditions (e.g. 
states of roads). In a disaster-affected decision environment, exoge-
nous information is expected to be insufficient to specify all environ-
mental variables in a deterministic manner. Therefore, varying specifi-
cations of uncertain environmental variables must be defined. 
Hypothetical scenarios aim at exploring dynamic developments in 
terms of changing states of the decision environment over time (e.g. 
shifts in population demands, secondary disasters such as earthquake 
aftershocks). As opposed to prognostic scenarios, the construction of 
hypothetical scenarios is not necessarily linked to exogenous infor-
mation. It rather processes endogenous information provided by part C 
of ReDRiSS itself: prioritized alternatives that come into question to 
solve the decision problem (promising alternatives) and “worst case” 
prognostic scenarios per promising alternative (significant scenarios) 
whose underlying states of the decision environment are modified by 
simulating dynamic developments.  
The distinction between prognostic and hypothetical scenarios is in-
spired by the scenario classification of Börjeson et al. (2006). The au-
thors distinguish between predictive and explorative scenarios (see 
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section 2.1.3). While prognostic scenarios refer to the class of predic-
tive scenarios and aim at answering the question “what is happening/ 
what will happen?” hypothetical scenarios are explorative scenarios 
and imply the question “what can happen?”  
In a decision situation under uncertainty (in terms of ignorance), the 
occurrence probability of any possible state of the decision environ-
ment (and, thus, of scenarios and outcomes of alternatives) is unavail-
able (Camerer & Weber 1992; Wiens 2013). This assumption is inten-
sified in a decision situation under complexity where the state of deci-
sion environment is characterized by a constant flux. Here, even the 
overall scenario space and the existing set of alternatives is unknown. 
Scenario construction in ReDRiSS follows the principle of insufficient 
reason, a statute that can be traced back to the work of Laplace and 
Bernoulli (Bamberg & Coenenberg 2006). It implies that any consid-
ered state of the decision environment (scenario) has the same occur-
rence probability. A major point of criticism of this principle is that, 
under the assumption of equal probabilities of states, each state is in-
deed characterized by a very specific occurrence probability (Wiens 
2013). Additionally, probabilities vary when more or less states are 
respected.  
Nevertheless, ReDRiSS follows the principle of insufficient reason. This 
is because, as emphasized by Kouvelis & Yu (1997), there is a threat of 
misjudgments with compulsively defining occurrence probabilities of 
scenarios. In fact, this principle is in ReDRiSS separately assumed for 
each scenario category (prognostic and hypothetical scenarios). Alt-
hough it is not verified to what degree the constructed sets of prognos-
tic and hypothetical scenarios represent the overall scenario space, 
ReDRiSS assumes the same occurrence probabilities of scenarios of 
each scenario category. This is crucial to avoid an over- or underesti-
mation of constructed scenarios. Nevertheless, the (subjective) occur-
rence probability of a (probable and expected) prognostic scenario is 
principly higher than the occurrence probability of a (critical and un-
expected) hypothetical scenario. 
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4.3.3 Construction of prognostic scenarios 
The decision situation is defined as certain if all environmental varia-
ble specifications are deterministically as exogenously given. In this 
case, scenarios are not required as the optimization model in [4-1] can 
be applied in a deterministic manner. When at least one uncertain en-
vironmental variable is identified, prognostic scenarios must be con-
structed to deal with this uncertainty. The following sections outline 
the process of constructing prognostic scenarios and their formal 
mathematical definition.  
4.3.3.1 Process of constructing prognostic scenarios 
The construction of prognostic scenarios is prepared by SCRM (pro-
cessing step 2) and conducted by SCCM (processing step 3). Five tasks 
are therefore required (see Figure 4-3).  
 
Figure 4-3: Process of constructing prognostic scenarios 
When implementing ReDRiSS, parameters of the optimization model 
must be classified by planning and environmental variables. As any 
environmental variable might become uncertain in the aftermath of a 
disaster, it is important to be prepared for the case that all environ-
mental variables must be reactively specified without the availability 
of any exogenous information. Therefore, a specification process per 
environmental variable is preventively defined (task 1). Widespread 
possibilities exist for this purpose; the possibility chosen depends on 
the underlying case of application. For example, it is imaginable to 
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define, per environmental variable, methods (e.g. Monte-Carlo method) 
or functions (e.g. statistical distributions) that regulate its specifica-
tion. The task is associated with the need for already capturing availa-
ble exogenous information (e.g. historical data) or its sources that must 
be activated when constructing prognostic scenarios by applying speci-
fication processes. 
The extent of prognostic scenarios is determined by the exogenous 
information states of environmental variables in the aftermath of a 
disaster (task 2). There is a distinction between the information states 
available and unavailable. If the information state of an environmental 
variable is unavailable, it must be respected within the construction 
process of prognostic scenarios. When its information state is availa-
ble, the question arises whether this information is complete or incom-
plete. In the case that the information state is complete, the environ-
mental variable can be specified in a deterministic manner. An incom-
plete information state at the most indicates several aspects of this 
specification (e.g. entries of several matrix cells of an environmental 
variable). It is assumed that the reliability of all available exogenous 
information is guaranteed within ReDRiSS; reliability verifications are 
the task of upstream processes of information gathering, e.g. supported 
by ICT systems. 
For example, an environmental variable might be a matrix highlighting 
the conditions of a transportation network. Value entries of cells of this 
matrix refer to the required times to use the routes (e.g. measured in 
hours). When the information is complete, each cell is specified by a 
number; when the information is incomplete, several cells cannot be 
specified as either the conditions of several route connections are not 
known or exogenous information just indicates difficulties of using the 
transportation routes. Varying specifications must be defined for the 
uncertain environmental variable by anticipating expected times.  
Hence, an environmental variable is uncertain if its information state is 
unavailable or available but incomplete. Environmental variables 
whose information state is available and complete can be specified in a 
deterministic manner (deterministic environmental variables) (task 3). 
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For the remaining environmental variables (uncertain environmental 
variables), the steered specification processes of processing step 2 
must be activated and conducted (task 4). Prognostic scenarios are 
finally constructed by combining each specification per uncertain envi-
ronmental variable and the constant specifications of the deterministic 
environmental variables and planning variables (task 5). 
4.3.3.2 Formal definition of prognostic scenarios 
Let in the following be: 
- 𝑃𝑉 = {𝑝𝑣1, … , 𝑝𝑣𝑚, … , 𝑝𝑣𝑀} the set of planning variables 
- 𝐸𝑉𝑑𝑒𝑡 = {𝑒𝑣1
𝑑𝑒𝑡 , … , 𝑒𝑣𝑑
𝑑𝑒𝑡 , … , 𝑒𝑣𝐷
𝑑𝑒𝑡} ⊆ 𝐸𝑉 the set of deterministic 
environmental variables 
- 𝐸𝑉𝑢𝑛𝑐 = {𝑒𝑣1
𝑢𝑛𝑐 , … , 𝑒𝑣𝑢
𝑢𝑛𝑐 , … , 𝑒𝑣𝑈
𝑢𝑛𝑐} ⊆ 𝐸𝑉 the set of uncertain 
environmental variables  
where 𝐸𝑉𝑑𝑒𝑡 ∪ 𝐸𝑉𝑢𝑛𝑐 = 𝐸𝑉. With respect to the formal scenario defini-
tion (see section 4.3.1), the set of prognostic scenarios 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 is defined 
as 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = (𝑉(𝑒𝑣1
𝑢𝑛𝑐) × …× 𝑉(𝑒𝑣𝑢
𝑢𝑛𝑐)…× 𝑉(𝑒𝑣𝑈
𝑢𝑛𝑐)) ∪ 
{𝑉(𝑒𝑣𝑑
𝑑𝑒𝑡)|𝑑 = 1,… , 𝐷} ∪ {𝑉(𝑝𝑣𝑚)|𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀} 
[4-6] 
where 
 𝑉(𝑒𝑣𝑢
𝑢𝑛𝑐) = {𝑣1(𝑒𝑣𝑢
𝑢𝑛𝑐),… , 𝑣𝑛𝑢(𝑒𝑣𝑢
𝑢𝑛𝑐), … , 𝑣𝑁𝑢(𝑒𝑣𝑢
𝑢𝑛𝑐)} [4-7] 
 𝑉(𝑒𝑣𝑑
𝑑𝑒𝑡) = {𝑣1(𝑒𝑣𝑑
𝑑𝑒𝑡)} [4-8] 
 𝑉(𝑝𝑣𝑚) = {𝑣1(𝑝𝑣𝑚)} [4-9] 
[4-7] is the set of 𝑁𝑢 specifications of 𝑒𝑣𝑢
𝑢𝑛𝑐 ∈ 𝐸𝑉𝑢𝑛𝑐; [4-8] and [4-9] 
refer to the constant specification per 𝑝𝑣𝑚 ∈ 𝑃𝑉 and 𝑒𝑣𝑑
𝑑𝑒𝑡 ∈ 𝐸𝑉𝑑𝑒𝑡. 
The 𝑙𝑡ℎ set included in 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 is denoted prognostic scenario 
𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔. Moreover, the number of prognostic scenarios 𝐿 is the 
number of specifications across all uncertain environmental variables: 
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𝐿 = |𝑉(𝑒𝑣1
𝑢𝑛𝑐)| ∙ … ∙ |𝑉(𝑒𝑣𝑢
𝑢𝑛𝑐)| ∙ … ∙ |𝑉(𝑒𝑣𝑈
𝑢𝑛𝑐)| =∏𝑁𝑢
𝑈
𝑢=1
 [4-10] 
4.3.4 Generation of alternatives 
Based on 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , a number of 𝐿 optimization sub-models is formulated 
and each of them is solved in a deterministic manner in processing 
step 4. The aggregated set of generated alternatives per optimization 
sub-model provides the input for stress test 1 (processing step 5, see 
section 4.4) which, in turn, prepares construction of hypothetical sce-
narios (processing step 6, see section 4.3.5). The optimization sub-
model of prognostic scenario 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 is 
min𝑎 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) = (𝑓1(𝑎, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
), … , 𝑓𝐹(𝑎, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)) [4-11] 
subject to 𝑔(𝑎, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) = (𝑔1(𝑎, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
),… , 𝑔𝐺(𝑎, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)) ≤ 0  
 𝑎 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝐽) ∈ Ω, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
The integration of an optimization model into ReDRiSS provides the 
advantage of mathematically developing alternatives according to the 
objectives and constraints of decision-makers. Either exact solvers or 
heuristics can be used to compute an optimal alternative or a set of 
Pareto-optimal alternatives per optimization sub-model. Pareto-
optimal alternatives refer to a set of mathematically equally good al-
ternatives where no objective can be improved without scarifying one 
or more of the other objectives (Shin & Ravindran 1991; Klamroth & 
Miettinen 2008). Particularly heuristics have proven as successful 
when applied in disaster management from a computational perspec-
tive. This is highly relevant when the decision-making process is faced 
with time pressure or when the optimization model is NP-hard and 
considerable effort is required to solve the problem numerically (Dom-
schke & Drexl 1996). 
In the case that the optimization model is of a multi-objective manner 
(𝐹 ≥ 2), methods of multi-objective decision-making (MODM) must be 
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applied to solve each optimization sub-model. MODM is a sub-division 
of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) which provides methods to 
handle varying objectives within the decision-making process. Meth-
ods of MODM assume that all alternatives are feasible that fulfill the 
constraint functions of a mathematical model (Walther 2010; Gelder-
mann 2014). Objectives are defined by quantifiable objective functions 
(Geldermann 1999; Geldermann 2014). Because of the potentially con-
flictive nature of objectives, there is typically not one optimal alterna-
tive available that optimizes all objective functions simultaneously. 
Rather several mathematically equally good alternatives exist which 
are denoted efficient or Pareto-optimal. To identify the best alternative 
out of a set of Pareto-optimal alternatives, preference-related infor-
mation of the decision-makers is required (Zitzler et al. 2000; Marler & 
Arora 2004; Klamroth & Miettinen 2008; Comes 2011). Three direc-
tions are distinguished in this regard (Geldermann 1999; Marler & 
Arora 2004; Walther 2010; Comes 2011; Geldermann 2014): methods 
that follow  
- an a priori articulation of preferences which are elicited at the be-
ginning of the search process (e.g. goal programming), 
- a progressive articulation of preferences where decision-makers 
need to iteratively provide preference-related information while 
solving the mathematical program (e.g. method of Geoffrion et al. 
1972), or 
- an a posteriori articulation of preferences where firstly a set of ef-
ficient alternatives is determined and secondly decision-makers 
are supposed to select the most satisfactory alternative (e.g. gen-
eration of the complete solution). 
In the case that a method of MODM is applied within ReDRiSS, it is im-
portant that the preferences of objectives which are defined by the 
decision-makers are the same as used in part C (see section 4.4). Let 
𝐴(𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) be the generated set of alternatives based on 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
. The ag-
gregated set of alternatives 𝐴 across all prognostic scenarios of 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 is 
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𝐴 = 𝐴(𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) ∪ …∪ 𝐴(𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) ∪ …∪ 𝐴(𝑠𝐿
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)
= {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑧, … , 𝑎𝑍} 
[4-12] 
4.3.5 Construction of hypothetical scenarios 
Input data for the construction of hypothetical scenarios is endogenous 
information which is generated by processing step 5 (see section 4.4): 
- A set of promising alternatives ?̃? = {?̃?1, … , ?̃?𝑏 , … , ?̃?𝐵} ⊆ 𝐴 that is 
filtered out of 𝐴. Just promising alternatives come into question 
to solve the decision problem. 
- A set of significant scenarios 𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 ⊆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 per ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃?. 
𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 = {𝑠1
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑠𝑊
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏} includes a number of 𝑊 prog-
nostic scenarios in which ?̃?𝑏 performs poorly compared to all 
other prognostic scenarios. 
The following sections outline the construction process of hypothetical 
scenarios and their formal mathematical definition. 
4.3.5.1 Process of constructing hypothetical scenarios 
The construction of hypothetical scenarios is prepared by SCRM (pro-
cessing step 2) and conducted by SCCM (processing step 6). A hypo-
thetical scenario is constructed per promising alternative and signifi-
cant scenario. The construction implies the modification of the state of 
the decision environment (specifications of environmental variables) 
assumed by the significant scenario. This modification is simulated by 
a dynamic development that is caused by a critical event. The process of 
constructing hypothetical scenarios regulates the integration of a criti-
cal event into a significant scenario to simulate a dynamic develop-
ment. Therefore, four tasks are required (see Figure 4-4). 
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Figure 4-4: Process of constructing hypothetical scenarios 
Critical events and their affected environmental variables are identi-
fied (task 1). Subsequently, a re-specification process per affected envi-
ronmental variable of a critical event is preventively defined (task 2). 
Re-specification processes of all affected environmental variables are 
applied to simulate a dynamic development within the significant sce-
nario (task 3). In fact, their underlying specifications are re-specified. A 
re-specification process must not necessarily impact all elements of an 
affected environmental variable (e.g. it might just re-specify several 
matrix cells). Moreover, again widespread possibilities exist to define a 
re-specification process which depends on the case of application (e.g. 
statistical distribution functions). By applying the re-specification pro-
cess of the affected environmental variables for each critical event in 
each significant scenario, a customized set of hypothetical scenarios is 
developed per promising alternative (task 4). Hence, the number of 
hypothetical scenarios within a customized set equates to the multipli-
cation of the number of significant scenarios and critical events (see 
section 4.3.5.2).  
The re-specification process of an affected environmental variable 
(referring to a critical event) triggers a dynamic development (of this 
environmental variable) that is either of an alternative-specific, envi-
ronment-specific, or generic manner:  
- Alternative-specific dynamic development: the re-specification 
process depends on the promising alternative itself in terms of 
its specifications of decision variables. When considering a facili-
ty location problem, for example, a promising alternative might 
contain a binary decision variable that regulates the geographic 
distribution of facilities. A critical event could be an earthquake 
Definition of critical 
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environmental variables
Disaster
Development of a 
re-specification process 
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affected environmental 
variable
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that triggers interruptions of roads. The re-specification process 
of the road network (affected environmental variable) could be 
managed by simulating interruptions of roads close to the facility 
locations that are indicated by the decision variable specification. 
- Scenario-specific dynamic development: the re-specification pro-
cess depends on the significant scenario in terms of its state of 
the decision environment (specifications). Taking the exemplary 
critical event above, the re-specification process could dictate the 
interruption of all main roads of the considered road network 
(affected environmental variable) by doubling the required times 
to use these main roads as it is assumed within the significant 
scenario.  
- Generic dynamic development: the re-specification process pre-
tends a modified state of an environmental variable. Taking the 
exemplary critical event above, the re-specification process could 
define a new state of several roads of the road network (affected 
environmental variable). Re-specifications in this case do not de-
pend on the promising alternative itself and/or on the specifica-
tion of the environmental variable assumed by the significant 
scenario. 
Combinations of these types are possible. For example, elements of an 
affected environmental variable (e.g. matrix cells) whose specifications 
are modified might be identified in an alternative-specific manner 
while the actual re-specification of these elements is scenario-specific. 
Moreover, constructed hypothetical scenarios always vary in the speci-
fications of environmental variables (of the significant scenarios) that 
are not affected by the dynamic development (and critical event). In 
the special case that a generic dynamic development is simulated by 
defining a new state of all environmental variables and all of their ele-
ments, the critical event triggers exactly one hypothetical scenario that 
is the same regarding any promising alternatives and significant sce-
narios. The number of hypothetical scenarios in the generic (and not 
customized) set equates to the number of critical events in this case. 
Hence, the basis for developing customized hypothetical scenarios per 
promising alternative is the possibility of defining re-specifications in 
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an alternative-specific and/or scenario-specific manner and/or the fact 
that an already customized set of significant scenarios is respected.  
Hypothetical scenarios are explicitly used to explore the individual 
vulnerabilities of a promising alternative (caused by the promising 
alternative itself or its significant scenario to which it is vulnerable). 
They are not used to increase the set of alternatives by solving hypo-
thetical scenario-specific optimization sub-models. This is because 
generated alternatives would then particularly hedge against possible 
but rather “unlikely” (as critical and unexpected) states. A generation 
of alternatives that is based on prognostic scenarios, in turn, increases 
the chance of obtaining alternatives that perform appropriately under 
probable and expected states of the decision environment. 
4.3.5.2 Formal definition of hypothetical scenarios 
Let, in the following, be: 
- 𝑘 a critical event 
- 𝐾 the maximal number of critical events 
- 𝐸𝑉𝑘
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 = {𝑒𝑣𝑘,1
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 , … , 𝑒𝑣𝑘,𝑡
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 , … , 𝑒𝑣𝑘,𝑇
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡} ⊆ 𝐸𝑉 the set of 𝑇 environ-
mental variables that must be modified due to 𝑘  
A single hypothetical scenario refers to a critical event 𝑘, a promising 
alternative ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃?, and one of its significant scenarios 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 ∈ 𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 . 
The re-specification 𝑉𝑤
?̃?𝑏(𝑒𝑣𝑘,𝑡
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡) of 𝑒𝑣𝑘,𝑡
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∈ 𝐸𝑉𝑘
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 in 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏  is:  
 𝑉𝑤
?̃?𝑏(𝑒𝑣𝑘,𝑡
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡) = {𝑣1(𝑒𝑣𝑘,𝑡
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡)} [4-13] 
Hypothetical scenario 𝑠𝑤,𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 ∈ 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 simulates a dynamic develop-
ment within 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏  by integrating the re-specification 𝑉𝑤
?̃?𝑏(𝑒𝑣𝑘,𝑡) of each 
𝑒𝑣𝑘,𝑡
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∈ 𝐸𝑉𝑘
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡: 
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𝑠𝑤,𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 = 
(𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏\ {𝑣𝑛𝑖(𝑒𝑣𝑖)|∀𝑒𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝐸𝑉 ∩ 𝐸𝑉𝑘
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,… , |𝐸𝑉|}, 𝑛𝑖
∈ {1,… , 𝑁𝑖}}) ∪ {𝑉𝑤
?̃?𝑏(𝑒𝑣𝑘,𝑡
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡)|𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇} 
[4-14] 
𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏  is the set of hypothetical scenarios regarding ?̃?𝑏: 
 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 = {𝑠1,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑠1,𝐾
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑠𝑊,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑠𝑊,𝐾
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏} [4-15] 
The set of hypothetical scenarios 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝 is: 
 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = {𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?1 , … , 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝐵} [4-16] 
The number of hypothetical scenarios |𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝| is defined by the number 
of promising alternatives 𝐵, the number of significant scenarios per 
promising alternative 𝑊, and the number of critical events 𝐾: 
 |𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝| = 𝐵 ∙ 𝑊 ∙ 𝐾 [4-17] 
The rationale of construction of hypothetical scenarios is illustrated in 
Figure 4-5 in terms of the ?̃?𝑏-specific transformation process of 𝑆
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 
into 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 .  
 
Figure 4-5: Rationale of hypothetical scenarios 
…
…
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4.4 Stress test 
Stress test is in literature defined as a technique to assess the vulnera-
bility of an object under observation to major changes in the environ-
ment in terms of exceptional but still plausible events (Blaschke et al. 
2001). The technique is applied to gather information about sources 
and effects of risks. It has proven particularly successfully in the finan-
cial sector to assess an institution’s portfolio regarding potential loss 
exposures (Hu et al. 2014; Yu et al. 2014). Part C of ReDRiSS proposes a 
stress test related approach to generate and evaluate outcomes of an 
alternative when it is applied to the states of the decision environment 
defined by prognostic and hypothetical scenarios. This stress test is 
required for two reasons: to prepare the construction of hypothetical 
scenarios (part B, processing step 6) and to prepare the robustness 
measurement of alternatives (part D, processing steps 8 and 9). In the 
following section, concepts are outlined that are included within part 
C. Subsequently, the stress test approach is presented and its applica-
tion within stress test 1 (processing step 5) and stress test 2 (pro-
cessing step 7) is discussed. 
4.4.1 Applied concepts 
In ReDRiSS, outcomes of alternatives correspond to objective function 
values when they are applied to varying scenario-specific optimization 
sub-models. Outcomes are evaluated to determine the robustness of 
alternatives. Therefore, they must be transformed into a suitable indi-
cator. The choice of such an indicator depends on the underlying con-
cept of robustness. In ReDRiSS, robustness measurement follows the 
concept of optimality robustness which is measured by the indicator of 
regret. Moreover, the optimization model might be of a multi-objective 
manner. In such a case, a number of outcomes per alternative and sce-
nario exists which equates to the number of objective functions. To 
respect multiple objectives while determining optimality robustness of 
an alternative, ReDRiSS includes an approach that is inspired by the 
method of multi-attribute value theory (MAVT). 
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4.4.1.1 Stress test in literature 
Stress test techniques distinguish between sensitivity tests and scenario 
tests. Sensitivity tests aim at stressing one single parameter without 
relating the considered shock to the other parameters. Scenario tests 
explore consequences of shocks by stressing various parameters sim-
ultaneously (Blaschke et al. 2001; Yu et al. 2014). Two approaches of 
scenario tests exist: the historical scenario approach and the hypothet-
ical scenario approach (Blaschke et al. 2001; Alexander & Baptista 
2009; Hu et al. 2014). The historical scenario approach assumes that 
future events will be similar to past ones without taking into account 
dynamic changes that may happen in future; the hypothetical scenario 
approach explores impacts of extreme but plausible changes in the 
external environment regardless of historical experiences (Hu et al. 
2014). According to Hu et al. (2014), existing approaches of scenario 
tests are faced with three problems. Firstly, most approaches are prob-
ability-based (e.g. value-at-risk). Secondly, scenario designers must 
frequently imagine or anticipate “rare events” without receiving any 
structural support. Thirdly, plausibility of scenarios is often not guar-
anteed.  
The stress test approach of ReDRiSS is inspired by the aforementioned 
classifications and in particular by scenario tests. In a nutshell, the 
behavior of an alternative is explored when it is applied to states of the 
decision environment assumed by prognostic and hypothetical scenar-
ios. Particularly the latter concentrate on unexpected states (“rare 
events”) of the decision environment as they “stress” the specifications 
of environmental variables assumed within prognostic scenarios.  
ReDRiSS answers the aforementioned challenges of scenario tests (Hu 
et al. 2014) as follows: occurrence probabilities of scenarios are not 
assumed due to an uncertain and even complex decision environment 
(principle of insufficient reason, see section 4.3.2). To support scenario 
designers, each scenario is of an equal formal structure and construct-
ed using a clear procedure. According to Comes (2011), plausibility is 
in practice a subjective concept and must be guaranteed by human 
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judgement. This is ensured by a close cooperation with decision-
makers when ReDRiSS is applied. 
4.4.1.2 Optimality robustness and regret 
Robust decision-making distinguishes between evaluating the robust-
ness of the solution and the robustness of the model that is used to 
generate the solution (Mulvey et al. 1995; Kouvelis & Yu 1997). Scholl 
(2001) splits this distinction into the interconnected concepts of solu-
tion robustness, optimality robustness, feasibility robustness, information 
robustness, planning robustness, and assessment robustness. In ReDRiSS, 
robustness measurement requests for comparing outcomes of alterna-
tives across scenarios. As the concepts of feasibility robustness, solu-
tion robustness, and optimality robustness explicitly concentrate on 
outcomes, they are principally applicable using ReDRiSS. The further 
listed concepts rather focus on robustness of the decision-making pro-
cess itself, such as on temporal effects across different steps of the 
planning process (planning robustness), the appropriacy of infor-
mation (information robustness), or the suitability of the underlying 
model (assessment robustness). Feasibility robustness, solution ro-
bustness, and optimality robustness follow the same rationale: an al-
ternative should perform well – according to the risk attitude of the 
decision-makers (see section 4.5) – in any scenario. A measure of 
“well” might be the deviation of an outcome from being not feasible 
(feasibility robustness), from a given outcome threshold (solution ro-
bustness), or from the scenario-optimal outcome that can be reached 
by any alternative in the considered scenario (optimality robustness). 
As scenarios might greatly differ in their assumptions (in ReDRiSS: 
specifications of environmental variables), robustness measurement of 
alternatives must respect scenario-specific characteristics. Following 
the considerations of Scholl (2001), the concept of optimality robust-
ness is suitable in this case and therefore used by ReDRiSS. Optimality 
robustness is measured by the indicator of regret. The regret of an 
alternative in a scenario is defined as the absolute or relative deviation 
of the outcome of an alternative in a scenario from the best outcome 
that can be reached by any other alternative in this scenario (Scholl 
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2001). Equations [4-18] and [4-19] show the absolute and relative 
regret of an alternative 𝑎𝑙𝑡 ∈ 𝐴𝑙𝑡 in a scenario 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛 regarding 
objective 𝑖; 𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) is the outcome of 𝑎𝑙𝑡 when it is applied in 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛 
and 𝑓𝑖
∗(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) is the optimal outcome of 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛 that can be achieved 
by any alternative of 𝐴𝑙𝑡. 12  
 𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) = 𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) − 𝑓𝑖
∗(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) [4-18] 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) =
𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) − 𝑓𝑖
∗(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛)
𝑓𝑖
∗(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛)
 [4-19] 
An alternative is denoted “totally robust” when it is the generic optimal 
alternative in any scenario (Scholl 2001). In fact, 𝑎𝑙𝑡 performs totally 
robustly in 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛 and regarding objective 𝑖 if 𝑓𝑖
∗(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) =
𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) as 𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) = 𝑟𝑟𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) = 0. A totally robust 
alternative rarely exists when multiple objectives are respected as 
many real-world problems do (𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) = 𝑟𝑟𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) =
0, ∀𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛, ∀𝑖). Robust decision-making should therefore rather 
focus on alternatives whose regret values are acceptable across sce-
narios and objectives (Scholl 2001). In fact, an absolute or relative 
threshold 𝑅𝐴𝑖 or 𝑅𝑅𝑖 can be defined where an alternative is denoted 
robust if 𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) ≤ 𝑅𝐴𝑖 , ∀𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛, ∀𝑖 or 𝑟𝑟𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) ≤
𝑅𝑅𝑖 , ∀𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛, ∀𝑖 (Scholl 2001). 
4.4.1.3 Multi-attribute value theory (MAVT) 
MAVT is a method of multi-attribute decision-making (MADM) which is 
the sub-division of MCDA that includes methods to evaluate a discrete 
number of alternatives regarding the achievement of objectives (Gel-
dermann 1999; Haase 2011). The purpose of MAVT is to determine a 
normalized outcome of an alternative (e.g. in a scenario) that respects 
preferences of the decision-makers regarding all considered objectives. 
As stated by several authors, MAVT has proven to be successful in the 
                                               
12 [4-18] and [4-19] highlight the case of a minimization problem. When a maximization 
problem is considered, 𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) = 𝑓𝑖
∗(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) − 𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) and 𝑟𝑟𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛) =
𝑓𝑖
∗(𝐴𝑙𝑡,𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛)−𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡,𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛)
𝑓𝑖
∗(𝐴𝑙𝑡,𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛)
. 
4.4 Stress test 
110 
context of disaster management as the method is clear and transparent 
in its nature (French 1996; Papamichail & French 2000; Geldermann et 
al. 2007; Bertsch 2008). The MAVT process comprises four steps 
where back-loops between all steps exist (Belton & Stewart 2002; 
Bertsch 2008). In the following, a summary of the MAVT process is 
provided; for in-depth information reference is made to Bertsch 
(2008). 
- Problem structuring: objectives are structured by criteria, e.g. in 
a hierarchical manner. A decision table is set up to highlight the 
outcome of each alternative regarding each criterion.  
- Preference elicitation: inter-criteria preferences and intra-criteria 
preferences are integrated by processing preference-related in-
formation of the decision-makers. Inter-criteria preferences are 
defined by the relative weight of each criterion to highlight its 
relative importance. Intra-criteria preferences focus on the nor-
malization of each objective specific outcome to the interval 
[0,1]. This is important to make possibly varying units of the cri-
teria comparable. Therefore, a value function per criterion is de-
fined. Different types of value functions are imaginable in this 
regard (e.g. linear, exponential). The “best” and “worst” outcome 
corresponds to 1 and 0 respectively. 
- Aggregation: one aggregated outcome per alternative is calculat-
ed by adding up the multiplication of the criterion-specific nor-
malized value of the alternative (according to the intra-criteria 
preferences) and the relative weight of this criterion (according 
to the inter-criteria preferences). 
- Sensitivity analysis: as the aggregated outcome per alternative 
follows subjective attitudes, sensitivity analyses explore the ef-
fects when relative weights (inter-criteria preferences) and val-
ue functions (intra-criteria preferences) are modified. If results 
are highly sensitive, decision-makers should check whether 
weights accurately reflect their preferences (Belton & Vickers 
1990). 
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An advancement of MAVT is provided by the method of multi-attribute 
utility theory (MAUT). This method determines the utility of an alterna-
tive based on utility functions by assuming that outcomes are uncertain 
due to random external factors (Belton & Stewart 2002; Bertsch 2008). 
MAUT respects uncertain outcomes by means of probability distribu-
tions and expectations of the decision-makers. This makes MAUT diffi-
cult to use in practice as such probability distributions are not typically 
known (Belton & Stewart 2002; O’Hagan & Oakley 2004; Geldermann 
et al. 2009). For in-depth information regarding differences and simi-
larities between MAVT and MAUT, see Bertsch (2008). 
4.4.2 Stress test approach 
Let the input of the stress test be: 
- 𝐴𝑙𝑡 = {𝑎𝑙𝑡1, … , 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 , … , 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝐽} a set of alternatives 
- 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛 = {𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛1, … , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘, … , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐾} a set of scenarios 
The stress test approach of ReDRiSS, as it is applied within stress test 1 
and stress test 2, comprises five tasks which are highlighted in Figure 
4-6.  
 
Figure 4-6: Stress test process 
Let the optimization model correspond to the minimization problem 
highlighted in [4-11] (see section 4.3.4). Per 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑙𝑡 and 
𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛, the outcome (objective function value) regarding each 
objective 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐹 is calculated by using the 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘-specific optimiza-
tion sub-model (task 1). The result is a matrix of outcomes of all alter-
natives of 𝐴𝑙𝑡 per 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛: 
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𝑓(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) = (
𝑓1(𝑎𝑙𝑡1, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) ⋯ 𝑓1(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝐽, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑓𝐹(𝑎𝑙𝑡1, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) ⋯ 𝑓𝐹(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝐽, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘)
) [4-20] 
The absolute regret is used as an indicator to compare outcomes. In 
preparation to the calculation, the best (minimal) outcome of all alter-
natives of 𝐴𝑙𝑡 per 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛 and per 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐹 is determined: 
 𝑓𝑖
∗(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) = 
min(𝑓𝑖(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) = {𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡1, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘), … , 𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝐽, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘)}) 
[4-21] 
The absolute regret of 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗  in 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘 and regarding 𝑖 is (task 2): 
 𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) = 𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) − 𝑓𝑖
∗(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) [4-22] 
The result is a set of absolute regret values of all alternatives of 𝐴𝑙𝑡 per 
𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛 and per 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐹: 
 𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) = {𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡1, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘), … , 𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝐽, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘)} [4-23] 
Tasks 3, 4, and 5 include a process that is inspired by MAVT. The objec-
tive of this process is to generate an aggregated absolute regret value 
(across all objectives 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐹) per 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛 and 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑙𝑡 that 
is normalized to the interval [0,1]. Therefore, values of each set 
𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘), 𝑖 = 1,…𝐹, 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝐾 (see [4-23]) are normalized 
(task 3), a relative weight of each objective 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐹 is defined (task 
4), and an aggregated regret value per 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛 and 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑙𝑡 is 
calculated (task 5).  
With respect to the MAVT process, the normalization of sets of absolute 
regret values (see [4-23]) requires the integration of intra-criteria 
preferences that are elicited from the decision-makers. Therefore, an 
individual value function 𝑣𝑓𝑖 is defined per 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐹. Value functions, 
thus, might vary across the objectives (e.g. linear or exponential value 
functions).  
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 𝑣𝑓𝑖: {
ℝ → [0,1]                                                                                                     
𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) ↦ 𝑣𝑓𝑖 (𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘)) = 𝑟𝑎𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘)
 [4-24] 
An alternative is defined as totally robust in a scenario when it 
achieves the absolute regret of 0. The “best” (minimal) and “worst” 
(maximal) normalized regret value of 𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘), thus, corre-
sponds to 0 and 1 respectively. 
 𝑣𝑓𝑖(min(𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘))) = 0 [4-25] 
 𝑣𝑓𝑖(max(𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘))) = 1 [4-26] 
Inter-criteria preferences are elicited from the decision-makers (task 
4) by relative weights of objectives 𝑤𝑒𝑖 ∈ [0,1], 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐹 where:  
 
∑𝑤𝑒𝑖 = 1
𝐹
𝑖=1
 [4-27] 
Based on the normalized absolute regret values 
𝑟𝑎𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘), 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐹, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽, 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝐾 and the relative 
weights of objectives 𝑤𝑒𝑖 ∈ [0,1], 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐹, the aggregated regret 
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) ∈ [0,1] is calculated (task 5): 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘) =∑𝑤𝑒𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑘)
𝐹
𝑖=1
 [4-28] 
The result is a matrix of aggregated regret values across all alternatives 
of 𝐴𝑙𝑡 and all scenarios of 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛: 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝐴𝑙𝑡, 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛) = (
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎𝑙𝑡1, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛1) ⋯ 𝑟𝑎
𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎𝑙𝑡1, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐾)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝐽 , 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛1) ⋯ 𝑟𝑎
𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎𝑙𝑡𝐽, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐾)
) [4-29] 
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A special note has to be made on the question of feasibility of alterna-
tives when they are tested against different scenario-specific optimiza-
tion sub-models. According to decision theory, the stress test approach 
follows the assumption that alternatives are applicable under different 
conditions of the decision situation and lead to a result in any of them 
(Neumann & Morlock 2002). Equal specifications of planning variables 
ensure that the decision space is identical from the planning perspec-
tive (see section 4.3.2). Each generated alternative is, thus, principly 
feasible in any scenario. In turn, specifications of environmental varia-
bles vary across scenarios. Their assumed specifications in a scenario 
describe the state of the decision environment. It is possible that con-
straints including environmental variables might be violated when 
testing an alternative in an optimization sub-model. Such violations are 
basically tolerated by ReDRiSS. This is because the behavior of alterna-
tives is explored under environmental conditions that are not under 
the control of the decision-makers. When an alternative is taken as 
action, it has to cope with any environmental conditions although a 
constraint is not fulfilled. Hence, the purpose of constraints is explicitly 
to regulate the generation of alternatives where constraints are not 
allowed to be violated. 
For example, a constraint can postulate a scenario-specific objective 
function threshold that must be reached by an alternative to be feasi-
ble. This threshold might not be reached by another alternative that, in 
turn, has achieved the threshold in a further scenario and that has been 
therefore added to the set of alternatives. The drawback of an alterna-
tive that does not reach the threshold in a scenario is reflected by an 
inferior regret value. For simplification reasons, it is generically as-
sumed in the following that an alternative clearly provides one objec-
tive function value per scenario and objective without explicitly con-
sidering violations of constraints. 
In some cases it might be possible that an alternative adapts to a cer-
tain degree to the scenario-specific state of the decision environment. 
Such a potential of an alternative is described in literature as its flexi-
bility as a feature of robustness itself (see section 3.2.2). Whether an 
alternative adapts or not depends on its underlying decision variables. 
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For example, a location planning problem typically includes decision 
variables that reflect strategic, tactical, or operational sub-decisions. 
Strategic decision variables (e.g. whether to establish a facility or not) 
are frequently (depending on the situational context) not adaptable to 
changed states of the decision environment. Tactical or operational 
decisions (e.g. the allocation of facilities to the sales areas) may be 
adaptable to such changes. ReDRiSS assumes that an alternative al-
ways adapts to the scenario-specific conditions (e.g. switching alloca-
tions of facilities to the sales areas when roads are inaccessible). In this 
way, it is ensured that the flexibility of alternatives is inherently re-
spected by ReDRiSS. 
4.4.3 Stress test application 
The following outlines the result processing when applying the stress 
approach by stress test 1 and stress test 2. 
4.4.3.1 Stress test 1 
Input of stress test 1 is:  
- The set of prognostic scenarios 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 (see [4-6], section 4.3.3.2) 
- The set of alternatives 𝐴 (see [4-12], section 4.3.4) 
The stress test approach (see section 4.4.2) is conducted based on this 
input. As result, a set of aggregated regret values is generated: 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝐴, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) = (
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎1, 𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) ⋯ 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎1, 𝑠𝐿
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎𝑍, 𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) ⋯ 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎𝑍, 𝑠𝐿
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)
) [4-30] 
Aggregated regret values are needed for two purposes. Firstly, a subset 
of promising alternatives ?̃? = {?̃?1, … , ?̃?𝑏 , … , ?̃?𝐵} ⊆ 𝐴 is filtered. This 
subset includes alternatives that perform robustly in all prognostic 
scenarios in comparison to the further alternatives. Secondly, a cus-
tomized subset of significant scenarios 
𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 = {𝑠1
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑠𝑊
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏} ⊆ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 is filtered per ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃?. This 
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subset includes those prognostic scenarios in which ?̃?𝑏 is characterized 
by the maximal “worst” aggregated regret values. ?̃? and 𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 , 𝑏 =
1,… , 𝐵 provides the input of processing step 6 (part B). The reason for 
prioritizing alternatives and scenarios is computational: as there might 
be a large number of alternatives and prognostic scenarios available, 
computational issues might be caused if all alternatives and prognostic 
scenarios are considered within the construction of hypothetical sce-
narios.  
A threshold 𝑇𝑆 ∈ [0,1] is defined by the decision-makers to filter ?̃?. An 
alternative is a promising alternative if all of its aggregated regret val-
ues are below this threshold in any prognostic scenario. Hence, ?̃? is: 
 ?̃? = {∀𝑎𝑧 ∈ 𝐴:max
∀𝑙
({𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)}) ≤ 𝑇𝑆} [4-31] 
Significant scenarios represent customized prognostic “worst case” 
scenarios. Let be: 
- 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) = {𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
), … , 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝐿
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)} ⊆
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝐴, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) the subset of aggregated regret values of ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃? 
regarding all prognostic scenarios of 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 
- 𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) = {𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡,1(?̃?𝑏),… , 𝑟𝑎
𝑚𝑒𝑡,𝑅(?̃?𝑏)}, 𝑅 = 𝐿 the met-
rical ordered equivalent of 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔). 
The identification of significant scenarios is steered by the 𝑛-quantile 
𝑞𝑛(?̃?𝑏) of the set 𝑟𝑎
𝑚𝑒𝑡(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) where 𝑛 must be defined by the de-
cision-makers. The aggregated regret of ?̃?𝑏 in each 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 ∈ 𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 , 
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏), must be higher (worse) than 𝑞𝑛(?̃?𝑏). Thus, the num-
ber of significant scenarios is the same of each promising alternative: 
|𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑗| = |𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑘|, ∀?̃?𝑗 , ?̃?𝑘 ∈ ?̃?, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. Hence, 𝑆
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏  is: 
 𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 = {∀𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔: 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) > 𝑞𝑛(?̃?𝑏)} [4-32] 
Figure 4-7 exemplarily visualizes the stress test 1 results (promising 
alternatives and significant scenarios) for the input data 𝐴 =
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{𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3}, 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = {𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , … , 𝑠10
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
}, 𝑇𝑆 = 0.7, and 𝑛 = 0.8. The re-
sults of this example are: 
- ?̃? = {?̃?1 = 𝑎2, ?̃?2 = 𝑎3} 
- 𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?1 = {𝑠1
𝑠𝑖,?̃?1 = 𝑠10
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , 𝑠2
𝑠𝑖,?̃?1 = 𝑠5
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
} 
- 𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?2 = {𝑠1
𝑠𝑖,?̃?2 = 𝑠3
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , 𝑠2
𝑠𝑖,?̃?2 = 𝑠5
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
} 
 
Figure 4-7: Visualization of exemplary stress test 1 results 
4.4.3.2 Stress test 2 
Input of stress test 2 is:  
- The set of prognostic scenarios 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 (see [4-6], section 4.3.3.2) 
- The set of promising alternatives ?̃? (see [4-31]), section 4.4.3.1) 
- The customized sets of hypothetical scenarios 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 , ∀?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃? 
(see [4-32] , section 4.4.3.1) 
The objective of stress test 2 is to provide data that is sufficient for 
measuring the robustness of each ?̃?𝑏 in part D (see section 4.5). There-
fore, the stress test approach is separately conducted for: 
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- each ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃? in each 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 
- each ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃? in each 𝑠𝑤,𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 ∈ 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏  
Results are the sets of aggregated regret values: 
 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) = (
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?1, 𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) ⋯ 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?1, 𝑠𝐿
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝐵, 𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) ⋯ 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝐵, 𝑠𝐿
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)
) [4-33] 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?, 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?) = (
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?1, 𝑠1,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?1) ⋯ 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?1, 𝑠𝑊,𝐾
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝐵 , 𝑠1,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝐵) ⋯ 𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝐵, 𝑠𝑊,𝐾
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝐵)
) [4-34] 
The expected aggregated regret and the maximal aggregated regret are 
calculated per ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃?. As occurrence probabilities of scenarios are not 
assumed, the expected aggregated regret 𝑅𝐸 is  
 
𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) =
1
𝐿
∑𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(
𝐿
𝑙=1
?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) [4-35] 
 
𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏) =
1
𝑊 ∙ 𝐾
∑∑𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑤,𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏)
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑊
𝑤=1
 [4-36] 
The maximal aggregated regret 𝑅𝑀 refers to the scenario per scenario 
category in which ?̃?𝑏 performs worst. It is defined as: 
 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) = max
∀𝑙
(𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)) [4-37] 
 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏) = max
∀𝑤,𝑘
(𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑤,𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏)) [4-38] 
The result of stress test 2 is a matrix including the expected and maxi-
mal aggregated regret values regarding both scenario categories (see 
Table 4-2). This matrix provides the input for the robustness meas-
urement in part D.  
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Table 4-2: Result matrix of stress test 2 
 
Prognostic scenarios Hypothetical scenarios 
Expected regret Maximal regret Expected regret Maximal regret 
?̃?1 𝑅𝐸(?̃?1, 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) 𝑅𝑀(?̃?1, 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) 𝑅𝐸(?̃?1, 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?1) 𝑅𝑀(?̃?1, 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?1) 
… … … … … 
?̃?𝑏 𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) 𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏) 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏) 
… … … … … 
?̃?𝐵 𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝐵, 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝐵, 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) 𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝐵, 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝐵) 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝐵, 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝐵) 
4.5 Robustness measurement 
Although there might be a large set of alternatives available, decision-
making implies taking one alternative as action to solve a decision 
problem. In ReDRiSS, the selection of such an action depends on the 
decision-makers’ perception of the effect of uncertainty and complexi-
ty. This perception is described by the terms risk attitude or risk pref-
erence which are ambiguously used in literature (Wiens 2013). Most 
authors agree in assuming the two extreme types of risk-averse and 
risk-seeking decision-makers. With respect to Hillson & Murray-
Webster (2007), risk-averse decision-makers are characterized as 
uncomfortable with potentially negative consequences triggered by a 
decision ex post. They prefer to avoid or at least to reduce as many 
threats as possible. Risk-seeking decision-makers welcome uncertain-
ty. They are less interested in avoiding or reducing threats but rather 
in exploiting opportunities (e.g. offered by alternatives). Part D of  
ReDRiSS measures robustness of promising alternatives by respecting 
the risk preferences of the decision-makers (processing step 8). The 
final processing step of ReDRiSS proposes a sensitivity analysis (pro-
cessing step 9) to explore the impact of preferential uncertainty on the 
robustness of promising alternatives. 
4.5.1 Integration of risk preferences 
Decision-makers in SCM principally tend to operate in a risk-averse 
manner (Scholl 2001). This risk aversion reflects all levels of decision-
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making in SCM, strategic, tactical, and operational decisions. The rea-
son for this risk aversion is not necessarily the personal risk attitude of 
decision-makers. They would rather bear responsibility to operate in 
the name of an organization and must be aware of justifying negative 
consequences of a decision ex post. However, decision-makers must 
also try to exploit existing potentials of alternatives to avoid wastes of 
resources.  
Hence, ReDRiSS assumes a principle risk aversion of decision-makers. 
They are not just confronted with a decision situation that threatens 
the objectives of the organizations they are operating in the name of 
(e.g. private companies, public authorities). In both fields of application 
of ReDRiSS, the development of compensation strategies and adapta-
tion strategies, public safety is threatened or even already affected.  
Input data of processing step 8 is the aggregated regret matrix provid-
ed by stress test 2 (see Table 4-2). Based on this data, the objective is 
to determine one robustness value per promising alternative. To meas-
ure robustness while respecting risk preferences, an in-depth consid-
eration of the principle risk aversion of decision-makers is required: 
their personal degree of pessimism which explores whether they per-
form in a rather neutral or pessimistic manner within their principle 
risk aversion. The task of integrating the degree of pessimism into  
ReDRiSS is associated with weighting the effect of uncertainty and 
complexity captured by prognostic and hypothetical scenarios. There-
fore, two aspects must be respected: the inter- and intra-scenario de-
grees of pessimism. 
Regarding the inter-scenario degree of pessimism, neutral decision-
makers would rather aim at measuring robustness of a promising al-
ternative based on the set of prognostic scenarios. This is because 
prognostic scenarios are defined as probable and expected. In turn, 
pessimistic decision-makers might be interested in hedging against 
critical and unexpected dynamic developments of the decision envi-
ronment specified by customized hypothetical scenarios. ReDRiSS re-
spects the inter-scenario degree of pessimism by a relative weight of 
each scenario category, 𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ [0,1], where: 
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 𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 +𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 1 [4-39] 
Regarding the intra-scenario degree of pessimism, neutral decision-
makers understand a promising alternative as robust if it achieves a 
small aggregated regret in any scenario of a considered scenario cate-
gory. Pessimistic decision-makers aim at hedging against that single 
scenario in which a promising alternative performs worst and, thus, 
achieves the highest aggregated regret. This is even true when this 
promising alternative is characterized by a very small aggregated re-
gret in any other scenario of the considered scenario category.  
ReDRiSS respects the intra-scenario degree of pessimism through a 
procedure that is inspired by the Hodge-Lehmann criterion (see section 
2.1.3.2). The criterion suggests combining the 𝜇 criterion and the min-
imax criterion13. Thereby, the reliability parameter 𝜆 ∈ [0,1] reflects 
the relative importance of the expected value of the considered set of 
outcomes (𝜇 criterion) compared to the worst value of this set (mini-
max criterion) (Zimmermann & Gutsche 1991; Scholl 2001; Rom-
melfanger & Eickemeier 2002; Wiens 2013). ReDRiSS adapts the ra-
tionale of the Hodge-Lehmann criterion to integrate the intra-scenario 
degree of pessimism separately for each scenario category. Therefore, 
a reliability parameter per scenario category, 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ [0,1], is 
defined. Neutral decision-makers totally trust in the quality of the set 
of aggregated regret values and follow the expected value of this set 
(𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 → 1). Pessimistic decision-makers do not trust in the quali-
ty of the set of aggregated regret values and follow the maximal value 
of this set (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 → 0). Hence, the intra-scenario degree of pessi-
mism is respected within ReDRiSS by calculating the criterion 
𝜙𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔(?̃?𝑏), ∀?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃?: 
 𝜙𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔(?̃?𝑏) = 𝜆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∙ 𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) + (1 − 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔)
∙ 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) [4-40] 
                                               
13 The minimax criterion is the equivalent of the maximin criterion (see section 2.1.3.2). It 
is applied when the objective of the decision situation is to minimize outcomes of alterna-
tives.  
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 𝜙ℎ𝑦𝑝(?̃?𝑏) = 𝜆
ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∙ 𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏) + (1 − 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝)
∙ 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏) 
[4-41] 
An alternative decision rule that has been explicitly suggested in litera-
ture to steer the specification of risk preferences follows the Hurwicz 
criterion (see section 2.1.3.2). In this case, the parameter 𝜆 regulates 
the degree of pessimism by aggregating the minimin criterion14 and 
the minimax criterion. The reason for not using a procedure within 
ReDRiSS that is related to the Hurwicz criterion lies in the assumed 
principle risk aversion of decision-makers. In fact, the Hurwicz criteri-
on allows decision-makers to even operate in an optimistic manner by 
following the minimin criterion (𝜆 = 1). This would be, however, not a 
wise behavior in disaster management. Moreover, by considering just 
extreme values by trading-off the minimin and minimax criteria, the 
medium range of values might be neglected. This might imply the 
threat of making contra-intuitive decisions (Bamberg & Coenenberg 
2006; Wiens 2013).  
Based on the adjusted inter- and intra-scenario degree of pessimism, a 
robustness value is calculated per ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃?: 
 𝑅𝑉(?̃?𝑏) = 𝑤𝑒
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∙ 𝜙𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔(?̃?𝑏) + 𝑤𝑒
ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∙ 𝜙ℎ𝑦𝑝(?̃?𝑏) [4-42] 
The result of processing step 8 is a set of robustness values 
{𝑅𝑉(?̃?𝑏)|∀?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃?}. Finally, the promising alternative is denoted robust 
alternative ?̃?, and is provided as decision recommendation to the deci-
sion-makers, that achieves the minimal robustness value in this set:  
 ?̃? = (?̃?𝑏 ∈ 𝐴:̃ 𝑅𝑉(?̃?𝑏) = min
∀?̃?𝑏∈?̃?
({𝑅𝑉(?̃?𝑏)})) [4-43] 
                                               
14 The minimin criterion is the equivalent of the maximax criterion (see section 2.1.3.2). It 
is applied when the objective of the decision situation is to minimize outcomes of alterna-
tives. 
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4.5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
The objective of sensitivity analyses in decision-making typically is to 
examine the impact of preferential parameters on initial results 
(Bertsch 2008). Chosen specifications of preferential parameters might 
be subjective in their nature. It is, thus, valuable to explore whether or 
not differences in the judgments of decision-makers matter in terms of 
the results (Belton & Vickers 1990; French 2003; Bertsch 2008). Sensi-
tivity analyses are conducted as the final step of the decision-making 
process. The objective is to test the robustness of initial results to per-
turbations of preferential parameter specifications (Saltelli et al. 2008; 
Comes 2011). Sensitivity analyses may observe effects of varying 
specifications of just one parameter or multiple parameters simultane-
ously (Butler et al. 1997; Geldermann et al. 2005; Bertsch 2008; Hiete 
et al. 2010; Comes 2011).  
In ReDRiSS, the objective of the sensitivity analysis in processing step 9 
is to explore the preferential robustness of robustness values of promis-
ing alternatives themselves. As stated by Bertsch (2008), obtained 
result rankings that remain stable compared to initially used parame-
ter specifications can be understood as robust. When, in turn, results of 
sensitivity analyses indicate that rankings are sensitive, decision-
makers should carefully check if parameter specifications accurately 
reflect their preferences (Belton & Vickers 1990; Bertsch 2008). Hence, 
the objective is to explore whether ReDRiSS results that have been 
proven as robust to data uncertainty are additionally robust to prefer-
ential uncertainty. Sensitivity analyses do not explore further scenarios 
or alternatives. This goes along with the considerations of Comes 
(2011) who claims from the perspective of disaster management that 
the purpose of sensitivity analyses is rather to observe the effect of 
preferential uncertainty than to identify new development paths for 
analyses. 
Two sensitivity analyses are conducted in ReDRiSS to explore the effect 
of varying preferential parameter specifications. This is firstly the vari-
ation of preferences of objectives (𝑤𝑒𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐹) that have been used 
in stress test 2 (processing step 7). Secondly, variations of chosen risk 
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preferences in processing step 8 are investigated. This concerns both a 
changed inter-scenario degree of pessimism (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔,𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝) and intra-
scenario degree of pessimism (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ,𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝). Whether sensitivities of 
(parameters of) preferences and risk preferences should be explored 
separately or simultaneously depends on the case of application. In any 
case, it is important to report interpretations of results by using ap-
propriate visualizations (Bertsch 2008). These visualizations should be 
enriched by explanations, e.g. by natural language reports, to stimulate 
discussions of decision-makers (Geldermann et al. 2009). The actual 
characteristics of such visualizations and explanations depend again on 
the case of application. Examples of visualizations of results of sensitiv-
ity analyses can be found in the case studies of this research (see chap-
ters 5 and 6). 
4.6 Summary and discussion 
Chapter 4 presented ReDRiSS, a DSS which aims at aiding decision-
makers of SCCM in the post-disaster management of P-SC disturbances. 
Based on the methodological and conceptual insights provided by 
chapters 2 and 3, the scope of ReDRiSS and the requirements it must 
fulfil have been outlined in section 4.1. The rationale of ReDRiSS has 
been discussed from a top-down perspective. While section 4.2 sum-
marized the general functioning and interactions of included parts and 
processing steps, an in-depth consideration into each processing step 
has been undertaken by sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. Firstly, processing 
steps regarding the implementation and application of a two-stage 
scenario technique (part A and part B) have been discussed in section 
4.3. Secondly, a stress test approach (part C) has been presented in 
section 4.4. This approach provides, in interaction with the two-stage 
scenario technique, endogenous information that is sufficient to, third-
ly, measure robustness of alternatives to solve the considered logistical 
decision problem (part D, section 4.5). In the following paragraphs, the 
achievement of the requirements listed in section 4.1 is verified.  
1. ReDRiSS should be based on a generic structure to be preventively 
adaptable to various decision situations (as the task of SCRM) and to 
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provide reactive decision support for SCCM in disaster response. The 
crucial challenge of ReDRiSS is support decision-makers in the explora-
tion of effects of uncertainty and complexity facing a disaster-caused 
decision environment. ReDRiSS includes a generic methodology that is 
adaptable to varying decision situations. The interchangeable element 
of this methodology is an optimization model to solve a logistical deci-
sion problem. This optimization model directly determines the specifi-
cation of alternatives (decision variables) and of scenarios (parame-
ters). The pre-disaster implementation of ReDRiSS (part A) as the task 
of SCRM requires the definition of the optimization model and its adap-
tation to be applicable within parts B, C, and D or, in general, by post-
disaster SCCM. This adaptation requires the selection of an appropriate 
solution algorithm, the classification of parameters of the optimization 
model, and the preparation of scenario construction by developing 
specification processes of parameters. The post-disaster process of 
ReDRiSS is the same in any decision situation. A two-stage scenario 
technique (part B) is coupled with a stress test approach (part C). In 
there, alternatives are tested and endogenous information (regret da-
ta) is provided to be evaluated by a standardized robustness meas-
urement (part D). 
2. ReDRiSS should be able to support both internal and external decision-
makers by developing either adaptation strategies or compensation 
strategies. Most approaches that have been proposed at the interface of 
SCM and DOM focus on the development of compensation strategies, in 
particular regarding the field of humanitarian logistics (see chapter 3). 
These approaches concentrate on the establishment of logistical com-
pensation structures in the case that the disaster causes destructions 
of P-SCs. There is a lack of approaches that consider the possibility that 
P-SCs (or several of their entities) can, although they are severely af-
fected, be kept alive by implementing the right decisions.  
ReDRiSS is able to support decision-makers in “repairing” disrupted  
P-SCs. This is because the application of ReDRiSS mainly depends on 
the optimization model that is used to generate and test alternatives. 
Rather than differentiating between compensation strategies and ad-
aptation strategies, ReDRiSS places the focus on the similarities that 
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affect both internal and external decision-makers: the excessive de-
mand of respecting uncertainty and complexity in a disaster-affected 
decision environment while making a decision. 
3. ReDRiSS should include an innovative scenario-based methodology to 
respect both uncertainty and complexity of the decision situation during 
a disaster situation. With respect to the previous two requirements, 
ReDRiSS suggests a two-stage scenario technique to explore uncertain-
ty and complexity (in terms of dynamic developments caused by sec-
ondary disasters or socioeconomic changes) within the disaster-
affected decision environment. Explorations differ in the type of infor-
mation processed. Uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge about the 
post-disaster state of the decision environment. Available exogenous 
information (from the decision environment) is, thus, the trigger to 
construct prognostic scenarios. They close lacks of exogenous infor-
mation by defining probable and expected states of the decision envi-
ronment. Complexity, in turn, is captured by analyzing vulnerabilities 
of these states. Therefore, endogenous information which is provided 
by ReDRiSS itself (outcomes of alternatives across prognostic scenari-
os) is used to simulate critical and unexpected dynamic developments 
within prognostic scenarios. This simulation implies that the state of a 
prognostic scenario changes toward a vulnerable state or a state of 
failure. This state of the decision environment is denoted hypothetical 
scenario. As widespread possibilities of dynamic developments affect-
ing a decision environment exist, hypothetical scenarios are construct-
ed in a customized manner (per promising alternative). In fact, a dy-
namic development either simulates the weakness of a promising al-
ternative itself (when it is hypothetically taken as decision in a 
prognostic scenario) or the weakness of a state of the decision envi-
ronment in which the promising alternative performs poorly com-
pared to further alternatives (significant scenario). Hence, ReDRiSS 
iteratively scans uncertainty and complexity facing the decision envi-
ronment: uncertainty is processed to close lacks of exogenous infor-
mation by prognostic scenarios, endogenous information in terms of 
alternatives and outcomes is generated, and complexity is simulated 
via dynamic developments within hypothetical scenarios.  
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4. ReDRiSS should be holistic in its nature to operationalize all steps of 
the decision-making process. Following the IDC model (see chapter 2), 
ReDRiSS operationalizes the steps of the decision-making process un-
der uncertainty that arise across the phases intelligence, design, and 
choice. Part A refers to the intelligence phase whose objective is to 
classify and to define the logistical decision problem. Moreover, the 
conduction of the design phase is prepared. Part B focusses on the de-
sign phase by generating alternatives under uncertainty. In part C, 
alternatives are evaluated (design phase) and negotiated (choice 
phase). Part D refers to the choice phase in terms of selecting an alter-
native and determining an action. Regarding the decision-making pro-
cess under complexity, literature suggests following the rationale of 
pattern-based management (see chapter 2). ReDRiSS operationalizes 
this approach using the two-stage scenario technique (part B). Prog-
nostic scenarios reveal uncertainty of the decision environment (pat-
tern seeking). Endogenous information in terms of alternatives and 
outcomes is generated based on prognostic scenarios (pattern model-
ling). Weaknesses of promising alternatives and significant scenarios 
are further explored by simulating dynamic developments within hy-
pothetical scenarios (pattern adapting). Hence, the rationale of  
ReDRiSS respects the requirements of both the decision-making pro-
cess under uncertainty and complexity.  
5. ReDRiSS should achieve a high analytical accuracy by using approach-
es of OR/MS to solve the underlying logistical decision problem. Ap-
proaches of both fields of OR/MS, mathematical programming and 
decision theory, are used by ReDRiSS to ensure its analytical accuracy. 
ReDRiSS includes an optimization model to solve the underlying logis-
tical decision problem by applying an appropriate algorithm (e.g. exact 
algorithm, heuristic). The optimization model is solved in a scenario-
based manner to generate and test alternatives. Outcomes of alterna-
tives are evaluated with respect to optimality robustness by using the 
regret as indicator. The evaluation of regret data is facilitated by a pro-
cess that is inspired by MAVT as a method of MADM. In fact, outcomes 
are normalized and aggregated (across all objectives) by integrating 
inter- and intra-objective preferences of the decision-makers. Risk 
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preferences of decision-makers are respected and a final (optimality) 
robustness value per promising alternative is generated by a process 
that is inspired by the Hodge-Lehmann decision criterion.  
6. ReDRiSS should be able to respect possible multiple objectives of the 
decision-makers and must operate according to their preferences. The 
optimization model that is integrated into ReDRiSS might be of a sin-
gle- or multi-objective manner. In the latter case, methods of MODM 
can be used to generate compromise alternatives (by respecting pref-
erences in an a priori, a posteriori, or progressive manner). Alterna-
tively, all Pareto-optimal solutions (regarding multiple objectives) or 
all feasible alternatives (if possible) might be respected. The actual 
integration of preferences of objectives is the task of the stress test 
approach. An aggregated regret value per (relevant) alternative and 
scenario is generated via a process that is inspired by MAVT. When 
preferences have already been defined during the generation process 
of alternatives (in the sense of MODM), it is important to use the same 
preferences within the stress test approach. 
7. ReDRiSS should focus on the design of robust (adapted or compen-
sated) P-SCs by providing a robust decision recommendation according 
to the risk preferences of the decision-makers. The objective of designing 
robust (adapted or compensated) P-SCs has been the trigger for the 
development of ReDRiSS. Therefore, ReDRiSS provides a platform on 
which threats in a disaster-affected decision environment can be sys-
tematically explored via scenarios. Measuring robustness based on the 
concepts of optimality robustness and regret allows the respect for 
scenario-specific characteristics. ReDRiSS includes a novel process of 
robustness measurement that additionally integrates the risk prefer-
ences of the decision-makers. This affects the question whether deci-
sion-makers prefer to hedge against probable and expected states of 
the decision environment (prognostic scenarios) or against critical and 
unexpected states and, thus, more abstract eventualities (hypothetical 
scenarios). ReDRiSS assumes a principle risk aversion of decision-
makers. It is, thus, ensured that they can never perform in an optimis-
tic manner (regarding hedging against threats) in the disaster-caused 
decision situation. 
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8. ReDRiSS should be transparent and easily understandable to provide a 
practical application for decision-makers. Decision-makers participate 
in any part of ReDRiSS. In preventive SCRM, they define the decision 
problem and are involved when formulating the optimization model 
and determining a solution algorithm. Moreover, they are integrated 
into the development of specification processes of environmental vari-
ables in preparation for scenario constructions. In reactive SCCM, deci-
sion-makers steer the process of ReDRiSS by setting preferential ad-
justment screws (preferences of objectives, risk preferences).  
ReDRiSS fulfills the general requirements of a DSS highlighted in chap-
ter 2. It includes a “model” of parts and processing steps, a “database” 
of exogenous and endogenous information, and a “user interface” to 
integrate preferences of objectives and risk preferences of the deci-
sion-makers. This integration of decision-makers into ReDRiSS is cru-
cial as it aims at technically aiding decision-makers but never replacing 
them (see chapter 2). In fact, respecting the (risk) preferences of the 
decision-makers is important for two reasons. Firstly, although ro-
bustness measurement is always associated with the identification of 
an alternative that hedges against threats caused by uncertainty and 
complexity, the degree of robustness additionally depends on the deci-
sion-makers’ perception of the decision situation. The degree of ro-
bustness must therefore be adjusted according to these perceptions. 
Secondly, by providing the opportunity for the decision-makers to ac-
tively steer the decision-making process, their trust in the DSS might 
increase. This is an important requirement to push the subsequent 
practical implementation of the obtained decision recommendation. 
  
5 Case study 1: humanitarian logistics 
in Haiti 
This chapter presents a case study that applies ReDRiSS in a decision 
situation arising in the field of humanitarian logistics. Haiti is hit by an 
earthquake which causes destructions of P-SCs. Therefore, logistical 
replacement structures in terms of humanitarian relief SCs must be 
established from scratch in disaster response. The focus of the case 
study is on the establishment of a humanitarian relief SC that compen-
sates the functions of destructed P-SCs of the CI sector “health care”. 
Thereby, the logistical decision problem is considered where in Haiti to 
set up temporary health care facilities to store medicine and medical 
equipment. Solving the facility location problem is a step toward defin-
ing the distribution structure of the humanitarian relief SC. ReDRiSS is 
applied to aid decision-makers in reactively identifying robust loca-
tions of the health care facilities. In section 5.1, the field of humanitari-
an logistics is introduced. The structure and assumptions of the case 
study are outlined in section 5.2, the logistical decision problem is 
solved in section 5.3, and the results are discussed in section 5.4. The 
chapter closes with a summary and discussion in section 5.5. 
5.1 Humanitarian logistics in disaster response 
Disasters are characterized by a sudden occurrence which might chal-
lenge the ability of the affected society or community to handle the 
triggered situation using its own resources (UNISDR 2004a). To miti-
gate human pain, threat of life, disease, hunger, damage of logistical 
structures, or losses of property, reactive operations of humanitarian 
relief provide aid for the disaster-affected area (ICDRM/GWU 2010). 
When the disaster causes destructions of P-SCs, logistical replacement 
structures must be established rapidly to compensate their failures. 
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The most extensive part of overall humanitarian relief refers to human-
itarian logistics. About 80 percent of humanitarian relief operations 
have a logistical background (Van Wassenhove 2006; Kovács & Spens 
2007). Humanitarian logistics comprises the “processes of planning, 
implementing and controlling the efficient and cost-effective flow and 
storage of goods and materials, as well as related information, from 
point of origin to point of consumption for the purpose of alleviating 
the suffering of vulnerable people” (Thomas & Kopczak 2005).  
The compensation of destructed P-SCs is the task of humanitarian relief 
SCs. They distribute relief supplies (e.g. foodstuff, water, medicine) 
from different sources to the destinations where they are needed (Eßig 
& Tandler 2010; Afshar & Haghani 2012). Particularly in the disaster 
response phase, which usually comprises the first 72 hours after an 
occurring disaster, relief supplies must be provided quickly for the 
beneficiaries to minimize human suffering and death (Balcik & Beamon 
2008). Due to a potentially large number of victims, “fast” decisions are 
required to establish humanitarian relief SCs. This is also the case 
when decisions are strategic, have a long term impact, and are irre-
versible in the short term. An example of such a decision is the choice 
of locations for warehouses, camps of dislocated people, or field hospi-
tals (Altay & Green 2006).  
The objective of humanitarian relief SCM is to steer the effective provi-
sion of relief supplies to as many beneficiaries as possible. However, 
inefficient procedures lead to wastes of resources that could have 
helped further people if they had been used appropriately (Tomasini & 
Van Wassenhove 2009). Humanitarian relief SCM must, therefore, re-
spect both objectives of effectiveness and efficiency (Balcik & Beamon 
2008; Bölsche 2009). Effectiveness aims at creating humanitarian re-
lief SCs that provide relief supplies for those in need. Efficiency refers 
to the humanitarian relief SC’s capacity to perform in an appropriately 
organized manner; the scope is on the minimization of resources (e.g. 
duration, costs). The objectives of effectiveness and efficiency typically 
conflict and must be balanced out in the design of a humanitarian relief 
SC (Kotabe 1998). Although effectiveness has been considered as the 
dominant objective in humanitarian relief SCM, longer term operations 
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illustrate the need for additionally respecting the objective of efficien-
cy. This is important to avoid a wasting of scarce resources and to pre-
pare a fast recovery (Beamon & Balcik 2008). 
As immediate response is required in the aftermath of a disaster, hu-
manitarian relief SCs must be designed and deployed at once. Howev-
er, the capability of decision-makers might be affected because of very 
limited knowledge about the state of the decision environment. Lacks 
of knowledge arise due to sparse exogenous information about conse-
quences such as needs of the population or states of CI sectors (e.g. 
transportation infrastructure), and about available resources (Ozel 
2001). Beside this uncertainty, the interconnectedness of CI sectors, 
possible occurrences of secondary disasters over time, and socioeco-
nomic changes also cause a state of complexity within the decision 
environment (see section 3.3.1).  
External decision-makers bear responsibility in humanitarian logistics 
(see section 3.3.2) such as representatives of governments, military, 
aid agencies, donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or pri-
vate companies (Van Wassenhove 2012). They must evaluate strengths 
and drawbacks of different SC designs while respecting uncertainty 
and complexity characterizing the decision environment. Determining 
an appropriate design requires, inter alia, the definition of the distribu-
tion structure of the humanitarian relief SC (see Figure 5-1). 
 
Figure 5-1: Distribution structure of humanitarian relief supply chains  
(adapted from Balcik et al. 2010) 
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A crucial logistical decision problem arising in this regard is facility 
location planning. Facilities (e.g. warehouses) act as intermediate buff-
ers between incoming supplies and local distribution. Incoming sup-
plies should be easily accessible and provide sufficient capacity; local 
distribution should be fast and correspond to the needs of the benefi-
ciaries. While the flow of goods is directed (highlighted by black lines 
in Figure 5-1), the flows of information are bidirectional (highlighted 
by gray dotted lines, only shown for one supplier for the sake of clari-
ty). 
In analogy to business SCs, the distribution structure of a humanitarian 
relief SC comprises a vertical and a horizontal component (Domschke 
& Schildt 1994; Bölsche 2009). The vertical distribution structure in-
cludes the stages at which facilities are established. Beneficiaries 
whose demands must be satisfied are located at the final stage of this 
vertical distribution structure. The horizontal distribution structure 
highlights the number and locations of facilities per stage as well as 
their relations (e.g. the allocation of local distribution to beneficiaries’ 
demands). Bölsche (2009) distinguishes between four types of ware-
houses regarding the vertical distribution structure (PAHO 2001): 
- General delivery warehouses are central warehouses that are 
characterized by high capacities. As their locations are of strate-
gic importance, they are typically established preventively. 
- Slow rotation warehouses are central or regional warehouses. 
They are needed for the storage of relief supplies whose delivery 
is not time sensitive (e.g. EDP-supplies).  
- Quick rotation warehouses are regional warehouses near airports 
or harbors. They are needed for the storage of relief supplies 
whose delivery is time sensitive (e.g. foodstuff, water, health 
care). 
- Temporary collection sites are local warehouses near the benefi-
ciaries. They are located in on-hand facilities (e.g. schools, gyms) 
and are needed for the final delivery of relief supplies. 
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5.2 Implementation of ReDRiSS 
The forthcoming sections provide a general description of the decision 
situation (ReDRiSS part A, processing step 1). Moreover, the optimiza-
tion model is formulated that is applied to process the logistical deci-
sion problem (ReDRiSS part A, processing step 2). This optimization 
model refers to an adaptation of the bi-objective unconstrained facility 
location problem (Revelle & Laporte 1996; Villegas et al. 2006; Daskin 
2013). 
5.2.1 General description of the decision situation 
In January 2010, a severe earthquake of the magnitude 7.0 hit Haiti. Its 
epicenter was about 17 km west of the country’s capital, Port-au-
Prince (WHO 2010). The earthquake was followed by about 70 severe 
aftershocks, two of them with a magnitude of 6.0 or higher and sixteen 
with a magnitude of 5.0 (UNC 2010). In summary, the direct and indi-
rect consequences of the 2010 earthquake were disastrous: the death 
toll was high, and destroyed infrastructure as well as a lack of coordi-
nation and planning hampered the effective and efficient distribution 
of disaster relief goods and services (Rencoret et al. 2010).  
Due to the experiences of this previous disaster in Haiti, an association 
of different NGOs (external decision-makers, in the following denoted 
NGO association) decides to preventively invest in an implementation 
of ReDRiSS to be prepared for the case of another earthquake in Haiti 
in future. The first task of implementing ReDRiSS is to develop a re-
quirements profile that summarizes the depicted decision situation 
and the scope of ReDRiSS (ReDRiSS part A, processing step 1). 
The NGO association concentrates on the compensation of destructed 
P-SCs of the CI sector “health care” by quickly establishing a temporary 
health care SC (as a humanitarian relief SC). To define the vertical dis-
tribution structure of this SC, the logistical decision problem of locating 
health care facilities (warehouses) in Haiti arises. Health care facilities 
refer to the category of quick rotation warehouses (see section 5.1) 
and are required for the storage of medicine or medical equipment. 
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They operate as trading centers to supply temporary collection sites 
which, in turn, organize the final provision of supplies for the benefi-
ciaries.  
As the epicenter location and the earthquake’s intensity are unknown 
prior to the occurrence of an earthquake, the decision problem must be 
solved reactively in disaster response. Solving the decision problem is 
restricted by an unknown extent of health care demands and states of 
the transportation infrastructure, as well as the possibility of second-
ary disasters occurring over time in terms of earthquake aftershocks. 
Uncertain health care demands restrict analyses to determine suitable 
locations of the health care facilities; interruptions of transportation 
infrastructures obstruct the exchange of supplies between regions. The 
possibility of secondary disasters triggers the threat of dynamic devel-
opments within the decision environment over time which might make 
an implemented alternative (the chosen health care facility locations) 
futile in retrospect. Widespread alternatives exist to solve the decision 
problem. The characteristics of the decision environment might affect 
the ability of decision-makers to compare these alternatives by analyz-
ing their advantages and drawbacks in terms of withstanding the 
aforementioned threats. Hence, ReDRiSS should aid the NGO associa-
tion reactively in identifying robust locations of health care facilities.  
The analysis of possible health care facility locations should respect 
both relevant objectives of humanitarian logistics, effectiveness and 
efficiency. Effectiveness is measured by the service level that is 
achieved by an alternative in terms of the extent of satisfied health care 
demands (or of temporary collection sites as a preliminary stage prior 
to the provision of beneficiaries, see section 5.1). Efficiency is meas-
ured by the costs that are required to achieve this service level. The 
consideration of efficiency in addition to effectiveness aims at avoiding 
wastes of resources (e.g. money) that could have helped further people 
if they had been used appropriately. Objectives of effectiveness and 
efficiency operate in contrary directions: an increase in service level 
(increase of effectiveness) typically causes an increase in costs (de-
crease of efficiency) and vice versa.  
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The scope of ReDRiSS in case study 1 is summarized by the require-
ments profile highlighted in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Requirements profile (case study 1) 
Disaster type Earthquake 
Location Haiti 
Decision-makers NGO association of the CI sector “health care” 
Decision support Compensation strategy 
Logistical  
decision problem 
Location planning of quick rotation warehouses (health care 
facilities) to define the vertical distribution structure of a 
temporary health care SC 
Objectives 
Identification of robust locations of health care facilities to 
achieve an effective and efficient distribution of medicine and 
medical equipment 
Challenges 
Unknown health care demands and states of the transporta-
tion infrastructure (uncertainty), dynamic developments in 
terms of aftershocks over time (complexity) 
5.2.2 Adaptation of the bi-objective unconstrained facility location 
problem to the decision situation 
ReDRiSS integrates an optimization model to process the decision 
problem. This optimization model must be preventively formulated 
(ReDRiSS part A, processing step 2). An appropriate optimization model 
of facility location planning to respect both objectives of effectiveness 
and efficiency is provided by the bi-objective unconstrained facility 
location problem (BOUFLP). ReDRiSS integrates an adapted version of 
the BOUFLP to the depicted decision situation.  
Basically, the BOUFLP is a hybrid of the mathematical programming 
formulations of the maximal covering location problem (MCLP) and the 
uncapacitated facility location problem (UFLP) and refers to the class of 
mixed integer linear programming (MILP) (Revelle & Laporte 1996; 
Villegas et al. 2006, Daskin 2013). The MCLP focusses on the objective 
of effectiveness. With respect to the assumed decision situation, the 
objective is to open health care facilities that maximize satisfied health 
care demands (service level). The objective of efficiency is addressed 
by the UFLP by opening health care facilities that minimize required 
costs (sum of transportation and fixed costs) to satisfy health care de-
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mand. The following paragraphs present the adapted formulation of 
the BOUFLP. 
Let 𝐼 = {1,2,… } be the set of possible locations where health care facil-
ities can be opened (built) and 𝐽 = {1,2,… } the set of locations where 
health care demands might arise. The health care demand in location 
𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 is 𝑏𝑗 . When opening a health care facility in location 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, fixed 
costs 𝑓𝑖  arise. 𝐺 is the predetermined number of health care facilities to 
open according to planning information provided by the NGO associa-
tion. Moreover, let ℎ𝑖𝑗  be the shortest road distance [km] between loca-
tion 𝑖 and location 𝑗; the associated transportation cost of using this 
road connection is indicated by 𝑐𝑖𝑗 . 
 𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏𝑗 ∙ ℎ𝑖𝑗 [5-1] 
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximal covering road distance [km]; a health care facility 
can just serve health care demands at locations within this distance. 
Locations of health care facilities that are able to meet 𝑏𝑗  are summa-
rized by the set 𝑄𝑗 . 
 𝑄𝑗 = {𝑖 ∈ 𝐼: ℎ𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥} [5-2] 
Binary decision variable 𝑦𝑖  indicates whether a health care facility is 
opened in location 𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 = 1) or not (𝑦𝑖 = 0); binary decision variable 
𝑥𝑖𝑗  indicates whether 𝑏𝑗  is met by a health care facility in location 𝑖 
(𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1) or not (𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0). Table 5-2 provides an overview of parame-
ters and decision variables of the adapted BOUFLP (Villegas et al. 
2006). 
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Table 5-2: Parameters and decision variables (case study 1) 
Parameter Description Range of values 
𝑏𝑗  Health care demand at location 𝑗 ∈ ℝ0
+ 
𝑓𝑖  Fixed cost of opening a health care facility at location 𝑖 ∈ ℝ0
+ 
ℎ𝑖𝑗  Road distance [km] between location 𝑖 and location 𝑗 ∈ ℝ0
+ 
𝑐𝑖𝑗 
Transportation cost of serving health care demand at 
location 𝑗 by health care facility at location 𝑖 
∈ ℝ0
+ 
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥  Maximal covering road distance [km] ∈ ℝ
+ 
𝐺 Number of health care facilities to be built ∈ ℕ+ 
𝑄𝑗 
Set of locations of all health care facilities that are able 
to meet health care demand at location 𝑗 within 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥  
 
Decision 
variable 
Description Range of values 
𝑦𝑖 
1: health care facility is opened at location 𝑖, 0: other-
wise 
∈ {0,1} 
𝑥𝑖𝑗  
1: health care demand at location 𝑗 is met by health 
care facility at location 𝑖, 0: otherwise 
∈ {0,1} 
Equations [5-3] to [5-9] show the mathematical formulation of the 
adapted BOUFLP. The objective functions [5-3] and [5-4] and the con-
straint functions [5-5] to [5-9] are discussed in the following para-
graphs. 
 max 𝑧1 =∑𝑏𝑗 ∑𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑖∈𝑄𝑗𝑗∈𝐽
 [5-3] 
 min 𝑧2 = ∑∑𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 +∑𝑓𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼𝑗∈𝐽𝑖∈𝑄𝑗
 [5-4] 
subject to 
 ∑𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1
𝑖∈𝐼
 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 [5-5] 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑦𝑖  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 [5-6] 
 ∑𝑦𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼
= 𝐺  [5-7] 
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 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 [5-8] 
 𝑦𝑖 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 [5-9] 
Equations [5-3] and [5-4] represent the objective functions of the 
MCLP and UFLP. [5-3] measures the service level of an alternative as 
the sum of satisfied health care demands that are met by opened health 
care facilities within the maximal covering distance 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥. The first 
term of [5-4] represents the associated transportation costs of meeting 
those health care demands (arising within 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥). The second term 
highlights fixed costs of opening the health care facilities. Constraint 
function [5-5] guarantees that each health care demand is met by just 
one health care facility; [5-6] forces health care demands to be as-
signed to open health care facilities; [5-7] proposes to open a number 
of 𝐺 health care facilities; [5-8] and [5-9] define the decision variables 
as binary (Villegas et al. 2006).  
In the adapted version of the BOUFLP, the calculation of both service 
level and costs just respect those health care demands that are maxi-
mally distanced by 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 from an opened health care facility. Hence, 
objective function values of an alternative (which is defined by the 
binary values of decision variables 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 and 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽) indi-
cate its achieved maximal service level and associated minimal costs.  
Haiti is divided into 10 départements which comprise 42 arrondisse-
ments (see Figure 5-2, section 5.3). The occurrence of the earthquake 
might trigger a health care demand 𝑏𝑗  in any arrondissement 𝑗 of the 
set 𝐽 = {1,… ,42}. As health care facilities are quick rotation ware-
houses, a fast import of medicine and medical equipment stored in 
these warehouses is essential. Therefore, they should be located near 
airports (Bölsche 2009). Haiti possesses 15 airports that are registered 
by the international air transportation association (IATA). The case 
study assumes that just an arrondissement that includes such an air-
port is allowed to host a health care facility. Thus, the set of possible 
locations is 𝐼 = {1,… ,15} ⊆ 𝐽.  
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The case study refers to the population distribution of Haiti in 2012. 
Therefore, the total population of Haiti is assumed to be 10,413,212 
(IHSI 2012). About 25% of this population lives in arrondissement 5 
(the capital city Port-au-Prince) whose underlying département Ouest 
(arrondissement 5, 6, 25, 27, and 28) includes 36% of the total popula-
tion. The département Arbitonite (arrondissements 15, 30, 31, 33, 34) 
achieves a ratio of 15% (IHSI 2012). The exact location of a health care 
facility to be opened in an arrondissement always refers to its most 
populated city. Country specific information has been attached to ap-
pendix A.1. 
To deliver medicine and medical equipment from the health care facili-
ties to the temporary collection sites (and finally to the beneficiaries), 
the road network (transportation infrastructure) must be intact. The 
case study respects states of larger tarred roads like highways or inter-
states as those are the only roads traversable by trucks. On the basis of 
the inland road network, road distances [km] for road connections 
between Haiti’s arrondissements are calculated with the help of GPS 
data. As the most populated city of each arrondissement specifies the 
possible health care facility location, the road network between these 
cities is considered by analyses.  
A specific assumption is made regarding arrondissement 6 (Gônave, 
département Ouest). This arrondissement refers to an island which is 
separated from the inland road network. A waterway connection must 
be used to access arrondissement 6. The shortest waterway connection 
to this island starts in arrondissement 5 (Port-au-Prince, département 
Ouest). As both most populated cities of the arrondissements 5 and 6, 
Port-au-Prince and Anse-à-Galets, possess harbors, the waterway con-
nection [km] is added to the infrastructure network. Road (waterway) 
distances across arrondissements have been attached to appendix A.2. 
5.3 Solving the logistical decision problem 
This section outlines the application of ReDRiSS in an occurring deci-
sion situation. Haiti is hit by an earthquake. Exogenous information 
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indicates that its epicenter is located in département Nord-Est. As ex-
ogenous information does not specify the exact epicenter location 
within this département, arrondissements 11, 12, 40, and 42 define the 
possible epicenter area (see Figure 5-2). 
 
Figure 5-2: Geographic representation of Haiti and epicenter area 
5.3.1 Prognostic scenarios 
Because of a lack of exogenous information arising in the immediate 
aftermath of the earthquake, the state of the decision environment is 
unknown. Prognostic scenarios are therefore constructed to describe 
probable and expected states. The following sections outline the con-
struction process of prognostic scenarios (ReDRiSS part B, processing 
step 3).15 
                                               
15 The construction of prognostic scenarios is based on specification processes of envi-
ronmental variables which are actually developed in ReDRiSS part A, processing step 2. 
For the sake of clarity, specification processes are presented in this section. 
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5.3.1.1 Classification of parameters 
To construct prognostic scenarios, parameters of the adapted BOUFLP 
must be specified. Parameters refer to planning variables and environ-
mental variables. Planning information that is required to specify the 
planning variables is assumed to be deterministic. The specification of 
each planning variable is, thus, constant in any constructed prognostic 
scenario. In the depicted decision situation it is assumed that fixed 
costs that might accrue for, inter alia, imports of material that is re-
quired to physically construct the health care facilities or permission 
fees to use a certain location in Haiti do not arise. It is rather assumed 
that the NGO association pre-allocates material to set up an exact 
number of 𝐺 health care facilities. All possible locations are made ac-
cessible by Haiti’s government without raising any additional fee. 
Hence, all alternatives (locations of health care facilities) are equal in 
their fixed costs which can be, thus, disregarded by analyses. Moreo-
ver, the NGO association defines a maximal covering distance accord-
ing to its experiences from past disasters. In summary, the following 
planning variables and their specifications are defined: 
- 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 100 km as the maximal covering distance 
- 𝐺 = 5 as the number of health care facilities to be opened 
- 𝑓𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 as disregarded fixed costs 
Environmental variables refer to those parameters whose specifica-
tions depend on environmental factors and are, thus, prone to uncer-
tainty. The environmental variables are: 
- 𝐵 = (𝑏1, … , 𝑏𝑗 , … , 𝑏42) as the vector of health care demands 
where 𝑏𝑗 ∈ 𝐵 specifies the health care demand at location 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽  
- 𝐻 = (
ℎ1,1 ⋯ ℎ1,42
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
ℎ42,1 ⋯ ℎ42,42
) as the matrix of shortest road distances 
across all arrondissements (including one waterway distance, 
see section 5.2.2) 
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- 𝐶 = (
𝑐1,1 ⋯ 𝑐1,42
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝑐42,1 ⋯ 𝑐42,42
) = (
𝑏1 ∙ ℎ1,1 ⋯ 𝑏42 ∙ ℎ1,42
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝑏1 ∙ ℎ42,1 ⋯ 𝑏42 ∙ ℎ42,42
) as the 
matrix of transportation costs across all arrondissements 
- 𝑄 = {𝑄1, … , 𝑄𝑗 , … , 𝑄42} where the set 𝑄𝑗 ∈ 𝑄 includes health care 
facilities that are able to meet 𝑏𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 
Exogenous information is assumed to be inappropriate to specify any 
environmental variable deterministically. Therefore, a specification 
process must be applied per environmental variable. This primarily 
affects 𝐵 and 𝐻 which are faced by unknown distributions of health 
care demands of the population and failures of the road network. The 
specifications of the uncertain environmental variables 𝐶 and 𝑄 can be 
directly calculated based on the developed specifications of 𝐵 and 𝐻 
(see [5-1] and [5-2]).  
It is assumed that the extent of damage in an arrondissement (health 
care demands and road failures) depends on the linear distance be-
tween this arrondissement and the earthquake’s epicenter arron-
dissement.16 The uncertain location of the epicenter arrondissement 
(11, 12, 40, or 42) must, thus, be respected by the specification pro-
cesses. Linear distances across Haiti’s arrondissements have been at-
tached to appendix A.3. 
5.3.1.2 Specification of health care demands 
The distribution of Haiti’s population is used to specify 𝐵 (see appen-
dix A.1) It is assumed that the relative share of the population in an 
arrondissement 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 needing health care decreases with the linear 
distance 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗 between 𝑗 and the epicenter arrondissement. To calcu-
late this relative share in 𝑗, a health care demand ratio function 𝑑(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗) 
is formulated.  
The NGO association fears a health care demand in the epicenter ar-
rondissement that equates to 100% of its population 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗  
                                               
16 The harvesine formula is used to calculate the linear distance between two points on a 
sphere. Geographic locations of the points refer to their latitudes and longitudes. 
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(𝑑(0) = 100%). It is assumed that health care demands principally 
arise in any arrondissement that is located within the maximal linear 
distance 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 from the epicenter arrondissement. The equation  
[5-10] shows the linear formulation of the health care demand ratio 
function as used in the case study. If expertise is available, alternative 
formulations can be taken (e.g. exponential courses).  
 
𝑑(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗) = {
𝑑(0) −
𝑑(0)
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥
∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗 , if 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗 < 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥
0, else                                                                      
 [5-10] 
In the depicted decision situation, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 is unknown. Therefore, a 
number of eight heath care demand ratio functions 𝑑𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗), 𝑛 =
1,… ,8 are used where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑛 ∙ 50 and 𝑑𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥) = 0 (see 
Figure 5-3).  
 
Figure 5-3: Health care demand ratio functions 
Based on 𝑑𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗) and 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗 , 𝑏𝑗  is calculated by: 
 𝑏𝑗 = 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗 ∙ 𝑑𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗), 𝑛 ∈ {1,… ,8} [5-11] 
Hence, eight specifications of 𝐵 are generated per possible epicenter 
arrondissement (11, 12, 40, or 42). The total number of obtained speci-
fications is 4 ∙ 8 = 32. 
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5.3.1.3 Specification of states of the road network 
To specify 𝐻, it is assumed that the probability of a road failure de-
pends on the linear distance of the considered road from the epicenter 
arrondissement. Let 𝑗,𝑚 ∈ 𝐽 be two neighbored arrondissements 
where a direct road connection between 𝑗 and 𝑚 exists that doesn’t 
cross any further arrondissement. The road distance between 𝑗 and 𝑚 
is denoted by ℎ𝑗𝑚 = ℎ𝑚𝑗. Moreover, it is assumed that the linear dis-
tance 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚 between 𝑚 and the epicenter arrondissement exceeds 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗; in fact 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚. The probability of a failure of the road con-
nection between 𝑗 and 𝑚 depends on 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗 (as it is closer to the epicen-
ter). This probability is specified by a road failure probability function 
𝑝(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗).  
It is assumed that the failure probability of a single road that is located 
within the epicenter arrondissement is 50% (𝑝(0) = 50%). Let 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥  be the maximal linear distance from the epicenter arron-
dissement where road failures are principally possible. The equation 
[5-12] highlights the linear formulation of the road failure probability 
function. If expertise is available, alternative formulations can be taken 
(e.g. exponential courses). 
 
𝑝(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗) = {
𝑝(0) −
𝑝(0)
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗 , if 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗 < 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
0, else                                                                      
 [5-12] 
In the depicted decision situation, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥  is unknown. Therefore, a 
number of eight road failure probability functions 𝑝𝑡(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗), 𝑡 = 1,… ,8 
are used where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑡 ∙ 50 and 𝑝𝑡(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥) = 0 (see Figure  
5-4). To specify 𝐻 by assuming a specific epicenter arrondissement 
and 𝑡 ∈ {1,… ,8}, the following steps must be conducted.  
1. For all neighbored arrondissements 𝑗, 𝑚 ∈ 𝐽 
a. calculate 𝑝𝑡(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗). 
b. generate a random number 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∈ [0,100]. 
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c. when 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≤ 𝑝𝑡(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗), set ℎ𝑗𝑚 = ℎ𝑚𝑗  to a default value to 
simulate a failure of the road connection between 𝑗 and 𝑚. 
2. Apply Dijkstra’s algorithm17 to calculate 𝐻 which includes all 
shortest road distances ℎ𝑜𝑢 = ℎ𝑜𝑢, ∀𝑜, 𝑢 ∈ 𝐽, 𝑜 ≠ 𝑢. 
Hence, eight specifications of 𝐻 are generated per possible epicenter 
arrondissement (11, 12, 40, or 42). The total number of obtained speci-
fications is 4 ∙ 8 = 32. 
 
Figure 5-4: Road failure probability functions 
5.3.1.4 Construction of prognostic scenarios and example 
Each prognostic scenario includes one specification of 𝐵 and 𝐻, the 
resultant specifications of 𝐶 and 𝑄, and the constant specifications of 
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝐺, and 𝑓𝑖 . In total, 256 prognostic scenarios are constructed (4 
epicenter arrondissements ∙ 8 health care demand vectors ∙ 8 matrices 
of shortest road distances) and summarized by the set 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 =
{𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , … , 𝑠256
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
}. 
Figure 5-5 exemplarily illustrates 𝑠83
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 which refers to epicen-
ter arrondissement 12, 𝑛 = 3 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 150 km), and 𝑡 = 3 
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 150 km). The left-hand side representations of Haiti in 
                                               
17 For detailed information about Dijkstra’s algorithm to calculate shortest paths within a 
network, reference is made to Neumann & Morlock (2002). 
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Figure 5-5 show the calculated health care demand ratios (upper rep-
resentation) and road failure probabilities (lower representation) 
across all arrondissements. The right-hand side representations of 
Haiti visualize the resultant specifications of 𝐵 (upper representation) 
and road failures as respected by 𝐻 (lower representations). The 
health care demand in 𝑠83
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 is 23.25% of Haiti’s total population. Alt-
hough arrondissement 5 is characterized by a small health care de-
mand ratio, it is characterized by the highest relative share of the over-
all health care demand. This is because arrondissement 5 refers to 
Port-au-Prince which includes 25.29% of Haiti’s total population. 
  
  
 
Figure 5-5: Exemplary visualization of a prognostic scenario 
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5.3.2 Alternatives 
An alternative is defined by the binary values of decision variable 
𝑦𝑖 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 (the binary values of decision variable 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 are 
adaptable to scenario-specific conditions, see below). These values 
indicate whether a health care facility is opened in arrondissement 
𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 (𝑦𝑖 = 1) or not (𝑦𝑖 = 0). As 𝐼 = {1,… ,15} and 𝐺 = 5, the feasible 
space of alternatives comprises 3003 alternatives18. All alternatives of 
this space are respected in the following. Hence, no solution algorithm 
is applied in the case study to generate the optimal alternative per 
scenario-specific optimization sub-model (ReDRiSS part B, processing 
step 4). The set of feasible alternatives is denoted 𝐴 = {𝑎1, … , 𝑎3003}. 
Each 𝑎𝑧 ∈ 𝐴 is tested in each 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 by using the respective 
scenario-specific optimization sub-model (ReDRiSS part C, processing 
step 5). Thereby, the binary values of 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 are adapted to 
the specifications of the environmental variables as assumed by 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
. 
Health care demand 𝑏𝑗  is met by health care facility 𝑖 when 𝑐𝑖𝑗  is mini-
mal (compared to all opened health care facilities of 𝑎𝑧) and when ℎ𝑖𝑗  
does not exceed 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 (then, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1; 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0 else). The adaptation of 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 is required as prognostic scenarios vary in 𝐻 and 𝐵.  
Based on the binary values of the decision variables 𝑦𝑖 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 and the 
adapted binary values of 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, objective function values 𝑧1 
(service level) and 𝑧2 (costs) are calculated. Subsequently, the normal-
ized regret of 𝑎𝑧 in 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 is determined by comparing, per objective, the 
calculated objective function value and the best (𝑧1: maximum; 𝑧2: min-
imum) objective function value that can be achieved by any other al-
ternative of 𝐴 in 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
. The normalization of the calculated regret per 
objective is exemplarily regulated by a linear value function. Let 
𝑟𝑧1(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) and 𝑟𝑧2(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) be the normalized regret of 𝑎𝑧 in 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
and regarding 𝑧1 and 𝑧2. Alternative 𝑎𝑧 performs best in 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 when 
𝑟𝑧1(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) = 𝑟𝑧2(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) = 0. 
                                               
18 (
|𝐼|
𝐺
) = (
15
5
) =
15!
(15−5)!∙5!
= 3003 
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𝑟𝑧1(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) =
𝑧1
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) − 𝑧1(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)
𝑧1
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) − 𝑧1
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)
 [5-13] 
 
𝑟𝑧2(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) =
𝑧2(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) − 𝑧2
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)
𝑧2
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) − 𝑧2
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)
 [5-14] 
With respect to preference-related information provided by the NGO 
association, the relative weights of objectives 𝑤𝑒𝑧1 = 0.7 and 𝑤𝑒𝑧2 = 0.3 
are chosen in the case study to calculate the aggregated regret of each 
𝑎𝑧 ∈ 𝐴 and 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔. Hence, the NGO association prioritizes the 
objective of effectiveness more highly than the objective of efficiency. 
The aggregated regret of 𝑎𝑧 in 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 is 
 𝑟(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) = 0.7 ∙ 𝑟𝑧1(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) + 0.3 ∙ 𝑟𝑧2(𝑎𝑧, 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) [5-15] 
The result is a 3003 × 256 matrix of aggregated regret values. This 
matrix is used to filter a set of promising alternatives ?̃? ⊆ 𝐴 and a cus-
tomized set of significant scenarios 𝑆𝑠𝑖𝑔(?̃?𝑏) ⊆ 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 per promising 
alternative ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃?. To determine ?̃?, alternatives of 𝐴 are ranked by the 
maximum (worst) aggregated regret value achieved by each 𝑎𝑧 ∈ 𝐴 
across all prognostic scenarios of 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 . Based on this ranking, the best 
31 promising alternatives are filtered (1%19 of all feasible alternatives) 
and denoted ?̃? = {?̃?1, … , ?̃?31}. Hence, promising alternatives are char-
acterized by a maximal aggregated regret that decreases the maximal 
aggregated regret of all alternatives of the set 𝐴\?̃?.  
Subsequently, prognostic scenarios of 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 are ranked per promising 
alternative ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃? by the aggregated regret that is achieved by ?̃?𝑏 in 
the prognostic scenarios. Based on this ranking, the “worst” 13 prog-
nostic scenarios are filtered (5%20 of all prognostic scenarios) that are 
                                               
19 This value has been exemplarily chosen in this case study. Depending on the preferences 
of the decision-makers, more or less alternatives can be added to the set of promising 
alternatives. 
20 This value has been exemplarily chosen in this case study. Depending on the preferences 
of the decision-makers, more or less prognostic scenarios can be added to the set of signif-
icant scenarios. 
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characterized by the highest values. For example, 𝑠83
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 is a significant 
scenario of promising alternative ?̃?2 = 𝑎307 = [5, 8, 10, 11, 12]; thus, ?̃?2 
performs relatively badly in 𝑠83
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 compared to in all further prognostic 
scenarios of 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 . The customized set of significant scenarios of ?̃?𝑏 is 
denoted 𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 = {𝑠1
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑠13
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏}. 
Table 5-3 provides an overview of the obtained promising alternatives 
and corresponding health care facility locations (arrondissements). 
Additional information regarding calculated aggregated regret values 
and the customized sets of significant scenarios has been attached to 
appendix A.4.  
Table 5-3: Promising alternatives 
Alternative Locations Alternative Locations 
?̃?1 = 𝑎321 [5, 8, 9, 10, 12] ?̃?17 = 𝑎281 [5, 9, 10, 12, 15] 
?̃?2 = 𝑎307 [5, 8, 10, 11, 12] ?̃?18 = 𝑎156 [6, 9, 10, 12, 14] 
?̃?3 = 𝑎287 [5, 9, 10, 11, 12] ?̃?19 = 𝑎157 [6, 9, 10, 12, 13] 
?̃?4 = 𝑎175 [6, 8, 10, 12, 15] ?̃?20 = 𝑎282 [5, 9, 10, 12, 14] 
?̃?5 = 𝑎301 [5, 8, 10, 12, 15] ?̃?21 = 𝑎283 [5, 9, 10, 12, 13] 
?̃?6 = 𝑎302 [5, 8, 10, 12, 14] ?̃?22 = 𝑎356 [5, 7, 9, 10, 12] 
?̃?7 = 𝑎303 [5, 8, 10, 12, 13] ?̃?23 = 𝑎412 [5, 6, 9, 10, 12] 
?̃?8 = 𝑎371 [5, 7, 8, 10, 12] ?̃?24 = 𝑎706 [4, 5, 9, 10, 12] 
?̃?9 = 𝑎427 [5, 6, 8, 10, 12] ?̃?25 = 𝑎1036 [3, 5, 9, 10, 12] 
?̃?10 = 𝑎721 [4, 5, 8, 10, 12] ?̃?26 = 𝑎1531 [2, 5, 9, 10, 12] 
?̃?11 = 𝑎1051 [3, 5, 8, 10, 12] ?̃?27 = 𝑎2246 [1, 5, 9, 10, 12] 
?̃?12 = 𝑎1546 [2, 5, 8, 10, 12] ?̃?28 = 𝑎622 [4, 6, 9, 10, 12] 
?̃?13 = 𝑎2261 [1, 5, 8, 10, 12] ?̃?29 = 𝑎177 [6, 8, 10, 12, 13] 
?̃?14 = 𝑎176 [6, 8, 10, 12, 14] ?̃?30 = 𝑎1447 [2, 6, 9, 10, 12] 
?̃?15 = 𝑎637 [4, 6, 8, 10, 12] ?̃?31 = 𝑎511 [4, 8, 10, 12, 15] 
?̃?16 = 𝑎155 [6, 9, 10, 12, 15]   
One can see in Table 5-3 that all promising alternatives suggest open-
ing a health care facility in arrondissements 10 and 12. While the first 
(Ouanaminthe) is part of the epicenter area, the latter (Cap Haïtien) 
refers to the most populated arrondissement in the north-eastern part 
of Haiti. Two promising alternatives suggest opening an additional 
health care facility in the epicenter area (arrondissement 11). A facility 
is located in Haiti’s most populated arrondissement 5 (Port-au-Prince) 
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in 21 promising alternatives. Locations in arrondissements of the 
southern-western part of Haiti, which is furthermost distanced by 
roads from the epicenter area (arrondissements 1, 2, 3, and 4), are part 
of 12 promising alternatives.  
5.3.3 Hypothetical scenarios 
Prognostic scenarios are constructed to close lacks of exogenous in-
formation in terms of an uncertain epicenter area and unknown con-
sequences of the earthquake regarding health care demands and states 
of the road network. Hypothetical scenarios are constructed to simulate 
dynamic developments caused by critical events affecting the states of 
the decision environment as assumed by prognostic scenarios over 
time. The case study explores critical events by secondary disasters in 
terms of earthquake aftershocks.  
Hypothetical scenarios are constructed in a customized manner per 
promising alternative. It is assumed that the extent of the caused con-
sequences by an aftershock depends on both its epicenter location and 
intensity. Critical aftershock epicenter locations are identified per 
promising alternative to simulate alternative-specific dynamic devel-
opments (see section 4.3.5). Both these locations and the intensities of 
the caused aftershocks also depend on the state of the decision envi-
ronment as assumed by its significant scenarios; hypothetical scenari-
os therefore additionally highlight scenario-specific dynamic develop-
ments (see section 4.3.5). The following sections discuss the process of 
developing and simulating critical aftershock events via hypothetical 
scenarios (ReDRiSS part B, processing step 6).21 
5.3.3.1 Identification of critical aftershock epicenter locations 
The case study explores the possibility of critical aftershock events 
whose epicenter locations might principally refer to any arrondisse-
ment. Just as the main earthquake did, the aftershock causes health 
                                               
21 The construction of hypothetical scenarios is based on re-specification processes of 
environmental variables which are actually developed in ReDRiSS part A, processing step 
2. For the sake of clarity, re-specification processes are presented in this section. 
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care demands and failures within the road network. The extent of 
these consequences in an arrondissement is again influenced by its 
linear distance from the aftershock’s epicenter arrondissement.  
The ability of a promising alternative to handle consequences (in terms 
of achieving an acceptable service level and/or transportation costs) 
depends on the area where these consequences occur. Thus, the criti-
cality of the epicenter location varies across the promising alternatives. 
Critical epicenter locations (arrondissements) are developed by explor-
ing critical changes of the states of 𝐵 and 𝐻. Each two critical epicenter 
locations are determined per ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃? and 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 ∈ 𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 . In fact, the abil-
ity of ?̃?𝑏 is explored  
- to manage critical shifts of health care demands (𝐵) caused by 
the aftershock in 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏  
- to react to critical additional failures within the road network 
(𝐻) caused by the aftershock in 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏  
Regarding the first it is assumed that the criticality of shifts of health 
care demands (caused by the aftershock) increases when arrondisse-
ments are affected that cannot be accessed easily via roads by the 
health care facilities (of ?̃?𝑏). Hence, aftershock epicenter 1 in 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏  re-
fers to the arrondissement whose shortest road distance to the closest 
opened health care facility (of ?̃?𝑏) is maximal. When an aftershock oc-
curs in this arrondissement, difficulties might be triggered to satisfy 
additional health care demands arising further afield. This is enhanced 
by road failures in the aftershock-affected area. 
Regarding the second, it is assumed that road failures near the health 
care facilities (of ?̃?𝑏) mostly impact the performance of ?̃?𝑏 . Therefore, 
aftershock epicenter 2 refers to the arrondissement containing the 
health care facility that satisfies most health care demands in 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏  
(which is indicated by the adapted binary values of decision variable 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽). An occurring aftershock within this arrondissement 
might cause that other arrondissements are isolated from the included 
health care facility because of additional (and probable) road failures. 
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This threat is intensified by the additional health care demands in the 
aftershock-affected area.  
Figure 5-6 exemplarily illustrates the two identified aftershock epicen-
ter locations with respect to promising alternative ?̃?2 = 𝑎307 and sig-
nificant scenario 𝑠12
𝑠𝑖,?̃?2 = 𝑠83
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 (which has been visualized in Figure  
5-5, section 5.3.1.4). The maximal road distance between any health 
care facility (of ?̃?2) and all arrondissements is the one between arron-
dissement 5 (Port-au-Prince) and 1 (Jérémie). Thus, the latter specifies 
aftershock epicenter 1. Arrondissement 5 satisfies most health care 
demands in 𝑠12
𝑠𝑖,?̃?2  and is taken as aftershock epicenter 2. The after-
shock epicenter locations of all promising alternatives and significant 
scenarios have been attached to appendix A.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-6: Exemplary visualization of aftershock epicenter arrondissements 
5.3.3.2 Simulation of aftershocks within significant scenarios 
Based on the aftershock epicenter locations, every two aftershocks are 
simulated within each 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 ∈ 𝑆𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 , ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃?. It is assumed that the in-
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tensity of the aftershock is below the intensity of the main earthquake. 
This is reflected by the ratio of caused health care demands and proba-
bility of road failures. In fact, the aftershock’s intensity is set to 75% of 
the main earthquake in 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 . To simulate the aftershock, again health 
care demand ratio and road failure probability functions are used (see 
section 5.3.1). The modified maximal health care demand ratio in the 
aftershock epicenter arrondissement is 75% (𝑑(0) = 75%) and the 
maximal road failure probability in the aftershock epicenter arron-
dissement is 37.5% (𝑝(0) = 37.5%). Furthermore, the maximal linear 
distances (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥), where health care demands or road 
failures are principally possible, is set to 75% as in 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 .  
Let 𝑑𝑛,𝑤(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗), 𝑛 ∈ {1,… ,8} and 𝑝𝑡,𝑤(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗), 𝑡 ∈ {1,… ,8} be the calcu-
lated health care demand ratio and road failure probability in arron-
dissement 𝑗 and 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 . Regarding the modified state of the road net-
work, it is assumed that a failed road in 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏  remains failed in the con-
structed hypothetical scenario. Roads that are still intact, in turn, 
receive a second chance to fail by the probability 𝑝𝑡,𝑤(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗). The pro-
cess of specifying 𝐻 equates to the process that has been outlined in 
section 5.3.1.3.  
To calculate the modified health care demand based on 𝑑𝑛,𝑤(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗), 
health care demand in 𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 , 𝑏𝑗,𝑤, must be respected. The maximal ad-
ditional health care demands (𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗,𝑤) can principly arise. Hence, 
the modified health care demand 𝑏𝑗  is  
 𝑏𝑗 = 𝑏𝑗,𝑤 + (𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗,𝑤) ∙ 𝑑𝑛,𝑤(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗), 𝑛 ∈ {1,… ,8} [5-16] 
5.3.3.3 Construction of hypothetical scenarios and example 
According to section 4.3.5, each two critical events (𝐾 = 2) are simu-
lated in each of 13 significant scenarios (𝑊 = 13) per each of 31 prom-
ising alternatives (𝐵 = 31). The total number of hypothetical scenarios, 
thus, is 2 ∙ 13 ∙ 31 = 806. Each 26 customized hypothetical scenarios 
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are constructed per promising alternative ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃? and are summarized 
by the set 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 = {𝑠1,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠1,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑠13,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 , … , 𝑠13,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏}. 
Figure 5-7 exemplarily shows the two hypothetical scenarios that have 
been constructed based on ?̃?2 = 𝑎307 and significant scenario 
𝑠12
𝑠𝑖,?̃?2 = 𝑠83
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 (which has been visualized in Figure 5-5, section 5.3.1.4). 
Explanations of the Figure 5-7 are provided below. 
  
  
 
Figure 5-7: Exemplary visualization of hypothetical scenarios 
The representations on the upper level show the health care demand 
distribution and state of the road network as assumed in hypothetical 
scenario 𝑠12,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?2  which simulates an aftershock in epicenter 1 (arron-
dissement 1). On the lower level, 𝑠12,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?2  is illustrated that has been 
constructed based on aftershock epicenter 2 (arrondissement 5). It 
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becomes obvious that 𝑠12,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?2  includes additional health care demands 
and road failures that are widely distanced from the closest health care 
facility of ?̃?2 in 𝑠12
𝑠𝑖,?̃?2  (arrondissement 5). In 𝑠12,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?2 , additional road 
failures and health care demands arise near the health care facility that 
satisfies most health care demands in 𝑠12
𝑠𝑖,?̃?2  (arrondissement 5). 
5.4 Results 
ReDRiSS provides a robust decision recommendation (promising al-
ternative) for the NGO association. Robustness measurement implies 
the testing of promising alternatives in all prognostic scenarios and 
customized hypothetical scenarios and the evaluation of the obtained 
results (aggregated regret data) by integrating the degree of pessi-
mism of the NGO association. The following sections discuss the pro-
cess and results of robustness measurement. 
5.4.1 Robustness measurement 
Each promising alternative ?̃?𝑏 ∈ ?̃? is tested in each prognostic scenario 
𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 and in each hypothetical scenario 𝑠𝑤,𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 ∈ 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 by 
using the respective optimization sub-models (ReDRiSS part C, pro-
cessing step 7). The aggregated regret 𝑟(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
) and 𝑟(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑤,𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏) 
are calculated based on the process outlined by equations [5-13],  
[5-14], and [5-15] (see section 5.3.2). As opposed to this process, the 
regret compares the objective function values of ?̃?𝑏 and the further 
promising alternatives of ?̃? in a scenario. By again using the relative 
weights of objectives 𝑤𝑒𝑧1 = 0.7 and 𝑤𝑒𝑧2 = 0.3, the result is a 
31 × (256 + 26) matrix of aggregated regret values. Based on this ma-
trix, the expected and maximal normalized aggregated regret of ?̃?𝑏 in 
each scenario category is determined. The expected aggregated regret 
of ?̃?𝑏 per scenario category is  
 
𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) =
1
256
∑𝑟(
256
𝑙=1
?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) [5-17] 
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𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏) =
1
26
∑∑𝑟(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑤,𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏)
2
𝑘=1
13
𝑤=1
 [5-18] 
The maximal aggregated regret of ?̃?𝑏 per scenario category is 
 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) = max
𝑙=1,…,256
(𝑟(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)) [5-19] 
 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏) = max
𝑤=1,…,13,𝑘=1,2
(𝑟(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑠𝑤,𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏)) [5-20] 
The result matrix of expected and maximal aggregated regret values 
has been attached to appendix A.6. This matrix provides the basis for 
measuring the robustness of promising alternatives by integrating risk 
preferences of the decision-makers (ReDRiSS part D, processing step 8). 
Risk preferences are reflected by the inter- and intra-scenario degrees 
of pessimism of the NGO association. The following values are assumed 
according to preference-related information provided by the NGO as-
sociation:  
- Inter-scenario degree of pessimism: 𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8,𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.2 
- Intra-scenario degree of pessimism: 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.2 
The values imply that the NGO association primarily aims at respecting 
prognostic scenarios for robustness measurements of promising alter-
natives (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8) and using the expected aggregated regret 
(𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8). Although hypothetical scenarios are less used for ro-
bustness measurement (𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.2), the evaluation of aggregated 
regret values in this scenario category follows the maximal aggregated 
regret (𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.2). Hence, the NGO association operates rather neu-
trally in its principle risk aversion; however, it is aware of threats sim-
ulated within hypothetical scenarios and respects them through ro-
bustness measurement. The robustness value 𝑅𝑉(?̃?𝑏) is 
 𝑅𝑉(?̃?𝑏) = 0.8 ∙ (0.8 ∙ 𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) + 0.2 ∙ 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔)) + 0.2
∙ (0.2 ∙ 𝑅𝐸(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏) + 0.8 ∙ 𝑅𝑀(?̃?𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏)) [5-21] 
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The obtained robustness ranking of the ten most robust promising 
alternatives is shown in Table 5-4 (the extensive ranking of all promis-
ing alternatives has been attached to appendix A.6). Promising alterna-
tive ?̃?17 = 𝑎281 achieves the best robustness value and is provided as 
decision recommendation ?̃? for the NGO association. The difference 
between the two most robust promising alternatives, ?̃?17 and ?̃?5, in 
their robustness values is very small (0.002). This is because they dif-
fer in just one arrondissement (?̃?17: 9, ?̃?5: 8). The insights provided by 
the robustness ranking are interpreted in section 5.4.3 after conduct-
ing three sensitivity analyses to explore the effects of preferential un-
certainty (see section 5.4.2). 
Table 5-4: Robustness ranking (case study 1) 
Number Alternative Locations Robustness value 
1 ?̃?17 = 𝑎281 [5, 9, 10, 12, 15] 0.475 
2 ?̃?5 = 𝑎301 [5, 8, 10, 12, 15] 0.477 
3 ?̃?1 = 𝑎321 [5, 8, 9, 10, 12] 0.515 
4 ?̃?20 = 𝑎282 [5, 9, 10, 12, 14] 0.549 
5 ?̃?3 = 𝑎287 [5, 9, 10, 11, 12] 0.551 
6 ?̃?2 = 𝑎307 [5, 8, 10, 11, 12] 0.565 
7 ?̃?21 = 𝑎283 [5, 9, 10, 12, 13] 0.579 
8 ?̃?6 = 𝑎302 [5, 8, 10, 12, 14] 0.582 
9 ?̃?22 = 𝑎356 [5, 7, 9, 10, 12] 0.599 
10 ?̃?7 = 𝑎303 [5, 8, 10, 12, 13] 0.609 
5.4.2 Sensitivity analyses 
The robustness ranking directly depends on the adjusted preferences 
of the NGO association in terms of preferences of objectives 
(𝑤𝑒𝑧1 , 𝑤𝑒𝑧2) and risk preferences (𝑤𝑒
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝, 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝). To ex-
plore effects of preferential uncertainty on the obtained results,  
ReDRiSS prescribes sensitivity analyses (ReDRiSS part D, processing step 
9). The following outlines the results of three conducted sensitivity 
analyses where the values of the inter-scenario degree of pessimism, 
the intra-scenario degree of pessimism, and the relative weights of 
objectives have been separately varied. Sensitivity analyses focus on 
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the promising alternatives in Table 5-4. Results are interpreted in sec-
tion 5.4.3. Data of the sensitivity analyses can be found in appendix A.7. 
5.4.2.1 Sensitivity of the inter-scenario degree of pessimism 
A robustness value of a promising alternative is calculated based on 
the discrete value pairs (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝),𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.1 ∙ 𝑛, 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 1 −
𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝑛 = 1,… ,10. The sensitivity analysis assumes the adjusted 
preferences of objectives (𝑤𝑒𝑧1 = 0.7,𝑤𝑒𝑧2 = 0.3) and intra-criteria 
degree of pessimism (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.2) as used for the genera-
tion of initial results. As the expected and maximal aggregated regret 
value per promising alternative doesn’t depend on (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝), 
obtained robustness values in the range of values 𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈
[0,1],𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 1 − 𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 are located on a linear straight line. Results 
of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 5-8. 
 
Figure 5-8: Sensitivity of the inter-scenario degree of pessimism (case study 1) 
Results indicate that the robust decision recommendation ?̃? varies 
across three intervals of the discrete value pair (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝): 
- ?̃? = ?̃?5 for (𝑤𝑒
ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ {0,0.1},𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 1 − 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝) 
- ?̃? = ?̃?17 for (𝑤𝑒
ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ {0.2,0.3},𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 1 − 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝) 
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
R
o
b
u
s
tn
e
s
s
 v
a
lu
e
Relative weight of hypothetic scenarios
a17 a5 a1 a20 a3 a2 a21 a6 a22 a7
current weight
5 Case study 1: humanitarian logistics in Haiti 
161 
- ?̃? = ?̃?1 for (𝑤𝑒
ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ {0.4,… ,1}, 𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 1 − 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝) 
5.4.2.2 Sensitivity of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism 
A robustness value of a promising alternative is calculated for the dis-
crete value pair (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝), 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.1 ∙ 𝑛, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.1 ∙ 𝑚, 𝑛 =
1,… ,10,𝑚 = 1,… ,10. The sensitivity analysis assumes the adjusted 
preferences of objectives (𝑤𝑒𝑧1 = 0.7,𝑤𝑒𝑧2 = 0.3) and inter-criteria 
degree of pessimism (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8,𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.2) as used for the gen-
eration of initial results. As the expected and maximal aggregated re-
gret value per promising alternative does not depend on (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝), 
obtained robustness values in the range of values 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ [0,1], 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈
[0,1] are located on a linear plane surface. Results of the sensitivity 
analysis are shown in Figure 5-9. For the sake of clarity, just the sur-
faces of promising alternatives achieving a best robustness value in 
any value pair (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝) are colored. 
 
Figure 5-9: Sensitivity of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism (case study 1) 
Results indicate that the robust decision recommendation ?̃? varies 
across three intervals of the discrete value pair (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝): 
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- ?̃? = ?̃?5 for (𝜆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.6, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 1) or (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.7, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈
{0.4,… ,1}) or (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ {0.3,… ,1}) or (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈
{0.9,1}, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ {0.2,… ,1}) 
- ?̃? = ?̃?17 for (𝜆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ {0.7,… ,1}, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ {0,0.1}) or (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈
{0.7,0.8}, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.2) or (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.7, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.3) 
- ?̃? = ?̃?1 for (𝜆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ {0,… ,0.5}, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ {0,… ,1}) or (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 =
0.6, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ {0,… ,0.9}) 
5.4.2.3 Sensitivity of preferences of objectives 
A robustness value of a promising alternative is calculated for the dis-
crete value pair (𝑤𝑒𝑧1 , 𝑤𝑒𝑧2),𝑤𝑒𝑧1 = 0.1 ∙ 𝑛, 𝑤𝑒𝑧2 = 1−𝑤𝑒𝑧1 , 𝑛 =
1,… ,10. The sensitivity analysis assumes the adjusted inter-criteria 
degree of pessimism (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8,𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.2) and intra-criteria 
degree of pessimism (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.2) as used for the genera-
tion of initial results. As the expected and maximal aggregated regret 
value per promising alternative depend on (𝑤𝑒𝑧1 , 𝑤𝑒𝑧2), robustness 
values in the range of values 𝑤𝑒𝑧1 ∈ [0,1], 𝑤𝑒𝑧2 ∈ [0,1] are not neces-
sarily located on a linear straight line. Results of the sensitivity analysis 
are shown in Figure 5-10. For the sake of clarity, robustness values are 
connected via trend lines.  
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Figure 5-10: Sensitivity of preferences of objectives 
Results indicate that the robust decision recommendation ?̃? varies 
across four intervals of the discrete value pair (𝑤𝑒𝑧1, 𝑤𝑒𝑧2): 
- ?̃? = ?̃?5 for (𝑤𝑒𝑧1 ∈ {0.8,0.9,1}, 𝑤𝑒𝑧2 = 1 − 𝑤𝑒𝑧1) 
- ?̃? = ?̃?17 for (𝑤𝑒𝑧1 ∈ {0.7}, 𝑤𝑒𝑧2 = 1 − 𝑤𝑒𝑧1) 
- ?̃? = ?̃?1 for (𝑤𝑒𝑧1 ∈ {0.4,0.5,0.6}, 𝑤𝑒𝑧2 = 1 − 𝑤𝑒𝑧1) 
- ?̃? = ?̃?3 for (𝑤𝑒𝑧1 ∈ {0,… ,0.3},𝑤𝑒𝑧2 = 1 − 𝑤𝑒𝑧1) 
5.4.3 Interpretation of results 
Initial results (see Table 5-4) indicate that three of five health care 
facility locations of the ten most robust promising alternatives are 
identical (arrondissements 5, 10, 12). Those locations can be, thus, 
understood as totally robust. Arrondissement 5 (Port-au-Prince) is 
Haiti’s most populated arrondissement; arrondissement 10 (Cap Ha-
ïtien) is the most populated arrondissement of Haiti’s north-eastern 
part; arrondissement 12 (Ouanaminthe) is the most populated arron-
dissement of the main earthquake’s epicenter area. Any scenario is 
characterized by a high health care demand in these arrondissements, 
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even when their underlying health care demand ratios are low. Hence, 
opening health care facilities in these arrondissements provides the 
advantage of increasing the service level by reducing the associated 
transportation costs. Regarding the remaining two health care facility 
locations that must be opened, the results show three regional clusters 
of arrondissements: a health care facility in an arrondissement of Hai-
ti’s north-western part (13, 14, 15), central part (7, 8, 9), or the main 
earthquake’s epicenter area (11). Figure 5-11 visualizes the findings of 
the robustness ranking.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Visualization of the robustness ranking 
Promising alternative ?̃? = ?̃?17 = [5, 9, 10, 12, 15] is provided as the 
robust decision recommendation for the NGO association. With respect 
to the insights provided by the sensitivity analyses (see section 5.4.2), 
further promising alternatives exist that achieve a best robustness 
value when different adjustments of preferential parameters are used 
(preferences of objectives and risk preferences). These are ?̃?1 which 
suggests opening health care facilities in arrondissements 8 and 9 and 
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?̃?5 which proposes facilities in arrondissements 8 and 15. The follow-
ing paragraphs explore differences between ?̃?1, ?̃?5, and ?̃?17.  
Promising alternative ?̃?5 is assessed as most robust when decision-
makers operate neutrally in their principle risk aversion. They choose 
a low inter- and intra-scenario degree of pessimism (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 →
1, 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 → 1). Robustness measurement is mainly based on the ex-
pected aggregated regret a promising alternative achieves across 
prognostic scenarios. In turn, ?̃?1 is most robust when decision-makers 
operate pessimistically in their principle risk aversion. Therefore, a 
high inter- and intra-scenario degree of pessimism is selected 
(𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 → 0, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 → 0). Robustness measurement is mainly based on 
the maximal aggregated regret a promising alternative achieves across 
hypothetical scenarios.  
Adjustments of preferential parameters as used in the case study 
(𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8, 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.8, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.2) indicate a rather neutrally op-
erating NGO association in its principle risk aversion. However, deci-
sion-makers are aware of the possibility of occurring threats within the 
decision environment caused by critical events and respect them 
through robustness measurements. The most robust promising alter-
native ?̃?17 can therefore be understood as a “compromise” of ?̃?1 and ?̃?5. 
In fact, ?̃?17 is assessed as most robust when prognostic scenarios are 
more highly prioritized than hypothetical scenarios (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 > 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝) 
and when the expected aggregated regret is taken to evaluate promis-
ing alternatives in prognostic scenarios and the maximal aggregated 
regret is used to evaluate promising alternatives in hypothetical sce-
narios (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 → 1, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 → 0). Hence, decision-makers principly trust in 
the set of prognostic scenarios. However, they are interested in imple-
menting a decision that performs robustly to deteriorated states of the 
decision environment specified by hypothetical scenarios. To under-
stand the effects of changing preferential parameter values, differences 
between ?̃?1, ?̃?5, and ?̃?17 are visualized in Figure 5-12 and are discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
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Figure 5-12: Visualization of robust promising alternatives 
Both ?̃?1 and ?̃?5 suggest a health care facility in arrondissement 8 and, 
thus, differ in just one health care facility location. Promising alterna-
tive ?̃?5 opens this facility in arrondissement 15. This is because prog-
nostic scenarios indicate that the north-western part of Haiti is most 
likely to be affected by the main earthquake. In turn, ?̃?1 aims at 
strengthening the part of Haiti that is located close to the epicenter 
area by opening the facility in arrondissement 9. The reason is that 
mostly hypothetical scenarios are respected by robustness measure-
ment. In many significant scenarios (of the promising alternatives), the 
majority of health care demands is satisfied by the facility in arron-
dissement 8. Decision-makers, therefore, aim at strengthening the part 
of Haiti close to this arrondissement (and the epicenter area) by a facil-
ity in arrondissement 9 to hedge against additional health care de-
mands and road failures. The “compromise” promising alternative ?̃?17 
opens health care facilities in arrondissements 9 and 15. It suggests 
protecting the epicenter area by a facility in the closer arrondissement 
9 (compared to arrondissement 8). As, however, prognostic scenarios 
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are mainly respected for robustness measurement, health care de-
mands that might arise in Haiti’s north-western part are covered by a 
facility in arrondissement 15. In summary, differences between ?̃?1, ?̃?5, 
and ?̃?17 concentrate on the distribution of facilities in Haiti’s northern 
part. The southern part, in turn, is always understood as well covered 
by the totally robust health care facility in arrondissement 5. The dif-
ference between ?̃?1 and ?̃?5 (black line) and their differences to ?̃?17 
(black dotted lines) are visualized in Figure 5-12. 
The conducted sensitivity analysis of preferences of objectives under-
lines the robustness of ?̃?1, ?̃?5, and ?̃?17 (as stated by the sensitivity anal-
yses of risk preferences). While ?̃?5 and ?̃?17 are most robust when 𝑤𝑒𝑧1  
increases 𝑤𝑒𝑧2 , ?̃?1 is most robust when 𝑤𝑒𝑧1  and 𝑤𝑒𝑧2  are almost the 
same. An additional promising alternative, ?̃?3, is assessed as most ro-
bust when 𝑤𝑒𝑧2  increases 𝑤𝑒𝑧1 . As decision-makers are interested in 
reducing transportation costs, the epicenter area is strengthened by an 
additional health care facility in arrondissement 11 in this case. 
5.5 Summary and discussion 
Chapter 5 applied ReDRiSS in a case study that focused on humanitari-
an logistics in Haiti. A decision situation has been considered where  
P-SCs of the CI sector “health care” have been destructed due to an 
earthquake. ReDRiSS provided analytical support to solve a facility 
location problem of opening quick rotation warehouses in Haiti to 
store medicine or medical equipment. Solving the facility location 
problem is an essential step toward defining the distribution structure 
of a humanitarian relief SC that takes over the functions of destructed 
P-SCs.  
Section 5.1 introduced the field of humanitarian logistics and outlined 
the relevance of facility location planning in this regard. The structure 
and assumptions of the case study have been discussed in section 5.2. 
An adapted version of the BOUFLP to solve the logistical decision prob-
lem has been formulated and the decision situation has been charac-
terized. The post-disaster application of ReDRiSS has been highlighted 
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in section 5.3 by following the processing steps of the two-stage sce-
nario technique. Robustness measurement has been addressed by sec-
tion 5.4. Generated results have been verified by sensitivity analyses 
and obtained findings have been interpreted. 
The case study shows that robust health care facility locations can be 
determined even when conditions of the disaster-affected decision 
environment are uncertain and complex. In fact, three of five health 
care facility locations are always the same (totally robust) across the 
ten most robust promising alternatives. Regarding the two remaining 
locations, regional clusters within Haiti exist whose underlying arron-
dissements might host these facilities. All clusters refer to Haiti’s 
northern or central part. This underlines a similarity of the investigat-
ed promising alternatives as well as their basic robustness. Differences 
in the obtained robustness values are, therefore, subtle. 
The case study highlighted the advantage of ReDRiSS to construct cus-
tomized sets of hypothetical scenarios. This advantage is captured by 
simulating alternative-specific and scenario-specific dynamic develop-
ments in terms of earthquake aftershocks. In fact, promising alterna-
tives to solve the facility location problem are identified, their individ-
ual worst case prognostic scenarios (significant scenarios) are filtered, 
and dynamic developments caused by critical events (aftershocks) are 
simulated within the significant scenarios. Both the criticality of dy-
namic developments in terms of their caused threats and the ability of 
promising alternatives to handle these threats vary across promising 
alternatives. Therefore, dynamic developments are simulated alterna-
tive-specifically by developing critical aftershock epicenter locations 
(arrondissements) from the perspective of a promising alternative. 
Furthermore, dynamic developments are simulated scenario-
specifically in the sense that the aftershock affects the state of the deci-
sion environment as assumed within a promising alternative’s worst 
case prognostic scenarios (significant scenarios). In this way, ReDRiSS 
provides the possibility of exploring individual advantages and weak-
nesses of promising alternatives by systematically analyzing complexi-
ty of the decision situation in terms of changed and deteriorated states 
of the decision environment. 
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A further advantage of ReDRiSS becomes obvious when interpreting 
the results of robustness measurement that respect risk preferences of 
the decision-makers. The conducted sensitivity analyses show three 
promising alternatives that are assessed as most robust for different 
adjustments of the preferential parameters. Although all of these 
promising alternatives are basically robust (as all health care facility 
locations refer to the identified regional clusters of Haiti, see above), 
they show significant differences regarding the underlying risk prefer-
ences of the decision-makers (in terms of their degrees of pessimism). 
These differences might become important when decision-makers 
implement a decision by transferring the decision recommendation 
into practice. Decision-makers operating in disaster management and 
in particular in the field of humanitarian logistics must make decisions 
that might trigger severe consequences for beneficiaries. Their trust in 
an implemented decision is therefore essential. A DSS can just 
strengthen this trust when offering the opportunity for the decision-
makers to influence the decision-making process by adjusting their 
(risk) preferences. 
Various extensions of the case study are possible. This firstly affects 
the adapted BOUFLP that is used to solve the facility location problem. 
The optimization model assumes that the number of health care facili-
ties to be opened, 𝐺, is predetermined by the decision-makers. This 
assumption might be modified by just defining a minimum and maxi-
mum number of facilities to be set up. To identify the best number of 
facilities, analyses must trade-off fixed costs (e.g. they increase when 
more facilities are opened) and transportation costs (e.g. they increase 
when fewer facilities are opened). Exploring this trade-off allows an in-
depth consideration of the objective of efficiency. A second extension 
of the case study refers to the construction process of prognostic and 
hypothetical scenarios. It is assumed that consequences caused by the 
earthquake in terms of health care demands and road failures in an 
arrondissement depend on its linear distance from the epicenter ar-
rondissement. Linear functions are used to reflect this dependence. 
Expert interviews might be useful to formulate a more precise function 
in this regard. Finally, the case study should be adapted to a historical 
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earthquake event (e.g. in 2010). This requires the reconstruction of the 
past conditions of the decision situation. Extensive tasks are therefore 
required such as, inter alia, literature reviews, interviews with experts 
and decision-makers (e.g. NGOs), data collections, restorations of exog-
enous information flows that arose in the aftermath of the earthquake, 
or analyses of decisions made. Despite the widespread challenges oc-
curring in this regard, comparing decision recommendations that are 
generated by ReDRiSS and actually made past decisions is an im-
portant step of continuing the verification of the DSS. 
  
6 Case study 2: business continuity 
management in the food sector 
This chapter presents a case study to apply ReDRiSS in a decision situ-
ation arising in the field of business continuity management (BCM). The 
case study has been developed within the research project SEAK (sce-
nario-based decision support to manage food supply disruptions) which 
was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF) from January 2013 to December 2015. SEAK’s major objective 
was the development of decision support approaches to aid internal 
decision-makers (companies of the CI sector “food”, denoted “food 
sector” in the following) in managing food SC (P-SC) disruptions.  
The depicted decision situation is about a flu pandemic that has spread 
in the middle-eastern part of Europe. It causes a large-scale staff ab-
sence in a food retail company owning stores in Berlin, Germany, 
which threatens its critical business processes in terms of operating 
the stores smoothly. To strengthen the functioning of these critical 
business processes, the logistical decision problem arises of allocating 
the available staff members to the stores. Therefore, the food retail 
company implements and applies ReDRiSS as a measure of BCM to 
develop a robust allocation that withstands uncertain and fluctuating 
customer food demands within the flu pandemic affected population 
(customers). In section 6.1, the field of BCM is introduced and its rele-
vance regarding the case study is outlined. Section 6.2 focusses on the 
implementation of ReDRiSS as a measure of BCM. ReDRiSS is applied in 
section 6.3 and the results are presented in section 6.4. The chapter 
closes with a summary and discussion in section 6.5. 
6.1 Business continuity management 
The following sections provide an introduction into the field of BCM. 
Definitions and standards are presented and the BCM lifecycle is out-
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lined describing a framework to operationalize BCM within an organi-
zation. Furthermore, the relevance of BCM for the topic of this case 
study is described which is on companies of the food sector that are 
impacted by a disease-caused staff absence. 
6.1.1 Definitions 
BCM refers to a set of principles, policies, and tools to support organi-
zations in keeping their critical business processes functioning if the 
situation arises where they are threatened or already affected by a 
disruptive event (Peck 2006). The focus is thereby on disruptive 
events that are characterized by a high impact and a low probability. 
Such events typically just allow a short timeframe for the decision-
makers to react (e.g. disasters) (Zsidisin et al. 2005). Since the year 
2012, BCM has been defined by the standard ISO 22301. Thus, organi-
zations have the opportunity to certify their BCM activities. According 
to ISO 22301, BCM is defined as a “holistic management process that 
identifies potential threats to an organization and the impacts to busi-
ness operations those threats, if realized, might cause, and which pro-
vides a framework for building organizational resilience with the ca-
pability of an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key 
stakeholders, reputation, brand, and value-creating activities” (ISO 
2015). Hence, BCM refers to proactive management process by provid-
ing a framework of tools (ISO 2015) with the objective of recovering 
disrupted critical business processes (Kildow 2011).  
Different disciplines that are bundled together by an organization must 
participate and collaborate within BCM (von Rössing 2005). According 
to the considerations of chapter 3, efforts of both preventive SCRM and 
reactive SCCM are required to manage SC disturbances (disruptions or 
destructions). When disturbances refer to disruptions of critical busi-
ness processes affecting an organization, BCM bears a particular re-
sponsibility in coordinating and, thus, bridging the gap between SCRM 
and SCCM (Boerse 2014). The interconnectedness of BCM, SCRM, and 
SCCM becomes directly obvious within the standard ISO 22301. On the 
one hand, BCM is described as a management process that coordinates 
the identification and minimization of risks. SCRM therefore builds the 
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foundation of a functioning BCM by identifying critical business pro-
cesses and risks of disruptive events and their consequences. On the 
other hand, BCM is described as a management process that provides 
an action framework to withstand an actually occurring disruption of 
the critical business processes (von Rössing 2005). It supports SCCM 
by providing a pre-developed business continuity plan (BCP). The task 
of SCCM is to transfer this BCP into practice to run an appropriate cri-
sis operation with the objective of recovering the normal operation 
over time (Eren & Schindler 2011). Figure 6-1 visualizes the relation-
ship between BCM, SCRM, and SCCM.  
 
Figure 6-1: Business continuity management (adapted from Lauwe 2007) 
A practical framework to operationalize BCM within an organization is 
provided by the BCM lifecycle. In this framework, BCM is described as a 
cyclically-ordered process that must be continuously repeated by an 
organization to establish BCM because the market and environmental 
conditions it operates within typically change over time (von Rössing 
2005). The BCM lifecycle indicates the stages of activities an organiza-
tion must move through and repeat to establish BCM (BCI 2013). It 
comprises six professional practices (see below) which either refer to 
management practices (professional practices 1 and 2) or to technical 
practices (professional practices 3, 4, 5, and 6) (BCI 2013). The man-
agement practices follow the objective of disseminating BCM as a 
whole within the organization; the technical practices aim at develop-
ing a BCM strategy and finally a BCP to manage disruptive events af-
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fecting critical business processes preventively (by SCRM) and reac-
tively (by SCCM). The following professional practices contribute to the 
management practices (BCI 2013):  
- Policy and program management (professional practice 1): the 
structure of BCM within an organization is based on a BCM policy 
and program. This describes general principles, guidelines, and 
conditions of BCM according to the organization’s objectives, re-
quirements, responsibilities, and visions (BCI 2010; Eren & 
Schindler 2011; BCI 2013).  
- Embedding business continuity (professional practice 2): the BCM 
policy and program must be sustainably embedded into the or-
ganization’s everyday business activities and its organizational 
culture (BCI 2013; BCI 2010). This requires iteratively analyzing 
the status quo (e.g. by audits) and creating awareness of the staff 
members (Eren & Schindler 2011).  
The objective of technical practices is to develop a BCM strategy and a 
BCP within the BCM policy and program. Therefore, the following pro-
fessional practices must be conducted (BCI 2013): 
- Analysis (professional practice 3): the organization is reviewed 
regarding its objectives, functioning, and constraints of the envi-
ronment it operates within (BCI 2010; BCI 2013). Three methods 
are applied in this regard. Consequences of disruptive events are 
analyzed via business impact analyses (BIA) with the objective of 
identifying critical business processes. The resources that are 
required to keep these critical business processes intact are de-
termined by continuity requirements analyses (CRA). Risk anal-
yses identify and assess risks that might cause a disruption of the 
critical business processes (BCI 2010; BCI 2013). 
- Design (professional practice 4): based on the insight provided 
by the previous professional practice, a BCM strategy is devel-
oped that states how continuity and recovery from a disruption 
of critical business processes could be achieved (BCI 2010; BCI 
2013). Such a BCM strategy must include both measures that can 
be applied prior to the occurrence of the disruption to minimize 
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risks and an action framework whose focus is on its reactive 
management (BCI 2010; BCI 2013). 
- Implementation (professional practice 5): the BCM strategy is ex-
ecuted by developing a concrete BCP that prescribes how to 
manage the disruption of the critical business processes (BCI 
2010; BCI 2013). The BCP is of particular importance (von 
Rössing 2005) as it comprises all corresponding documents that 
are required to implement recovery measures in the aftermath of 
an occurring disruptive event (BCI 2010; BCI 2013). 
- Validation (processional practice 6): to establish a permanent 
and effective BCM within the organization, the results of the 
technical practices, the development of a BCM strategy and a 
BCP, must be continuously validated. This requires a reflection of 
the organization to improve its resilience via maintenance, exer-
cise, and review (BCI 2010; BCI 2013). 
An organization must conduct the professional practices of the BCM 
lifecycle prior to the occurrence of a disruptive event threatening its 
critical business processes. Its focus, however, is on both, the preven-
tive and reactive management of such an event. This underlines the 
cross-divisional function of BCM to support both SCRM and SCCM (see 
Figure 6-1). 
6.1.2 The relevance of business continuity management in the case 
study 
The companies of the food sector are part of the CI network of a society 
or community. Thus, an effective BCM of these companies is not just 
required to protect from own economic losses caused by disruptions of 
critical business processes. Rather, the management of disruptive 
events is also relevant to ensure public safety as companies of the food 
sector bear a particular responsibility in this regard. In today’s global-
ized world, an increasing geographic, economic, and legislative inter-
connectedness of food SCs triggers the risk of disruptions within any 
part which propagate through the food sector and, thus, affect various 
companies simultaneously (Dani & Deep 2010). As opposed to further 
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CI sectors such as water or energy, intervention measures of public 
authorities are limited to protecting people from the consequences of a 
food undersupply. This is mainly because the food sector includes a 
high number of market players (Dani & Deep 2010). 
According to a survey provided by GfK (2014), a trend can be observed 
in the German population to store fewer private stocks of foodstuff. In 
turn, companies of the food sector usually refer to a warehousing 
strategy that allows the satisfaction of customer food demands just for 
several days (Dalton 2006). This efficiency of food SCs under normal 
conditions increases their vulnerabilities to be severely affected by 
disruptive events (Peck 2006). When private stocks are not enough, 
foodstuff might become quickly scarce and the population might react 
through so-called “panic purchases”. This purchasing behavior of 
hoarding larger amounts of foodstuff might further strain the already 
affected companies (Dalton 2006). In order to manage disruptive 
events, BCM (of the companies) must manage “priority channels” with-
in the food supply (e.g. to guarantee the provision of food staples). In 
this regard, it is important to encourage cooperation between compa-
nies and between companies and public authorities (Peck 2006). 
According to Woodman (2007), who analyzes companies in the United 
Kingdom regarding their efforts of embedding BCM into their struc-
tures, the risk of a staff absence is one of the central risks to be consid-
ered by BCM. Although a staff absence has been mentioned as a fre-
quent source of business interruptions, however, less than 50% of the 
surveyed companies have developed preventive strategies to manage 
this type of risk. The ratio is significantly below further efforts of BCM 
such as handling industrial fires or failures of ICT systems. Possible 
sources of a staff absence are widespread. Literature in particular high-
lights the criticality of outbreaks of epidemics or pandemics22 (Sikich 
2008; Tan & Takakuwa 2011). This is because in such a case, the extent 
of the staff absence is not just determined by the diseased number of 
staff members. Rather, healthy staff members might be forced to stay 
                                               
22 An epidemic affects a regional area; a pandemic affects countries or even continents 
simultaneously.  
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at home to care for, inter alia, family members such as their children 
when schools or kindergartens close (Dalton 2006). Further staff 
members might not appear at work to avoid an infection (Dalton 
2006). The objective of BCM must be to establish a communication 
structure within an organization. This includes, for example, the fast 
provision of information of protective measures to avoid an infection. 
Companies must take care to not mix different groups of available staff 
members. This is because several staff members might be character-
ized by a higher infection risk than others due to their job specifica-
tions (e.g. sales representatives) (Dalton 2006). 
6.2 Implementation of ReDRiSS 
The case study considers a food retail company that owns stores in 
Berlin, Germany. It conducts the BCM lifecycle to prepare for disrup-
tive events affecting its critical business processes. Those critical busi-
ness processes refer to the activities its staff members must conduct to 
operate a store such as, inter alia, activities at the checkout (purchas-
ing) area, the filling up of shelves, or customer advisory services. The 
food retail company has applied the prescribed management practices 
according to the BCM lifecycle (see section 6.1.1) and has embedded a 
BCM policy and program into its everyday business activities and or-
ganizational culture. By applying the technical practices according to 
the BCM lifecycle, a large-scale staff absence has been identified as a 
major risk disrupting its critical business processes. Thereby, diseases 
(e.g. epidemics, pandemics) have been determined as the most crucial 
source (professional practice 3: analysis). When a disease-caused staff 
absence occurs, the food retail company is forced to operate its stores 
with a reduced number of staff members which threatens its major 
objective of profit maximization. This objective is, however, not just 
affected by a reduced number of staff members. Rather, the objective is 
also threatened by the uncertain purchasing behavior of the disease-
affected customers which is reflected by fluctuations in their food de-
mands. Moreover, the food retail company is aware of its responsibility 
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to protect public safety because it participates in the CI network. 
Hence, it develops a BCM strategy that prescribes preventively estab-
lishing ReDRiSS by SCRM to reactively support SCCM when a disease-
caused staff absence enters. The application of ReDRiSS should support 
SCCM in managing the crisis operation in terms of robustly allocating 
available staff members to the stores by respecting the uncertain cus-
tomer food demands (professional practice 4: design). Thus, ReDRiSS 
is an implemented system that, when it is applied, reactively develops 
a concrete BCP within the BCM strategy (professional practice 5: im-
plementation). In the following sections, the implementation process 
of ReDRiSS is outlined. The subsequent need for validating ReDRiSS 
(professional practice 6: validation) is discussed in the final section 6.5. 
6.2.1 General description of the decision situation 
The first task of implementing ReDRiSS is the development of a re-
quirements profile that summarizes the depicted decision situation 
and the scope of ReDRiSS (ReDRiSS part A, processing step 1).  
Figure 6-2 shows the geographical distribution of the 29 stores of the 
food retail company in Berlin. Further information regarding Berlin’s 
structure (districts I to XII) has been attached to appendix B.1. Food 
retail stores can be classified by the sizes of their sales area into con-
sumer markets (500 − 4999 m2) and self-service warehouses 
(5000 − 7000 m2) (Kotzab & Teller 2005). The size of the sales area 
comprises the space that is available for the customers when they 
make their purchases. It includes the goods shelves and the footprints, 
the corresponding corridors, and the checkout (purchasing) area. 
Parking spaces and areas that are inaccessible for the customers are 
excluded from the sales area (e.g. offices, areas of storage, incoming 
goods). The 29 stores of the food retail company refer to 18 consumer 
markets and 11 self-service warehouses. 
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Figure 6-2: Geographic distribution of stores in Berlin23 
In order to operate a store, a minimum number of staff members is 
required to be employed in it. If this number is not allocated to a store, 
this store has to be closed. It is assumed that the food retail stores are 
highly standardized and a single staff member can potentially work in 
any of both types of stores (consumer markets and self-service ware-
houses) without lowering the throughput of foodstuff [kg] he/she is 
able to generate. The possible throughput of a store is, thus, directly 
linked to its employed number of staff members. 
Decision-makers are located at the management level of the food retail 
company that supervises the allocations of staff members to the stores 
and that has the authority to close stores in cases of necessity (deci-
sion-makers are denoted “food retail company” in the following). 
When a large-scale staff absence occurs, the food retail company must 
organize its crisis operation by distributing available staff members to 
the stores for the scope of one day. As there is a minimum number of 
staff members required to operate a store, the allocation of staff mem-
                                               
23 Source of the geographical map of Berlin: (d-maps 2015) 
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bers might imply that the food retail company is forced to close several 
stores.  
The major objective of the food retail company is profit maximization. 
It is assumed that average costs are constant in the normal and in the 
crisis operation of the stores and that disposition costs are negligible. 
Therefore, the profit that can be achieved by the food retail company 
on one day is proportional to the aggregated revenue of all stores. To 
achieve this objective, the food retail company must find a way to turn 
over the throughput of foodstuff that is principly achievable by the 
reduced number of employed staff members.  
When making a decision of allocating staff members to the stores, in-
formation about the extent of the staff absence is required. This infor-
mation must be provided by all store managers early enough (in the 
morning). A “safety markup” is added to this aggregated ratio of the 
staff absence across all stores as several staff members might not re-
port sick in the morning or as they become diseased during the day. 
Thus, the “safety markup” provides the food retail company some 
breadth to flexibly re-allocate staff members during the day in order 
not to be forced to close any additional store. Decisions that can be 
taken by the food retail company vary. For instance, it is imaginable to 
keep as many stores open as possible with the minimum required ca-
pacity of staff members. Alternatively, stores might be closed and the 
remaining stores are operated by a higher capacity of staff members 
(to achieve a higher throughput of foodstuff in the opened stores). 
The decision-making is enhanced by the fluctuating character of cus-
tomer food demands. Such fluctuations arise because the population of 
Berlin (customers) is also affected by the flu pandemic. It is imaginable 
that the customer food demands increase as healthy people raise their 
individual stocks of foodstuff for several days to be prepared for an 
infection. Alternatively, households whose inhabitants are already 
infected might not be able to go to the stores which might, in turn, 
cause a decrease in customer food demands. The mostly unpredictable 
shift in customer food demand is additionally motivated by the fact 
that some areas of Berlin are more industrial than others. Moreover, 
6 Case study 2: business continuity management in the food sector 
181 
normal consumption behavior is potentially altered when a great part 
of the customers remain at home diseased, primarily in the more lived-
in districts.  
Coupling effects between the staff absence and the customer food de-
mands might be severe: while the food retail company might be forced 
to close several stores because of fewer available staff members, cus-
tomer food demand might increase and cause a (company-specific) 
undersupply of foodstuff. Although just one company of the food sector 
is considered in the case study, public safety might be threatened by 
the flu pandemic. This is because further companies operating within 
the area of Berlin and further parts of middle-eastern Europe might be 
impacted in the same way. Thus, existing redundancies within the food 
sector are reduced. Table 6-1 shows the requirements profile of the 
depicted decision situation. 
Table 6-1: Requirements profile (case study 2) 
Disaster type Pandemic 
Location Berlin, Germany 
Decision-makers Food retail company 
Decision support Adaptation strategy 
Logistical  
decision problem 
Allocation of staff members to the stores 
Objective 
Identification of a robust allocation of staff members to max-
imize profit in terms of turning over the achieved throughput 
of foodstuff by the available staff members 
Challenge 
Unknown and fluctuating customer food demands due to 
changed purchasing behaviors of diseased customers 
6.2.2 Development of an optimization model for staff allocation  
planning 
The following paragraphs describe the optimization model that is inte-
grated into ReDRiSS (ReDRiSS part A, processing step 2) to solve the 
underlying logistical decision problem.  
The profit [€] that can be achieved by the food retail company for the 
scope of one day depends on the aggregated revenue [€] in all stores. 
This revenue depends on the achieved throughput of the stores by the 
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employed staff members [kg] and, in fact, the share of this throughput 
that is turned over by the customers [€]. Generally, it is assumed that 
the achieved throughput of a store increases linearly with the em-
ployed number of staff members in this store. A staff absence directly 
causes losses in the throughput and, thus, losses in the possible reve-
nue and profit. The major influencing factor of whether the achieved 
throughput is turned over to generate the possible revenue and profit 
is whether the flu pandemic affected customers satisfy their food de-
mands at the food retail company or not.  
In the depicted decision situation, the purchasing behavior is not pre-
dictable which is reflected by unknown and fluctuating customer food 
demands. Hence, the objective of the food retail company must be to 
create the best conditions that the customers actually make their pur-
chases in its stores. The optimization model, therefore, follows the 
calculus that the chance of a diseased customer attending a store in-
creases when the purchasing distance (distance between the customer 
and its next store) decreases. When the staff members are allocated to 
the stores in a manner that allows that all served customers need a 
minimum sum of purchasing distances to reach their serving stores, 
the chance increases that the food retail company turns over the possi-
ble throughput and, thus, maximizes its revenue and profit. By follow-
ing this calculus, the secondary effect enters that the food retail com-
pany meets its responsibility in protecting public safety by managing 
the crisis operation in a people-oriented manner. 
Let 𝐽 = {1,2,… } be the set of customers that is served by the set of 
stores 𝐼 = {1,2,… }. The food demand of customer 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 is denoted 𝑏𝑗 . A 
number of staff members 𝑚 is available and must be allocated to the 
stores. The achieved throughput of a store 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 depends on its em-
ployed number of staff 𝑡𝑖  (decision variable). It is assumed that this 
throughput increases linearly to the number of employed staff mem-
bers; this additional throughput per staff member is indicated by the 
constant factor 𝛾. Moreover, let 𝑑𝑖𝑗  be the purchasing distance between 
𝑗 and 𝑖. 
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An opened store 𝑖 must employ a minimum number of staff members 
𝑙𝑖 . The binary decision variable 𝑥𝑖  indicates whether store 𝑖 is opened 
(𝑥𝑖 = 1) or closed (𝑥𝑖 = 0) which depends on the specification of 𝑡𝑖 . 
Moreover, let 𝑢𝑖  be the maximum number of staff members in this 
store (during normal operation). The employed number of staff mem-
bers 𝑡𝑖  in an opened store must be between 𝑙𝑖  and 𝑢𝑖:  
 𝑙𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝑢𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 [6-1] 
Let 𝐵𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑗  be the overall customer food demand that can be 
satisfied by the stores during normal operation where 𝑢𝑖  staff mem-
bers are employed in each store 𝑖. Due to the staff absence, the unsatis-
fied customer food demand 𝐵− is:  
 𝐵− = 𝐵𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝛾 ∙ 𝑚 [6-2] 
Each 𝑏𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 can be satisfied by exactly one store. Binary decision vari-
able 𝑦𝑖𝑗  indicates whether 𝑗 is served by store 𝑖 (𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1) or not 
(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 0). Table 6-2 provides an overview of parameters and decision 
variables of the optimization model. 
Table 6-2: Parameters and decision variables (case study 2) 
Parameter Description Range of values 
𝑏𝑗  Food demand [kg] of customer 𝑗 ∈ ℝ+ 
𝑑𝑖𝑗  
Purchasing distance [km] between store 𝑖 and 
customer 𝑗 
∈ ℝ0
+ 
𝑙𝑖 
Minimum number of staff members in an 
opened store 𝑖 
∈ ℕ+ 
𝑢𝑖  
Maximum number of staff members in an 
opened store 𝑖 
∈ ℕ+ 
𝑚 Available number of staff members ∈ ℕ+ 
𝛾 Throughput per staff member and day [kg] ∈ ℝ+ 
Decision variable Description Range of values 
𝑥𝑖  1: store 𝑖 is opened, 0: otherwise ∈ {0,1} 
𝑡𝑖 Number of allocated staff members to store 𝑖 ∈ ℕ0 
𝑦𝑖𝑗  1: store 𝑖 serves customer 𝑗, 0: otherwise ∈ {0,1} 
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The equations [6-3] to [6-11] show the formulation of the developed 
optimization model which refers to the class of MILP. In the following 
paragraphs, the objective function [6-3] and the constraint functions 
[6-4] to [6-11] are discussed. 
 min z =∑∑𝑦𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑗𝑖
 [6-3] 
subject to 
 ∑𝑡𝑖 = 𝑚
𝑖
 ∀𝑖 > 0 [6-4] 
 ∑𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1
𝑖
 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 [6-5] 
 ∑(𝑦𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑏𝑗) ≥ 𝛾 ∙ 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
𝑗
 ∀𝑗, ∀𝑖 > 0 [6-6] 
 𝑡𝑖 ≥ 𝑙𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖  ∀𝑖 [6-7] 
 𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝑢𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖  ∀𝑖 [6-8] 
 𝑥0 = 0  [6-9] 
 𝑡𝑖 ∈ ℕ0 ∀𝑖 [6-10] 
 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑗, ∀𝑖 > 0 [6-11] 
The objective function [6-3] prescribes allocating the available number 
of staff members to the stores so that the sum of the purchasing dis-
tances between all serving stores and served customers is minimized. 
Due to the staff absence, it might be necessary to close stores or to run 
stores with a lower capacity of staff members. The customer food de-
mands that cannot be satisfied (𝐵−, see [6-2]) are “served” by a “dum-
my store” (𝑖 = 0). This “dummy store” does not employ any staff mem-
ber and is characterized by purchasing distances to all customers of 
zero (𝑑𝑜𝑗 = 0, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽). The constraint function [6-4] ensures that a 
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number of 𝑚 staff members are allocated to the “real” stores (𝑖 > 0). In 
constraint function [6-5], it is guaranteed that a customer is assigned 
to exactly one store. The throughput of a store corresponds to the em-
ployed number of staff members in this store. This throughput must be 
achieved with the customer food demands that are served by that 
store. Therefore, the constraint function [6-6] assumes that the 
throughput of each store 𝑖 > 0 is at least as high as the throughput 
capacity that can be achieved by the number of staff members em-
ployed in this store (the reason for the “≥”-relation is discussed in the 
following paragraph). The constraint functions [6-7] and [6-8] ensure 
that the allocated number of staff members in a store is between the 
minimum and maximum number of staff members of the store, [6-9] 
ensures that the “dummy store” is closed, and [6-10] and [6-11] define 
the feasible range of values of the decision variables. 
The “≥”-relation used in the constraint function [6-6] might theoreti-
cally allow an overload of the stores (in the sense that the served cus-
tomer food demands increase the achieved throughput in a store). This 
overload, however, is directly minimized by the objective function. In 
fact, customer food demands that trigger an increase of the throughput 
capacity of a store (defined by employed staff members) are assigned 
to another store (or the “dummy store”) to minimize the objective 
function. It is, thus, just possible that the “last” customer food demand 
that is assigned to a store is served although it actually exceeds the 
remaining throughput capacity of the store. The application of the op-
timization model shows that this overload is significantly below one 
per mill and the effect is, thus, negligible. If a “=”-relation was used to 
formulate the constraint function, the assignment of customer food 
demands to the stores would just be secondarily steered by their pur-
chasing distances. Primarily, this assignment would be regulated by 
the objective of an equality of the throughput capacity and customer 
food demands. A further alternative formulation of the constraint func-
tion by a “≤”-relation would lead to the trivial solution that all custom-
er food demands are served by the “dummy store”. The overall pur-
chasing distance of served customers and the “real” stores (𝑖 > 0) 
would be zero in this case. 
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6.3 Solving the logistical decision problem 
A flu pandemic spreads in the middle-eastern part of Europe. The food 
retail company is affected by a large-scale staff absence which threat-
ens its critical business processes in terms of operating its stores 
smoothly with the available number of staff members. The BCM de-
partment of the food retail company activates ReDRiSS to support 
SCCM in developing a robust allocation of the available staff members 
to the stores for the scope of one day. 
6.3.1 Prognostic scenarios 
To solve the logistical decision problem, parameters of the optimiza-
tion model presented in section 6.2.2 must be specified. Parameters 
refer to planning variables and environmental variables. As not all envi-
ronmental variables can be specified deterministically (see below), 
prognostic scenarios are constructed to explore the consequences of 
the disease-caused staff absence (ReDRiSS part B, processing step 3). 
The specification of each planning variable is constant in any prognos-
tic scenario because deterministic planning information is available. In 
the depicted decision situation it is assumed that planning information 
indicating the extent of the staff absence and, thus, the number of 
available staff members 𝑚 is provided by the store managers early 
enough in the morning to flow into the decision-making process. It 
shows an aggregated ratio of the staff absence (including the “safety 
markup”, see section 6.2.1) across all stores of 60%. Further planning 
variables refer to the maximum number of staff members 𝑢𝑖  that are 
employed in a store 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 in the normal operation, the minimum num-
ber of staff members 𝑙𝑖  that has to be employed in a store 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 to open 
this store, and the throughput 𝛾 [kg] that is achieved in a store by a 
staff member per day. The constant specifications of these planning 
variables are known by the food retail company and are outlined in 
section 6.3.1.1. Moreover, the constant specification of planning varia-
ble 𝑑𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 indicating the purchasing distances between all 
stores and customers is deduced in section 6.3.1.2.  
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The optimization model integrates one environmental variable which 
refers to the customer food demands 𝑏𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽. As the customers of the 
food retail company are affected by the flu pandemic, the specification 
of this environmental variable is prone to uncertainty. It is assumed in 
the depicted decision situation that there is no exogenous information 
arising ad-hoc that allows decision-makers to deterministically specify 
(parts) of the (geographical) customer food demand distribution 
across the districts of Berlin. Therefore, a specification process is de-
veloped and applied as it is presented in section 6.3.1.3.24 
6.3.1.1 Specification of store characteristics 
According to real planning information that is provided by the SEAK 
project, the considered food retail company is characterized by 
- 18 consumer markets and 11 self-service warehouses (see Fig-
ure 6-2, section 6.2.1), 
- a market share in Berlin of 10.6%, 
- a maximum number of staff members of 𝑢 = 42 in a consumer 
market and of 𝑢 = 91 in a self-service warehouse (thus, the total 
number of staff members in normal operation is 1757), 
- a monetary value density of foodstuff of 3.786 €/kg, 
- a monetary sales value per customer of 4.761 €/(person∙day), 
- and an average throughput per additional staff member em-
ployed in a store of 𝛾 = 266.1 kg/day whereby it is assumed that 
this throughput is equal in a consumer market and in a self-
service warehouse.  
In the food sector, staff requirements fluctuate in normal operation on 
a yearly, monthly, and even daily basis (Kirsch et al. 1998). The staff 
absence causes a situation where the available staff members must 
keep critical business processes within a store intact in order to oper-
ate this store. Therefore, 𝑙𝑖  must be employed in a store 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼.  
                                               
24 The construction of prognostic scenarios is based on a specification process of the envi-
ronmental variable which is actually developed in ReDRiSS part A, processing step 2. For 
the sake of clarity, the specification process is presented in this section. 
6.3 Solving the logistical decision problem 
188 
In order to define 𝑙𝑖  in a consumer market and a self-service ware-
house, planning information about the personnel structure of the food 
retail company is required. Although this planning information princi-
ply exists, it is not communicated by the considered food retail compa-
ny for the purpose of this case study. For this reason, the minimum 
staff is estimated by using the study of Baethge-Kinsky et al. (2006). 
According to the authors, a large German store chain employs 59% 
full-time staff members and 41% part-time or marginal staff members 
in its stores. When a store is under-occupied, staff members must 
quickly switch their operations to run all critical business processes. It 
is, however, not ensured that any staff member is appropriately quali-
fied to operate all critical business processes smoothly. Particularly the 
skills of part-time or marginally employed staff members are frequent-
ly not sufficiently pronounced in this regard (Baethge-Kinsky et al. 
2006). The authors highlight this using the example of sales activities 
in a store that are rather threatened by unqualified staff members than 
improved by implemented management strategies that focus on the 
enhancement of the skills of the staff members. Moreover, the study 
highlights just an intermediate level of knowledge of the staff members 
concerning the operation of the critical business processes. Hence, it is 
assumed in the following that at least the number of full time employed 
staff members is required to operate a store. In fact, the minimum 
number of staff members is rounded up to 60% of the maximum num-
ber of staff members and is, thus, 𝑙 = 26 in a consumer market and 
𝑙 = 55 in a self-service warehouse. 
Table 6-3 summarizes the constant specifications of the planning vari-
ables which define the store characteristics. In total, the food retail 
company employs 1757 staff members (when each store is operated by 
the maximum number of staff members) whereof not less than 1073 
staff members are required to run all 29 stores (by the minimum num-
ber of staff members per store). When the staff absence causes the 
unavailability of more than 684 staff members (40% of the maximum 
staff) at least one store has to be closed. Following exogenous infor-
mation indicating a staff absence of 60%, 𝑚 = 702 staff members are 
available in the depicted decision situation.  
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Table 6-3: Planning variables regarding store characteristics 
Planning variable Consumer market Self-service warehouse 
Maximum staff 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 [persons] 42 91 
Minimum staff 𝑙𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 [persons] 26 55 
Throughput per staff member 
and day 𝛾 [kg] 
266,1 266,1 
6.3.1.2 Specification of locations and purchasing distances of custom-
ers 
The food retail company serves 10.6% of the overall customer food 
demand of Berlin (see above). As Berlin consists of 2.04 million house-
holds (Statistik Berlin Brandenburg 2012), the number of households 
served by the food retail company (or the company’s catchment area) 
is 216,300. To reduce computational effort within the case study, an 
aggregation factor of 10:1 is used indicating that one customer repre-
sents ten households. Hence, 21,630 customers are considered in the 
following. To specify the purchasing distances between these custom-
ers and the stores to specify planning variable 𝑑𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, cus-
tomer data regarding their locations are required. As this planning 
information is, however, not communicated by the considered food 
retail company, a realistic geographic distribution of customer loca-
tions must be deduced for the purpose of the case study.25  
The analysis, generation, and estimation of the catchment area of com-
panies has been the scope of various authors (e.g. Krüger et al. 2013; 
Koller 2014). These empirical studies refer to and confirm the findings 
of Huff (1964) who has stated four regularities. Firstly, the ratio of 
customers patronizing a shopping area varies with the purchasing 
distance from this shopping area. Secondly, the ratio of customers pat-
ronizing various shopping areas is influenced by the product diversity 
of each shopping area. Thirdly, purchasing distances of customers to 
various shopping areas are affected by the type of product purchases. 
Fourthly, the attraction of a shopping area depends on the proximity of 
rival shopping areas.  
                                               
25 It is expected that the food retail company owns customer location data which is dis-
cussed in section 6.5. 
6.3 Solving the logistical decision problem 
190 
As the case study considers just one food retail company, the product 
diversity offered by consumer markets and self-service warehouses is 
almost identical. Thus, the second and third regularities can be ne-
glected when estimating customer locations. Following the remaining 
regularities, the catchment area of a store depends on the purchasing 
distances of customers and on the locations of stores of competing 
food retail companies.  
To estimate the customer locations, customers are cyclically-
distributed around the store’s locations. Thereby there is no distinc-
tion made between housing areas, industrial estates, or undeveloped 
lands. The number of customers per district is determined by the mar-
ket share of the food retail company and the population of the districts 
(Statistik Berlin Brandenburg 2012). A distribution function is defined 
to specify the purchasing distances of the cyclically-distributed cus-
tomers. This function is based on empirical data of purchasing distanc-
es provided by Krüger et al. (2013) that has been gathered via con-
sumer surveys within the stores of the food sector. The data distin-
guishes between the monitored region (e.g. rural areas, urban cores) 
and the company form of the considered food retail companies (e.g. 
discounter, self-service warehouses, consumer markets) (Krüger et al. 
2013). Moreover, the densities of stores of all food retail companies in 
the districts 𝑛 [1/km2] is integrated into the distribution function (ac-
cording to information provided by the SEAK project, see appendix 
B.1).  
Based on this data, a district-specific distribution function 𝐹𝑛(𝑑) of pur-
chasing distances 𝑑 is developed via a regression of the empirical data 
of Krüger et al. (2013). 𝐹𝑛(𝑑) determines, in dependence of 𝑛, the ratio 
of customers that find a store within the purchasing distance 𝑑 [km]. 
 
𝐹𝑛(𝑑) =
{
 
 
 
 0                                                     for 𝑑 ≤
0.043
𝑛
                 
0.189 ∙ ln(2.6 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑛) + 0.412 for 
0.043
𝑛
< 𝑑 <
8,633
𝑛
1                                                     for 𝑑 ≥
8,633
𝑛
                 
  [6-12] 
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Figure 6-3 highlights 𝐹𝑛(𝑑) for an average density of stores in Berlin of 
𝑛 = 0.5/km2 in comparison to the empirical data of Krüger et al. 
(2013).  
 
Figure 6-3: Purchasing distances 
According to the function highlighted in Figure 6-3, the shortest pur-
chasing distance of a customer to his/her next store is 0.043/0.5 =
0.086 km; the maximum purchasing distance is 8.633/0.5 =
17.266 km. It becomes obvious that the obtained purchasing distances 
of customers to the consumer markets and the self-service warehouses 
are basically below the empirical data. The reason therefore is that the 
latter does not respect regional circumstances such as populations or 
densities of stores. With respect to the purchasing distances in urban 
cores, the obtained purchasing distances increase the empirical data. 
This is because the study of Krüger et al. (2013) does not differentiate 
between the types of the supermarkets (e.g. consumer markets, self-
service warehouses) in the urban core. Hence, empirical data does not 
respect the larger catchment area of such high capacity supermarkets. 
To further verify the plausibility of 𝐹𝑛(𝑑), Figure 6-3 additionally 
shows empirical data of another study provided by Dialego (2011). 
This study neither differentiates purchasing distances by the company 
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forms of the food retail companies nor by district-specific characteris-
tics.  
The number of customers per store is defined by the population of the 
underlying district. To determine the customer locations by using 
equation [6-12], the following procedure is conducted: 
1. Select a random location of a customer in the urban area of Ber-
lin or its surrounding (defined by a latitude and longitude). 
2. Determine the linear distance [km] 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡1 of this customer to 
his/her next store (given by the shortest purchasing distance).26  
3. Determine the density of stores 𝑛 of the district this next store is 
located within (see appendix B.1); calculate the minimum dis-
tance 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.043/𝑛 and the maximal distance 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
8.633/𝑛 a customer is allowed to be distanced from this next 
store. 
4. Select a random distance 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡2 by using the density function 
𝑓𝑛(𝑑) = 𝐹𝑛(𝑑)′. 
5. If 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡1 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡2 and if 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡1 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥, accept the cus-
tomer location; else, go to step 1. 
This procedure is repeated until 21,630 customer locations have been 
determined. A randomly selected customer that is located outside the 
city boundaries of Berlin, but whose linear distance to his/her next 
store is between 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 (which is, thus, a feasible cus-
tomer location), is assigned to the district this store is located within. 
The 21,630 generated customer locations are illustrated in the “heat 
map” in Figure 6-4. 
                                               
26 The harvesine formula is used to calculate the linear distance between two points on a 
sphere. Geographic locations of the points refer to their latitudes and longitudes. 
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Figure 6-4: “Heat map” of customer locations 
To specify planning variable 𝑑𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖, ∀𝑗, the linear distances between all 
customers and their next stores (which is defined by 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡1, see above) 
are calculated. The results show an average purchasing distance (be-
tween all customers and stores) of 12.26 km; the range of purchasing 
distances is between 30 m and about 40 km. More than 50% of the 
food retail company’s customers are located less than 1 km distanced 
from their next stores. Less than 5% of customers cannot find a store 
within a radius of 10 km. 
6.3.1.3 Specification of costumer food demands 
The flu pandemic causes shifts in the customer food demands 𝑏𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 
that exceed everyday fluctuations. Different developments are thereby 
imaginable (see section 6.2.1). As the environmental variable cannot 
be specified deterministically, a specification process is developed that 
allows describing different states of the customer food demand. It is 
assumed that a customer makes purchases every day to satisfy his/her 
food demands. According to UGW (2014), one third of the German 
population makes at least three purchases per week; another one third 
makes on average two purchases per week. Nielsen (2013) even states 
a number of 180 purchases per person and year. Due to the aggrega-
468
100
21
4
0
N
u
m
b
e
r o
f c
u
s
to
m
e
rs
 (lo
g
a
rith
m
ic
a
l c
o
lo
r s
c
a
le
)
6.3 Solving the logistical decision problem 
194 
tion of households by the factor 10:1, one purchase per customer and 
day is seen as realistic. 
The specification process is steered by a distribution function. In fact, a 
gamma distribution is used as it has been proven as an appropriate 
statistical distribution to estimate food consumption data (Battese et 
al. 1988; Vilone et al. 2014). Furthermore, the gamma distribution is 
exclusively defined for the positive range of real numbers which avoids 
the undesired effect of obtaining negative customer food demands. To 
formulate a gamma distribution, an expected value of customer food 
demands 𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  and a realistic standard deviation 𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  must 
be defined. 
Rather than respecting the foodstuff diversity offered by the food retail 
company, it is assumed that each customer purchases a basket of food-
stuff whose relevant criterion is its weight [kg]. The monetary value 
density of foodstuff is 3.786 €/kg and the monetary sales value per 
person is 4.761 €/day(d) (see above). Hence, the average food demand 
𝜇𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛  [kg/d] is: 
 
𝜇𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 = 4.761
€
𝑑
∙
1 𝑘𝑔
3.786 €
≈ 1.257
𝑘𝑔
𝑑
 [6-13] 
As one customer represents ten households and a household in Berlin 
includes on average 1.72 persons (Statistik Berlin Brandenburg 2012), 
the average food demand of a customer per day, 𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 , is: 
 
𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 = 𝜇𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 ∙ 1.72 ∙ 10 = 21.62
𝑘𝑔
𝑑
 [6-14] 
Empirical studies indicate a coefficient of variation of 30% regarding 
both, the human energy consumption and the consumption of food 
components such as fats, proteins, or vegetables (Hoffmann et al. 2002; 
Pot et al. 2014). Thus, this coefficient of variation is used to describe 
realistic fluctuations of the expected food demand 𝜇𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 . Thus, the 
standard deviation 𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 [kg/d] of a customer [person] of the food 
retail company is:  
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𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 = 𝜇𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 ∙ 0.3 ≈ 0.377
𝑘𝑔
𝑑
 [6-15] 
It is assumed that food demands of different persons are independent 
which implies that random variables do not correlate. The standard 
deviation of a customer 𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  cannot be determined by adding up 
the standard deviations of persons represented by a customer 
(𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 ≠ 𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 ∙ 10 ∙ 1.72). Rather, 𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  is calculated by 
using the variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟: 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 ∙ 10 ∙ 1.72 [6-16] 
Subsequently, 𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  can be calculated by: 
 
𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 = √𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 = √1.72 ∙ 10 ∙ 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
= √1.72 ∙ 10 ∙ 𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 ≈ 1.564 
𝑘𝑔
𝑑
 
[6-17] 
The density function of the gamma distribution is defined as (Bol 
2003):  
 
𝑓(𝑥) = {
𝛽𝛼
𝛤(𝛼)
𝑥𝛼−1𝑒−𝛽𝑥 for 𝑥 > 0
0                         for 𝑥 ≤ 0
 [6-18] 
where, in the depicted decision situation, 𝛼 = (𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟)
2/
(𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟)
2, 𝛽 = 𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟/(𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟)
2, and 𝛤(𝛼) is the function 
value of the gamma function. A customer food demand 𝑏𝑗  of each 
𝑗 ∈ {1, … ,21,630} is randomly generated by using this gamma distribu-
tion. 
The constructed prognostic scenarios differ in the specifications of the 
obtained 21,630 values of customer food demands. A set of 100 prog-
nostic scenarios 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = {𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , … , 𝑠100
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
} is constructed by randomly 
generating 100 food demands per customer and using the constant 
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specifications of the planning variables. Figure 6-5 exemplarily shows 
the histogram of the obtained customer food demands which primarily 
defines 𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
. 
 
Figure 6-5: Histogram of customer food demands in a prognostic scenario 
6.3.2 Alternatives 
With respect to the constant specifications of the planning variables, 
the food retail company is able to satisfy an overall customer food de-
mand 𝐵𝑠𝑎𝑡 = 𝑚 ∙ 𝛾 = 702 ∙ 266.1 ≈ 187,000 kg on one day. The opti-
mization calculus prescribes opening stores and allocating available 
staff members to these stores that increase the chance that this food 
demand is met by the served customers as they require a minimum 
sum of purchasing distances to the serving stores (see section 6.2.1).  
The optimal alternative is computed per prognostic scenario-specific 
optimization sub-model (ReDRiSS part B, processing step 4). An alterna-
tive is defined by the binary values of decision variable 𝑥𝑖 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, which 
indicates whether a store is opened (𝑥𝑖 = 1) or not (𝑥𝑖 = 0), and 
𝑡𝑖 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 which is the allocated number of staff members to the opened 
stores. The binary values of decision variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 high-
light whether 𝑏𝑗  is served by store 𝑖 (𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1) or not (𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 0). As op-
posed to the other decision variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 is adaptable to 
the scenario-specific characteristics when testing an alternative in 
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another scenario than it has been generated for. An alternative is, thus, 
defined by the binary values of 𝑥𝑖 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 and 𝑡𝑖 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼. 
In total, 100 optimization sub-models are formulated and solved. 
Branch-and-bound algorithms, cutting plane algorithms, and their 
combination in terms of branch-and-cut algorithms can be applied to 
solve integer linear programming problems in general (Rader 2010). 
In the case study, a branch-and-cut algorithm is applied.27  
The result of solving each of the 100 optimization sub-models is a set 
of 45 heterogeneous alternatives which is summarized by the set 
𝐴 = {𝑎1, … , 𝑎45}. It becomes obvious that several alternatives have 
been identified as the optimal solution in just one optimization sub-
model while further alternatives characterize the optimal solution in 
various optimization sub-models and, thus, of different prognostic 
scenarios. Detailed information about the alternatives in terms of their 
underlying opened and closed stores as well as the number of allocated 
staff members to the opened stores have been attached to appendix 
B.2. 
For example, 𝑎1 has been generated as the optimal solution in 𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
. 
The alternative prescribes opening 19 of the 29 stores. The histogram 
of the resultant purchasing distances between the served customers 
and the serving stores compared to the shortest purchasing distances 
of all 21,630 customers (see section 6.3.1.2) is shown in Figure 6-6. 
One can see that the purchasing distances according to 𝑎1 are signifi-
cantly below the shortest purchasing distances of all customers. This 
can be explained by the optimization calculus. Those stores are opened 
that are able to meet the food demands of the customers that can reach 
the store within a short purchasing distance. This is additionally moti-
vated by the finding that about 98% of the served customer food de-
mands are served by their nearest opened store. The food retail com-
pany then increases the chance to actually meet 𝐵𝑠𝑎𝑡. 
                                               
27 For information regarding the functioning of branch-and-cut algorithms, see Rader 
(2010). 
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Figure 6-6: Exemplary purchasing distances 
Across all alternatives of 𝐴, 19 of the 29 stores are always opened 
while 9 of 29 stores are always closed. Seven alternatives suggest addi-
tionally opening store 9 (district XI). This store is closed in the remain-
ing 38 alternatives. Hence, alternatives can be classified into two 
groups, group 1 (38 alternatives) and group 2 (seven alternatives). The 
alternatives within each group differ in the allocation of staff members 
to the opened stores. Moreover, 17 of 18 consumer markets are always 
opened across all alternatives. Just the consumer market of store 7 
which is located in the sparsely populated district XII is always closed. 
In turn, only the self-service warehouses of store 2 (district I) and 
store 11 (district VI) and, in alternatives of group 2, store 9 are opened. 
The remaining eight self-service warehouses are always closed. Alter-
natives within each group just vary slightly in the allocation of the staff 
members to the stores. Thus, the main question that has to be an-
swered by the food retail company is to choose between an alternative 
of group 1 or group 2. Alternatives are discussed in-depth when as-
sessing their robustness in section 6.4. 
6.3.3 Hypothetical scenarios 
The reason for constructing prognostic scenarios is to explore conse-
quences of an allocation planning of available staff members under 
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realistic and expected specifications of customer food demands. They 
provide the basis to generate a breadth of alternatives which the food 
retail company can select from. The objective of hypothetical scenarios 
is to explore the performance of these alternatives when the flu pan-
demic causes extreme developments of customer food demands that 
are actually not expected but that are, however, plausible to character-
ize the decision environment. As computational effort is sufficient and 
with respect to the ReDRiSS process, the special feature arises in the 
case study that all generated alternatives of 𝐴 and prognostic scenarios 
of 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 are respected when constructing hypothetical scenarios (see 
section 4.2.2). Therefore, stress test 1 (ReDRiSS part C, processing step 
5) is omitted (all alternatives of 𝐴 are seen as “promising” and all 
prognostic scenarios of 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 as “significant”). The following para-
graphs describe the process and results of the construction of hypo-
thetical scenarios (ReDRiSS part B, processing step 6).  
In the case study, hypothetical scenarios are constructed by simulating 
generic dynamic developments of customer food demands (see section 
4.3.5). Thus, the constructed set of hypothetical scenarios is the same 
for each 𝑎𝑏 ∈ 𝐴. Their construction is based on a re-specification pro-
cess28 to develop modified specifications of 𝑏𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽. The re-
specification process prescribes varying the input data of the gamma 
distribution (see section 6.3.1.3) in terms of simulating (i) increased 
fluctuations of customer food demands and (ii) decreased and in-
creased average food demands of a customer per day. Based on (i) and 
(ii), each 100 hypothetical scenarios are constructed. The overall set of 
hypothetical scenarios is 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = {𝑆(𝑖)
ℎ𝑦𝑝, 𝑆(𝑖𝑖)
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} = {𝑠1
ℎ𝑦𝑝, … , 𝑠200
ℎ𝑦𝑝
}. 
The subset 𝑆(𝑖)
ℎ𝑦𝑝 = {𝑠1
ℎ𝑦𝑝, … , 𝑠100
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} explores increased fluctuations of 
customer food demands which can be directly or indirectly caused by 
the flu pandemic. In the first sense, it might be possible that an amplifi-
cation of the flu pandemic triggers an increased number of customers 
that stay at home for several days. They use their private stocks of 
                                               
28 The development of this re-specification is actually the task of ReDRiSS part A, pro-
cessing step 2. For the sake of clarity, the re-specification process is presented in this 
section. 
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foodstuff during this time. In turn, customers that have already over-
come their diseases might make bulk purchases to substitute their 
already used stocks of foodstuff. Moreover, increased fluctuations of 
customer food demands can be indirectly caused when customers re-
spond to developments such as closed stores or longer queues at the 
checkout (purchasing) area within the stores in terms of reducing their 
bulk purchases. The possibility of decreased fluctuations in customer 
food demands is not assumed in the case study. This would imply a 
more homogenous and uniform behavior of the customers.  
To translate the increased fluctuations into the specifications of 
𝑏𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, the coefficient of variation 𝑐𝑣 of the gamma distribution (see 
[6-18], section 6.3.1.3) is modified. In fact, 𝑐𝑣 is defined as (Kohn & 
Öztürk 2013): 
 
𝑐𝑣 =
𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟
𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟
 [6-19] 
The coefficient of variation (regarding the customer food demands) is 
𝑐𝑣 = 7.23% in any prognostic scenario. To construct 𝑆(𝑖)
ℎ𝑦𝑝
, 𝑐𝑣 is in-
creased by 100% (factor 2), 200% (3), 300% (4), 400% (5), and 900% 
(10). Each 20 hypothetical scenarios are constructed per modification 
factor. Table 6-4 provides an overview of the characteristic values of 
the gamma distribution as well as the resultant minimum and maxi-
mum customer food demand [kg] per modification factor. 
Table 6-4: Characteristic values of hypothetical scenarios (i) 
 {𝑠1−20
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} {𝑠21−40
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} {𝑠41−60
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} {𝑠61−80
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} {𝑠81−100
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} 
Factor 2 3 4 5 10 
𝑐𝑣 [%] 14.47 21.7 28.93 36.17 72.34 
𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  [kg] 21.62 21.62 21.62 21.62 21.62 
𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  [kg] 3.13 4.69 6.26 7.82 15.63 
Minimum demand [kg] 8.7 6.3 4 2.1 0.1 
Maximum demand [kg] 39.3 49.2 61.6 81.5 170.9 
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The subset 𝑆(𝑖𝑖)
ℎ𝑦𝑝 = {𝑠101
ℎ𝑦𝑝, … , 𝑠200
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} explores decreased and increased 
average food demands of customers per day. An increase can be moti-
vated by the possibility of “panic purchases” of customers when an 
amplification of the flu pandemic occurs. In turn, customer food de-
mands might decrease when the flu pandemic triggers more people to 
stay at home sick as they are not able to make their purchases for sev-
eral days.  
To simulate such developments, the expected customer food demand 
𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 = 21.62 kg/d, which has been assumed within the prognostic 
scenarios, is modified. In fact, each 20 hypothetical scenarios are con-
structed by defining a decrease of 𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  by 50% (factor 0.5) and an 
increase of 𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  by 50% (1.5), 100% (2), 200% (3), and 400% (5). 
Table 6-5 provides an overview of the characteristic values of the 
gamma distribution as well as the resultant minimum and maximum 
demand [kg] per modification factor. 
Table 6-5: Characteristic values of hypothetical scenarios (ii) 
 {𝑠101−120
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} {𝑠121−140
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} {𝑠141−160
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} {𝑠161−180
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} {𝑠181−200
ℎ𝑦𝑝
} 
Factor 0.5 1.5 2 3 5 
𝜇𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  [kg] 10.81 32.43 43.24 64.68 108.1 
𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟  [kg] 0.78 2.34 3.13 4.69 7.82 
𝑐𝑣 [%] 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 
Minimum demand [kg] 7.5 22.1 29.9 45.7 72.6 
Maximum demand [kg] 14.9 43.8 60.9 92.5 147.3 
Figure 6-7 exemplarily shows the histograms of the customer food 
demands of 𝑠1
ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ 𝑆(𝑖)
ℎ𝑦𝑝
 and 𝑠121
ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ 𝑆(𝑖𝑖)
ℎ𝑦𝑝
 in comparison to 
𝑠1
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 (see Figure 6-5, section 6.3.1.3). 
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Figure 6-7: Histograms of customer food demands 
6.4 Results 
ReDRiSS is applied to develop a robust decision recommendation for 
the food retail company in terms of a robust allocation of staff mem-
bers to the stores that withstands fluctuating demands. Therefore, the 
alternatives are tested across the prognostic and hypothetical scenari-
os and the risk preferences are adjusted by the food retail company to 
assess the obtained results. The following sections outline the results 
of the case study. 
6.4.1 Robustness measurement 
With respect to section 6.3.2, the generated set of alternatives 𝐴 can be 
split into group 1 and group 2. Both groups are characterized by the 
following equal allocations of staff members which can, thus, be de-
scribed as totally robust:  
- 26 staff members (minimum number of staff members) are allo-
cated to consumer markets at the stores 6, 13, 19, 20, 22, 23, and 
26 
- 55 staff members (minimum number of staff members) are allo-
cated to the self-service warehouse at store 11 
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- 42 staff members (maximum number of staff members) are allo-
cated to the consumer markets at the stores 8 and 29 
- No staff member is allocated to the consumer market at store 7 
which is closed 
- No staff member is allocated to the self-service warehouses at 
the stores 3, 4, 10, 12, 16, 21, 27, and 28 which are closed 
Hence, the alternatives of group 1 and group 2 differ in the allocation 
of staff members to the stores 1, 2, 5, 14, 15, 17, 18, 24, and 25 and in 
the allocation of staff members to the self-service warehouse at store 9 
which is closed in group 1 and opened in group 2 (by the minimum 
number of 55 staff members). Figure 6-8 visualizes the findings re-
garding totally robust and variable allocations of staff members. 
 
Figure 6-8: Robust and variable allocation of staff members 
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The findings can be explained as follows. Consumer markets are char-
acterized by a smaller capacity (of staff members) than self-service 
warehouses. Opening consumer markets increases the chance of better 
geographically covering the customer food demands. When more cus-
tomer food demands are served that are located closely distanced to 
the opened stores, the chance increases of turning over 𝐵𝑠𝑎𝑡 and, thus, 
of maximizing revenue and profit (see section 6.2.1). Due to its larger 
capacity and, therefore, the high possible throughput of foodstuff to be 
achieved in a self-service warehouse, opening such a store is just valu-
able if it is located in a district that is characterized by a high density of 
population and/or a lack of available consumer markets (e.g. store 2 
and 11). 
All stores within district XII in the south-eastern part of Berlin are 
closed (stores 4, 7, and 27). This can be directly explained by the densi-
ty of population of the district that is 1,481 residents/km2 which is 
significantly below the average density of population of Berlin of 3,891 
residents/km2. The high number of opened stores in the central part of 
Berlin can be explained in the same way. Various stores are opened 
within district V (9,032 residents/km2), district II (13,554 
dents/km2), and district VI (7,249 residents/km2). For example, the 
consumer market at store 29 (district II) is opened in any alternative 
with the maximum number of 42 staff members. The self-service 
warehouse at store 2 is opened because of the above average density 
of population of district I (5,043 residents/km2) and the fact that the 
food retail company doesn’t possess any further store in the vicinity. 
Furthermore, all consumer markets of the north-eastern part of Berlin 
are opened by the minimum number of 26 staff members. Those dis-
tricts are characterized by an average density of population and the 
objective is to achieve a good geographical coverage of customer food 
demands within this part of Berlin. 
Hence, robustness measurement of alternatives (ReDRiSS part C) must 
respond to the following questions:  
1. Should the self-service warehouse at store 9 be opened (group 2) 
or closed (group 1)? 
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2. What is the most robust allocation of staff members to the stores 
1, 2, 5, (9), 14, 15, 17, 18, 24, and 25? 
To answer to these questions, each alternative 𝑎𝑏 ∈ 𝐴 is tested in each 
prognostic scenario 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 and in each hypothetical scenario 
𝑠𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝 (ReDRiSS part C, processing step 7). As the underlying op-
timization model refers to a single-objective minimization problem, the 
normalized regret of 𝑎𝑏 in a scenario 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝 is calculated by 
(when using a linear value function): 
 
𝑟(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑠) =
𝑧(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑠) − 𝑧
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝑠)
𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝑠) − 𝑧𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝑠)
 [6-20] 
where 𝑧(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑠) is the objective function value when 𝑎𝑏 is tested in the 
𝑠-specific optimization sub-model, and 𝑧𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝑠) and 𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝑠) are 
the minimal (best) and maximal (worst) objective function values that 
can be achieved by any other alternative of 𝐴 in this sub-model. The 
result is a 45 × (100 + 200) matrix of normalized regret values.  
Based on this matrix, the expected normalized regret of 𝑎𝑏 per scenario 
category 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 and 𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑝 is determined: 
 
𝑅𝐸(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) =
1
100
∑𝑟(
100
𝑙=1
𝑎𝑏 , 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) [6-21] 
 
𝑅𝐸(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝) =
1
200
∑𝑟(
200
𝑘=1
𝑎𝑏 , 𝑠𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝) [6-22] 
The maximal aggregated regret of 𝑎𝑏 per scenario category is: 
 𝑅𝑀(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) = max
𝑙=1,…,100
(𝑟(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑠𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
)) [6-23] 
 𝑅𝑀(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝) = max
𝑘=1,…,200
(𝑟(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑠𝑘
ℎ𝑦𝑝
)) [6-24] 
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The obtained matrix of expected and maximal normalized regret val-
ues has been attached to appendix B.3. This matrix provides the basis 
for measuring the robustness of alternatives in a risk preference de-
pendent manner by integrating the inter- and intra-scenario degrees of 
pessimism of the decision-makers (ReDRiSS part D, processing step 8). 
According to preference-related information provided by the food re-
tail company, the following degrees of pessimism are assumed: 
- Inter-scenario degree of pessimism: 𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.3,𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.7 
- Intra-scenario degree of pessimism: 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.7, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.3 
The reason for selecting these values is that alternatives of set 𝐴, that 
have been generated based on prognostic scenario-specific optimiza-
tion sub-models, are very stable. In fact, group 1 and group 2 just differ 
in one additionally opened store and the differences of the alternatives 
of each group are slight. Thus, the food retail company aims at primari-
ly measuring robustness of alternatives based on the hypothetical sce-
narios to explore their robustness to large-scale shifts within the cus-
tomer food demand. This is reflected by the inter-scenario degree of 
pessimism of 𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.3 and 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.7. Moreover, the food retail 
company aims at measuring robustness of alternatives within prognos-
tic scenarios by rather using the expected normalized regret 
(𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.7) and within hypothetical scenarios based on the maximal 
normalized regret (𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.3). Hence, the decision-makers operate 
rather pessimistically in their principle risk aversion. The robustness 
value 𝑅𝑉(𝑎𝑏) is calculated by: 
 𝑅𝑉(𝑎𝑏) = 0.3 ∙ (0.7 ∙ 𝑅𝐸(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔) + 0.3 ∙ 𝑅𝑀(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔)) + 0.7
∙ (0.3 ∙ 𝑅𝐸(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝) + 0.7 ∙ 𝑅𝑀(𝑎𝑏 , 𝑆
ℎ𝑦𝑝)) [6-25] 
Table 6-6 shows the five best ranked alternatives of the obtained ro-
bustness ranking. The robustness values of all alternatives have been 
attached to appendix B.3. It becomes obvious that differences in the 
robustness values of alternatives are small, particularly between alter-
natives of the same group. This is because they just differ in the alloca-
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tion of several staff members. However, differences between group 1 
and group 2 are significant: the three best ranked alternatives refer to 
group 2 and, thus, suggest opening the self-service warehouse at store 
9. This is confirmed by exploring the average robustness value of all 
alternatives of group 1 (0.659) and group 2 (0.607). As alternatives of 
group 2 prescribe allocating the minimum number of 55 staff members 
within the self-service warehouse at store 9, this number must be re-
duced in its further opened stores. This causes a decrease in the 
achievable throughputs of these stores. The most significant decrease 
of allocated staff members (compared to alternatives of group 1) refers 
to the self-service warehouse at store 2 (decrease of up to 12 staff 
members) and to the consumer market at store 24 (decrease of up to 
14 staff members). While store 2 is located within a district that is 
characterized by a medium density of population (district I: 5,043 res-
idents/km2), store 24 is, as store 9, located within district XI. 
Table 6-6: Robustness ranking (case study 2) 
Number 
Alternative 
(group) 
Allocation of staff members 
Robustness 
value 
1 
𝑎4 
(group 2) 
1(store)-38(staff); 2-78; 5-26; 6-26; 8-42;  
9-55; 11-55; 13-26; 14-26; 15-27; 17-34; 18-
35; 19-26; 20-26; 22-26; 23-26; 24-26; 25-36; 
26-26; 29-42 
0.558 
2 
𝑎31 
(group 2) 
1-37; 2-78; 5-26; 6-26; 8-42; 9-55; 11-55; 13-
26; 14-26; 15-28; 17-34; 18-35; 19-26; 20-26; 
22-26; 23-26; 24-26; 25-36; 26-26; 29-42 
0.569 
3 
𝑎12 
(group 2) 
1-37; 2-79; 5-26; 6-26; 8-42; 9-55; 11-55; 13-
26; 14-26; 15-27; 17-33; 18-35; 19-26; 20-26; 
22-26; 23-26; 24-26; 25-36; 26-26; 29-42 
0.572 
4 
𝑎20 
(group 1) 
1-42; 2-90; 5-31; 6-26; 8-42; 11-55; 13-26; 
14-27; 15-32; 17-39; 18-40; 19-26; 20-26;  
22-26; 23-26; 24-39; 25-41; 26-26; 29-42 
0.577 
5 
𝑎33 
(group 1) 
1-42; 2-89; 5-32; 6-26; 8-42; 11-55; 13-26; 
14-27; 15-32; 17-39; 18-40; 19-26; 20-26;  
22-26; 23-26; 24-40; 25-40; 26-26; 29-42 
0.581 
Hence, ReDRiSS recommends implementing an alternative of group 2 
(question 1, see above) and, thus, also opening store 9. Although, ac-
cording to the alternatives of group 2, the exact allocation of staff 
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members to the stores just varies slightly, a decision must be finally 
made. Therefore, ReDRiSS suggests the allocation as specified by 𝑎4 as 
it achieves the best robustness value (question 2, see above). 
6.4.2 Sensitivity analyses 
ReDRiSS prescribes the conduction of sensitivity analyses to explore 
the stability of the robust decision recommendation 𝑎4 when prefer-
ence-related information of the decision-makers changes (ReDRiSS 
part D, processing step 9). Sensitivity analyses concentrate on varying 
adjustments of the inter- and intra-scenario degrees of pessimism. The 
following investigates sensitivities in the robustness values of the ten 
most robust alternatives within the initial robustness ranking. Data of 
the sensitivity analyses have been attached to appendix B.4. 
To explore the effects of a changing inter-scenario degree of pessi-
mism, a robustness value per alternative is calculated based on the 
discrete value pairs (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝), 𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.1 ∙ 𝑛, 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 1 −
𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝑛 = 1,… ,10. The intra-scenario degree of pessimism is as-
sumed to be the same as used to develop the initial robustness ranking 
(𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.7, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.3). As the expected and maximal normalized 
regret per alternative doesn’t depend on (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝), obtained 
robustness values in the range of values 𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ [0,1],𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 1 −
𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 are located on a linear straight line. The results of the sensitivi-
ty analysis are shown in Figure 6-9. For the sake of clarity, just the 
robustness values of the two most robust alternatives per group, ac-
cording to the initial robustness ranking, are visualized (group 1: 𝑎20, 
𝑎33; group 2: 𝑎4, 𝑎31). 
Results confirm the stability of alternatives of group 2 to be more ro-
bust than alternatives of group 1 (see blue lines in Figure 6-9). In fact, 
𝑎4 is always the most robust alternative when 𝑤𝑒
ℎ𝑦𝑝 ≤ 0.9. Just in the 
case that robustness is exclusively measured based on hypothetical 
scenarios (𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 1), an alternative of group 1, 𝑎20, achieves a better 
robustness value. Nevertheless, differences between 𝑎4 and 𝑎20 are 
slight in this case which is reflected by a delta of their robustness val-
ues of 0.0018.  
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Figure 6-9: Sensitivity of the inter-scenario degree of pessimism (case study 2) 
The sensitivity analysis of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism re-
quires calculating a robustness value per alternative based on the dis-
crete value pair (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝), 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.1 ∙ 𝑛, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.1 ∙ 𝑚, 𝑛 =
1,… ,10,𝑚 = 1,… ,10. It is assumed that the inter-scenario degree of 
pessimism is the same as used to develop the initial robustness rank-
ing (𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 = 0.3,𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 0.7). As the expected and maximal normal-
ized regret per alternative does not depend on (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 , 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝), obtained 
robustness values in the range of values 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 ∈ [0,1], 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 ∈ [0,1] are 
located on a linear plane surface.  
The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 6-10. For the 
sake of clarity, just the surfaces of alternatives achieving a best robust-
ness value in any value pair (𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔, 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝) are colored. This second sen-
sitivity analysis confirms the findings of the first sensitivity analysis. 
The initial decision recommendation 𝑎4 is the most robust alternative 
when 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 > 0.1 (for any given value of 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔). When 𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 ≤ 0.1 and, 
thus, robustness is rather measured based on the maximal regret 
which is achieved by an alternative in the hypothetical scenarios, al-
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ferences in the robustness value of alternatives of group 1 and group 2 
are slight. 
 
Figure 6-10: Sensitivity of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism (case study 2) 
6.4.3 Interpretation of results 
Both sensitivity analyses indicate that the robustness of the alterna-
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alternatives of group 1 suggest closing store 9. Instead, they prescribe 
increasing the achievable throughput of foodstuff within the stores in 
the districts that are characterized by high densities of population (e.g. 
district II and V). This is done by allocating more staff members to 
these stores. Although customer food demands might also decrease 
within the catchment areas of these stores, the high number of cus-
tomers within these districts (as the number of customers in a district 
depends on the density of population, see section 6.3.1.2) limits an 
increase in the sum of purchasing distance between the served cus-
tomers and the serving stores.  
Subset 𝑆(𝑖𝑖)
ℎ𝑦𝑝
 specifies changes in the average customer food demands 
in comparison to the one that has been assumed within the prognostic 
scenarios (𝜇 = 21.62 kg). Most of the hypothetical scenarios in this 
subset describe an increase in this average customer food demand. 
With respect to such developments of the customer food demands, the 
alternatives of group 2 perform more robustly. This is because the 
high-capacity (regarding the number of staff members) self-service 
warehouse at store 9 is now able to turn over its large throughput of 
foodstuff to just a few customers. As a result, the sum of purchasing 
distances between the served customers and serving store 9 decreases. 
These findings can be verified by the average robustness values of al-
ternatives of group 1 and group 2 when just hypothetical scenarios are 
used for robustness measurement (𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 = 1). When measuring ro-
bustness of alternatives exclusively when they are applied to 𝑆(𝑖)
ℎ𝑦𝑝
, just 
one alternative of group 2 is ranked within the ten most robust alter-
natives (𝑎4, ranked 3rd). The average robustness values of alternatives 
of group 1 and group 2 are 0.738 and 0.753. When just measuring ro-
bustness based on 𝑆(𝑖𝑖)
ℎ𝑦𝑝
, six alternatives of group 2 are ranked within 
the ten most robust alternatives. The best alternative of group 1 is 𝑎23 
which is ranked 6th; the average robustness values of alternatives of 
group 1 and group 2 are 0.782 and 0.714.  
As the final result of the senility analyses and the interpretation of 
their findings, the robustness of 𝑎4 (group 2) is confirmed which is, 
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thus, provided as the decision recommendation for the food retail 
company. 
6.5 Summary and discussion 
In this chapter, ReDRiSS has been used as a measure of BCM of a food 
retail company that is located in Berlin, Germany. Section 6.2 outlined 
the BCM lifecycle which refers to a framework that operationalizes the 
establishment of BCM within an organization. This lifecycle prescribes 
developing a BCM strategy and a BCP in order to protect the critical 
business processes of the organization from the negative consequences 
of disruptive events. In the case study, the food retail company has 
developed a BCM strategy that suggests preparing for the risk of a dis-
ease-caused staff absence. Therefore, ReDRiSS has been implemented 
to support the food retail company in reactively developing a BCP that 
assists SCCM in the, in this regard, occurring logistical decision prob-
lem of robustly allocating available (healthy) staff members to its 
stores. Such a robust allocation of staff members must thereby with-
stand shifts in the customer food demands caused by the disease. In 
section 6.3, the application of ReDRiSS has been illustrated for a deci-
sion situation where the middle-eastern part of Europe, including Ber-
lin, is hit by a pandemic. This pandemic impacts the food retail compa-
ny with a 60% staff absence. The results of the application have been 
presented in section 6.4. Therefore, the process of measuring robust-
ness of alternatives has been outlined and the generated robust deci-
sion recommendation has been verified via sensitivity analyses. 
The application of ReDRiSS reveals two groups of alternatives (group 1 
and group 2) where each alternative specifies the optimal solution of at 
least one prognostic scenario-specific optimization sub-model. Alter-
natives of each group equate in the prescribed opened and closed 
stores but slightly differ in the actual number of allocated staff mem-
bers to the opened stores. The robustness measurement indicates that 
the alternatives of group 2 perform more robustly than the alterna-
tives of group 1. In fact, they lead to more stable results when they are 
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applied to all prognostic and hypothetical scenarios (and when robust-
ness measurement follows the adjusted risk preferences of the food 
retail company). Thus, the alternatives of group 2 are characterized by 
the pronounced ability to deal with the constructed states of the cus-
tomer food demands.  
Whether an actually implemented alternative (as a decision) is, how-
ever, successful or not can just be assessed in retrospect. Nevertheless, 
the application of ReDRiSS ensures that decision-makers obtain the 
information that prognostic scenarios exist where the optimal alterna-
tives differ across two groups. It is, thus, at least beneficial for the deci-
sion-makers to think about the existence of alternatives that suggest 
opening or closing store 9 (group 2, group 1). In summary, ReDRiSS 
allows decision-makers to analytically generate and evaluate alterna-
tives that might handle varying patterns of customer food demands. Its 
application increases both transparency within the decision-making 
process and knowledge about advantages and drawbacks of alterna-
tives. 
ReDRiSS has been developed to support reactive SCCM in the post-
disaster period. Nevertheless, a preventive application of ReDRiSS is 
possible in the depicted case study. This is because just one environ-
mental variable is considered (customer food demands) and no exoge-
nous information arises ad-hoc that allows the deterministic specifica-
tion of (parts) of this variable. Therefore, the preventive application of 
the underlying specification and re-specification processes steering the 
constructing of prognostic and hypothetical scenarios is possible. The 
only variable that depends on exogenous information arising ad-hoc is 
the planning variable 𝑚 which specifies the available number of staff 
members. To preventively apply ReDRiSS in the depicted decision situ-
ation, varying severity levels of staff absence - which are reflected by 
the specifications of 𝑚 - must be simulated. In this way, the food retail 
company receives a BCP for each considered severity level of staff ab-
sence. The preventive application of ReDRiSS is additionally required 
to steadily validate the system as it is prescribed by the final profes-
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sional practice of the BCM lifecycle (professional practice 6: valida-
tion). This is firstly important to ensure that responsible persons of 
reactive SCCM obtain a certain routine in applying ReDRiSS. Secondly, 
the validation might reveal drawbacks of the system that must be ad-
justed and advancements to be implemented (e.g. modifications of the 
optimization model). General requirements that must be fulfilled to 
preventively use ReDRiSS are discussed in chapter 7.  
It has been assumed that the food retail company owns planning in-
formation about its customers’ locations. As this information is not 
communicated by the food retail company considered for the purpose 
of this case study, a procedure has been developed that allows the real-
istic estimation of customer location data. Actions of companies that 
can be observed at their stores, however, corroborate the belief that 
customer location data is principly available. In fact, customer surveys, 
queries of the zip code of the customers over the counter, or customer 
loyalty schemes where the customers must provide their addresses to 
participate are systematic approaches of companies to collect custom-
er data. They, thus, receive an in-depth picture of their catchment area. 
The developed optimization model prescribes minimizing the aggre-
gated purchasing distances between all serving (opened) stores and 
the served customers. Then, the chance increases that the possible 
revenue and, as the costs are neglected, the profit that is achievable by 
the available number of staff members (by their achieved throughputs 
in all opened stores) is actually met by the customers. Hence, the opti-
mization model follows a calculus that is people-oriented. This can be 
motivated by the so-called “availability competition” of companies. 
Besides its objective of maximizing profit, the food retail company 
takes over the responsibility to be available for its customers in times 
of crises and to support them in their (personal) critical situations. 
Such goodwill of the food retail company in times of crises might in-
crease customer loyalty under normal conditions. This might even 
acquire new customer potentials in the long term. 
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Various extensions of the case study are possible. The food retail com-
pany considered owns stores in any district of Berlin. However, the 
results (alternatives) show that all stores of district XII, which is char-
acterized by a low density of population, are closed (store 4, 7, and 27). 
Although the objective of profit maximization is processed in a people-
oriented manner (by minimizing aggregated purchasing distances), the 
focus is not on a comprehensive supply of foodstuff. To strengthen the 
objective of protecting public safety by applying ReDRiSS where a 
comprehensive supply of foodstuff is strived for, further constraints 
must be added. For example, a modification of the optimization model 
might be in this regard to prescribe that at least one store is opened 
per district or to restrict the maximally allowed purchasing distance 
between any customer and the opened stores. A further future re-
search direction is to additionally respect local vulnerabilities of inhab-
itants of the districts by analyzing the customer structure of each dis-
trict in-depth (e.g. their demographic distributions). Therefore, the set 
of hypothetical scenarios should be extended to explore local effects of 
the flu pandemic on the customer food demands. 
  
7 Conclusions and outlook 
The focus of this research contribution has been on post-disaster DSSs 
that aid decision-makers of reactive SCCM in managing disaster-caused 
P-SC disturbances. Therefore, ReDRiSS has been developed to reactive-
ly solve logistical decision problems that might arise and which either 
adapt a disrupted P-SC or compensate a destructed P-SC (as the two 
severity levels of a P-SC disturbance). To ensure that ReDRiSS can be 
applied in the post-disaster phase, efforts of preventive SCRM are re-
quired in the pre-disaster phase. Rather than predicting disasters to 
proactively reduce disaster risks, its objective is thereby to implement 
and customize ReDRiSS. This can be understood as an innovative 
measure of disaster risk reduction. In fact, the threat of mismanaging 
the consequences of a disaster in its aftermath is mitigated as a tool is 
available that aids decision-makers of reactive SCCM in solving a logis-
tical decision problem analytically.  
The following sections conclude the findings of this research. There-
fore, the remainder of this chapter is organized into three sections. 
Section 7.1 provides a critical appraisal to evaluate the achievement of 
the research objectives which have been presented in section 3.4. In 
section 7.2, the implementation and application of ReDRiSS is dis-
cussed from a superior perspective. Finally, possible fields of future 
research are outlined in section 7.3. 
7.1 Critical appraisal 
Research objective RO1 prescribed to develop a DSS that takes the 
analytical advantage of OR/MS models by using them within an appli-
cable decision support tool.  
ReDRiSS includes an analytical methodology that combines a two-stage 
scenario technique, an optimization model, and a decision-analytic 
evaluation procedure (using MAVT and the decision rule of Hodge-
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Lehmann) for robustness measurement. The task of the optimization 
model is to solve an addressed logistical decision problem. Scenario-
specific optimization sub-models are formulated where each sub-
model specifies one state of the disaster-affected decision environment 
which is represented by the optimization model’s parameters. Rather 
than applying the optimization model stochastically or following the 
rationale of robust optimization, each optimization sub-model is 
solved deterministically. Thus, a breadth of alternatives is generated 
that can be further analyzed. Each generated alternative has been 
thereby proven as advantageous in at least one of the constructed sce-
narios. The procedure of evaluating the alternatives derives from the 
Hodge-Lehmann decision rule. To provide the required data base 
therefore, each alternative is stress tested in each constructed scenario 
by using the respective optimization sub-models. The result is one 
outcome per alternative and scenario (which is represented by the 
indicator of regret). This outcome reflects the appropriacy of the alter-
native to be used as the decision in the scenario. The outcomes are 
evaluated by taking into account the personal degree of pessimism of 
the decision-makers (inter- and intra- scenario degrees of pessimism). 
Thereby, the opportunity is provided for the decision-makers, accord-
ing to the basic idea of the Hodge-Lehmann decision rule, to either 
perform neutrally or pessimistically in their principle risk aversion 
(which is generically assumed because decision-makers operate at the 
interface of DOM and SCM). 
The analytical methodology of ReDRiSS combines methods of OR/MS 
that refer to mathematical programming, decision theory, and scenario 
techniques to handle non-quantifiable uncertainty. Thus, ReDRiSS pro-
vides, to a certain degree, an analytical security for the decision-
makers as they can make their decision based on a sound analysis. This 
is an important requirement when considering the major obstacles 
facing the management of a disaster-caused P-SC disturbance in disas-
ter response: lacking information, dynamic developments within the 
decision environment, time pressure, and cognitive overload that 
cause biases to occur. Analytical security is additionally important 
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from the legal perspective. As the persons responsible, decision-
makers might be personally liable for a finally made decision ex post 
and be probably forced to justify this decision. In this regard, transpar-
ency of the identification process of an implemented decision increases 
when an analytically accurate methodology has been used. 
The objective of a DSS in general is never the replacement of the deci-
sion-makers who are still the persons responsible that must make and 
implement a decision (Er 1988). It is ensured within the analytical 
methodology of ReDRiSS that the decision-makers are recurrently in-
volved in the decision-making process. In fact, they obtain the oppor-
tunity to directly steer adjustment screws which influence the devel-
opment of the decision recommendation. Such adjustment screws 
mainly refer to the integration of their preferences concerning objec-
tives when developing the optimization model and solving the scenar-
io-specific sub-models, their participation when setting up the specifi-
cation processes (of environmental variables) steering scenario con-
struction, and the integration of their degree of pessimism when 
measuring the robustness of alternatives. In this way, ReDRiSS guaran-
tees that the decision recommendation achieves a high analytical accu-
racy without excluding the decision-makers from its development pro-
cess. This, in turn, strengthens the applicability of ReDRiSS as both the 
transparency of its functioning increases and trust of the decision-
makers can be built into the analytical methodology. 
The quality of a decision that has been recommended by a DSS should 
be higher than without. Nevertheless, the quality of a made decision 
can just be assessed in retrospect. This is especially true in the context 
of disaster management where the sum of all disaster-caused conse-
quences characterizing the decision environment do not typically be-
come obvious before the situation has recovered. ReDRiSS has been 
prototypically implemented and applied within two case studies to 
validate its applicability. Although these case studies have illustrated 
the functioning of the analytical methodology and plausible results 
have been obtained, further validations are essentially required. This is 
mainly important to reveal and eradicate drawbacks of the analytical 
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methodology. Further validations refer to both additional case studies 
and practical field tests. Thereby, experts and potential end users 
should participate. Case studies should re-simulate real world decision 
situations ex post to compare the decision made (and its consequenc-
es) and the decision that would have been recommended by ReDRiSS. 
Research objective RO2 prescribed the development of a reactive DSS 
that aids decision-makers in the disaster response phase by providing 
a robust decision recommendation. 
It is the requirement of decision-making in general to implement a 
decision that leads to an appropriate result under varying circum-
stances facing the decision environment. Thus, robustness must be the 
crucial feature of decision-making. Following the assumed conditions 
of a disaster-affected decision environment, it must therefore be the 
particular ability of ReDRiSS to recommend a robust decision. Robust-
ness measurement within ReDRiSS is based on the idea of stress test-
ing each generated alternative within each constructed scenario. 
Thereby, the outcome of an alternative in a scenario refers to the indi-
cator of regret. The regret constitutes the difference between the ob-
jective function value(s) of the tested alternative in a scenario-specific 
optimization sub-model and the best objective function value(s) that 
can be achieved in this sub-model by any other of the generated alter-
natives. Hence, an alternative that is provided as the robust decision 
recommendation by ReDRiSS is characterized by the ability to lead to 
more stable outcomes across all scenarios compared to all further al-
ternatives. In this regard, robustness measurement also respects the 
steered degree of pessimism of the decision-makers within their prin-
ciple risk aversion (inter-and intra-scenario degree of pessimism).  
The degree of robustness of an alternative measured within ReDRiSS 
explicitly reflects its ability to achieve a better outcome than the fur-
ther generated alternatives. Thus, robustness measurement does not 
allow any statement concerning the achieved “absolute” robustness of 
an alternative. It explicitly highlights the “relative” robustness of the 
alternatives. Furthermore, robustness measurement just focusses on 
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the constructed sets of scenarios. It is, however, not ensured that these 
sets include the state of the disaster-affected decision environment 
that meets its real conditions. The analytical methodology exclusively 
guarantees that the scenarios are constructed by a sound procedure to 
identify states that might be relevant or critical for decision-making 
(two-stage scenario technique). Hence, it can be neither excluded by 
ReDRiSS that the robust decision recommendation actually hedges 
against states of the decision environment that do not characterize the 
real state nor that further alternatives exist that would have been more 
appropriate to handle the decision situation in retrospect.  
Preventive SCRM must implement ReDRiSS to prepare its application 
by reactive SCCM in disaster response (this reference case of using 
ReDRiSS is discussed in-depth in section 7.2). The preventive imple-
mentation ensures that basic components of ReDRiSS are set up such 
as the optimization model, the solution algorithm to solve this model, 
and specification processes to construct scenarios. Although this en-
sures that the available time in disaster response can be, thus, exclu-
sively used to apply ReDRiSS, time pressure remains a crucial factor 
within this application. In fact, exogenous information arising in disas-
ter response and that provides insights about the conditions of the 
decision environment might be, if it is available, vague or cryptic in its 
format. Therefore, it might be necessary to translate this information 
into an appropriate format to be useable by the specification processes 
steering scenario constructions. This, however, might be highly time-
consuming. Furthermore, the research contribution has assumed that 
the reliability of all arising information is guaranteed. This is a strong 
assumption in a real world application and requires that upstream 
processes of information gathering are functional (e.g. ICT systems). 
Finally, computational effort is also required to solve the scenario-
specific optimization sub-models and to test the generated alterna-
tives. Although ReDRiSS reduces computational effort by filtering 
promising alternatives and significant scenarios to relieve at least the 
time-consuming construction of hypothetical scenarios, computational 
effort is still a crucial factor when applying ReDRiSS.  
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Research objective RO3 prescribed the development of an innovative 
scenario-based approach that allows the processing of uncertainty and 
complexity in a disaster-caused decision situation. 
ReDRiSS includes a two-stage scenario technique. Prognostic scenarios 
are constructed in the first stage. They are targeted at overcoming un-
certainty in terms of ignorance caused by lacking information about 
the state of the disaster-affected decision environment. Their construc-
tions require activating the preventively developed specification pro-
cesses of the environmental variables which refer to those parameters 
of the optimization model that are prone to be affected by the disaster. 
Prognostic scenarios aim at describing probable and expected states of 
the decision environment. They are integrated into the analytical 
methodology of ReDRiSS as they provide the basis for formulating op-
timization sub-models in order to generate alternatives. The second 
stage of the two-stage scenario technique refers to the construction of 
hypothetical scenarios. Their objective is to explore relevant effects of 
complexity facing the disaster-affected environment. In fact, dynamic 
developments that are caused by critical events are simulated by using 
the preventively developed re-specification processes of the environ-
mental variables. Hypothetical scenarios describe critical and unex-
pected states of the decision environment and are exclusively needed 
within the analytical methodology to stress test alternatives. 
The construction of hypothetical scenarios assumes that a critical 
event causes a dynamic development which is simulated by re-
specifying one or more environmental variables. ReDRiSS provides the 
opportunity to simulate either alternative-specific, scenario-specific, or 
generic dynamic developments, and combinations of these possibili-
ties. To simulate an alternative-specific dynamic development, the re-
specification of an affected environmental variable respects the effects 
of a hypothetically implemented alternative within the decision envi-
ronment. A scenario-specific dynamic development depends on the 
specification of an environmental variable as it has been assumed 
within a prognostic scenario (significant scenario). When simulating a 
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generic dynamic development, the re-specification of an environmen-
tal variable is directly defined without respecting its specification in a 
prognostic scenario or the characteristics of a generated alternative. 
The construction of hypothetical scenarios in case study 1 referred to a 
combination of alternative- and scenario-specific dynamic develop-
ments to simulate earthquake aftershocks. In case study 2, generic 
dynamic developments have been simulated by modifying customer 
food demands in Berlin from scratch. 
The objective of the two-stage scenario technique is to systematically 
scan the scenario space to construct relevant scenarios. Relevance 
refers to the ability of the scenarios to increase the knowledge about 
the decision environment. This relevance is, however, exclusively veri-
fied by the expertise of end users or external experts. In fact, the rele-
vance of the constructed prognostic and hypothetical scenarios de-
pends on the appropriacy of the specification- and re-specification 
processes which are developed in contribution of end users and exter-
nal experts. 
The construction of hypothetical scenarios provides the opportunity to 
construct a customized set of hypothetical scenarios per generated 
alternative. Each alternative is stress tested in its customized set (each 
alternative is still tested in any prognostic scenario). Hence, regret data 
as the result of the stress test to be used by robustness measurement 
have been generated based on different sets of hypothetical scenarios 
in this case. Comparability is guaranteed as the customized sets of hy-
pothetical scenarios have been constructed based on the same re-
specification processes. However, in-depth analyses might be valuable 
to exclude inaccurate results of robustness measurement in this re-
gard.  
The two-stage scenario technique and, in particular, its second stage 
provides a novel approach to systematically explore the effects of 
complexity facing the decision environment. This ability of ReDRiSS 
just refers to the simulation of dynamic developments that are caused 
by critical events and that are associated with the main disaster (sec-
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ondary disasters, socioeconomic changes). Thus, further dynamic de-
velopments as well as the great majority of the further properties that 
might characterize a complex system (see chapter 3) are not ad-
dressed. Nevertheless, the aforementioned specifications of dynamic 
developments in particular have been emphasized as the main source 
of complexity restricting disaster management.  
Robustness measurement respects the degree of pessimism of the de-
cision-makers. A distinction is made between the inter- and intra-
scenario degrees of pessimism. The first determines to what degree 
robustness is measured based on prognostic scenarios and on hypo-
thetical scenarios. Pessimistic decision-makers rather respect hypo-
thetical scenarios for robustness measurement. The latter defines 
whether each obtained set of regret data (across all prognostic scenar-
ios and hypothetical scenarios) should be evaluated based on the ex-
pected regret (neutral decision-makers) or on the worst regret (pessi-
mistic decision-makers) of this set. ReDRiSS assumes that the end us-
ers have the skills to select plausible values of the two degrees of 
pessimism. For example, values that have been used within the case 
studies reflect rather pessimistic decision-makers. Nevertheless, so far 
ReDRiSS does not exclude the possibility of selecting implausible val-
ues. Such implausibility might be caused by an extreme mixture of the 
values selected for the inter- and intra-scenario degrees of pessimism 
describing both pessimistic and neutral decision-makers at once. 
Hence, extensions of the analytical methodology are required such as 
assuming plausible value combinations from which the end users can 
choose. 
Research objective RO4 prescribed the development of a DSS that is 
generic in nature, is able to adapt to varying logistical decision prob-
lems, and supports either internal or external decision-makers. 
Two severity levels of a disaster-caused P-SC disturbance have been 
distinguished: disruptions and destructions. ReDRiSS has not been 
developed to provide a highly specific application that supports deci-
sion-makers in solving one pre-defined logistical decision problem. It 
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rather focusses on the similarities in the challenges that confront the 
decision-makers when solving any logistical decision problem. These 
challenges in particular refer to the properties of the disaster-affected 
decision environment to be faced by uncertainty and complexity. 
Whether a disaster has caused a destruction of a P-SC or whether the 
consequences on the P-SC have been less severe in terms of a disrup-
tion does not influence the disaster-caused consequences within the 
decision environment. Hence, reactive SCCM and, in this regard, both 
internal and external decision-makers in principle operate under the 
same environmental conditions. Most research that focuses at the in-
terface of DOM and SCM can be found in the field of humanitarian lo-
gistics and, thus, addresses external decision-makers. However, the 
similarities of disaster-caused consequences and the primarily focus of 
ReDRiSS to analytically consider these consequences allows it to be 
used to aid internal decision-makers. Thus, this research contributes in 
bridging the gap between SCM, DOM, and BCM. 
Relevant elements of the decision environment whose states depend 
on the disaster-caused consequences refer to the environmental varia-
bles of the optimization model. Their specifications are, thus, prone to 
uncertainty and complexity. In turn, it has been assumed that the spec-
ifications of planning variables are deterministically available and con-
stant across all constructed scenarios. However, real world decision 
situations in the past have shown that discrepancies in the specifica-
tions of planning variables in particular have led to inappropriate deci-
sions or issues in the decision-making process (e.g. Haiti earthquake 
2010). This is because varying norms, goals, and value judgements of 
different stakeholders must be typically respected when planning 
which is especially the case in the field of humanitarian logistics (Eßig 
& Tandler 2010). ReDRiSS does not respect such problems of coordina-
tion and collaboration. 
The case studies have illustrated the applicability of ReDRiSS when 
addressing different types of disasters (earthquakes, pandemics), lo-
gistical decision problems (facility location planning, resource alloca-
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tion planning), decision-makers (association of NGOs, food retail com-
pany), and dynamic developments (secondary disasters in terms of 
earthquake aftershocks, socioeconomic changes in terms of fluctuating 
demands). Nevertheless, to mark out the system boundaries and, thus, 
the possible cases of application of ReDRiSS, a classification scheme of 
disasters and caused logistical decision problems is required. Such a 
classification scheme should provide information about the optimiza-
tion model to solve the disaster-caused logistical decision problem, its 
parameters in terms of environmental and planning variables, the 
properties of the decision variables characterizing the alternatives (e.g. 
whether they possess the flexible properties to adapt to different envi-
ronmental conditions by modifying their specifications), and the type 
of the dynamic developments to be simulated via hypothetical scenari-
os. 
7.2 Preventive application and reactive 
implementation 
This research contribution has presented the reference case of using 
ReDRiSS where its implementation is the task of preventive SCRM in 
the pre-disaster phase and its application supports reactive SCCM in 
the post-disaster phase. The need for preventively setting up the basic 
components of ReDRiSS (e.g. optimization model, specification pro-
cesses) is motivated by the lack of time in disaster response. Therefore, 
it must be the task of preventive SCRM to identify both disaster risks 
concerning disturbances of P-SCs and logistical decision problems that 
might arise and require analytical support.  
For example, the NGO association which is the (external) decision-
maker in case study 1 identified, based on its experiences of the Haiti 
earthquake in 2010, the threat of mismanaging the identification of 
locations for quick rotation warehouses. These warehouses are part of 
a humanitarian health care SC and are needed to store medicine or 
medical equipment. Thus, the NGO association decided to invest in an 
implementation of ReDRiSS that provides analytical support in the 
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post-disaster phase to solve the facility location problem. In this way, 
the NGO association is prepared for another earthquake disaster affect-
ing Haiti in future. 
The example reveals that it is, following the reference case, possible 
that the NGO association invests in an implementation of ReDRiSS 
which will, however, possibly never be applied. This would be the case 
if Haiti is not hit by an earthquake in the future. With respect to this 
controversy, the question arises whether the possibility exists to im-
plement ReDRiSS not before a disaster is concretely impending or 
when a disaster has already occurred in the post-disaster phase. Such a 
reactive implementation of ReDRiSS would be the task of SCCM. In 
turn, the contrary question is whether it could provide an added value 
for the decision-makers to apply ReDRiSS ex ante. Such an application 
would be the task of preventive SCRM to proactively develop robust 
decision recommendations to be prepared for a disaster occurring in 
the future.  
Referring to the first question, a reactive implementation of ReDRiSS is 
mainly restricted by the time exposure of its underlying processing 
steps. Those must be conducted in the timeframe that has actually 
been reserved for the application-related processing steps which are 
time-consuming on their own (see section 7.1). The additional imple-
mentation-related processing steps refer to the formulation of the op-
timization model according to the objectives of the decision-makers 
and the implementation of an appropriate solution algorithm. Moreo-
ver, specification and re-specification processes must be developed to 
prepare scenario construction. Initial information might be needed to 
set up these processes (e.g. the road network) and information sources 
to activate the processes must be acquired. Those tasks altogether are 
likely to exceed the time which is available to make a decision. For 
example, this time has been defined in literature as typically 72 hours 
after the occurrence of a disaster in the field of humanitarian logistics 
(Balcik & Beamon 2008).  
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Nevertheless, there are decision situations imaginable where a reactive 
implementation of ReDRiSS might be valuable. Taking again the deci-
sion situation of case study 1 as an example, it is expected that the NGO 
association does not exclusively intervene to establish humanitarian 
health care SCs in Haiti. Rather, its objective is the establishment of 
such SCs wherever a disaster causes destructions of the preexisting 
health care P-SCs. Following the example, the facility location problem 
might, thus, also become relevant in further earthquake-affected coun-
tries. Hence, it might be useful to transfer the components of an al-
ready implemented “version” of ReDRiSS (optimization model, solution 
algorithm, specification and re-specification processes) to another 
setting. Such a transfer might be possible to start in the post-disaster 
phase. This is because the implementation time can then be significant-
ly decreased and the most time-consuming tasks refer to the gathering 
of initial information and the acquiring of information sources. 
According to the second question, a preventive application of ReDRiSS 
in the pre-disaster phase provides the possibility of proactively devel-
oping robust decision recommendations (for a logistical decision prob-
lem) by simulating different specifications of the occurring disaster in 
advance. As it has been highlighted in this research contribution, how-
ever, there are a practically unlimited number of possible consequenc-
es of a disaster. With respect to the decision situation assumed in case 
study 1, for instance, the epicenter of an earthquake might arise in any 
arrondissement with varying intensities. Thus, to preventively develop 
a robust decision recommendation for any possible specification of the 
earthquake (epicenter location and intensity), the analytical method-
ology of ReDRiSS must be repeated a large number of times. Neverthe-
less, even when this has been done it might be possible that an actually 
occurring disaster provides exogenous information that indicates dis-
aster-caused consequences which have not been respected preventive-
ly. 
As well, there are decision situations imaginable where a preventive 
application of ReDRiSS could still provide an added value for the deci-
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sion-makers. Taking the decision situation of case study 2, the decision 
environment is characterized by just one environmental variable that 
is prone to uncertainty (customer food demands). As it is expected that 
it might rarely be the case that parts of this environmental variable can 
be specified deterministically due to exogenous information arising in 
the post-disaster phase, a preventive application is useful. The food 
retail company then simulates different severity levels of the staff ab-
sence (planning variable) to obtain, for each severity level, the robust 
decision recommendation. In this way, the food retail company owns 
preventive plans assuming different escalation levels of the staff ab-
sence that can be activated in the case of necessity.  
The preventive application of ReDRiSS is always useful for training 
reasons to ensure its appropriate application by the end users when a 
disaster actually occurs. In this regard, it is important that end users 
practice the steering of their controlled adjustment screws. Those refer 
to the usage of the specification and re-specification processes to con-
struct scenarios, the provision of preferences to trade-off the objec-
tives considered by the optimization model, the prioritization of prom-
ising alternatives and significant scenarios required for the construc-
tion of hypothetical scenarios, and the definition of values regarding 
the inter- and intra-scenario degrees of pessimism. Furthermore, train-
ing refers to the activation of the acquired information sources that 
provide the input for the scenario construction. Finally, weaknesses of 
the analytical methodology and of its applicability might become obvi-
ous and can be preventively eradicated. 
7.3 Directions for future research 
Following the reference case of using ReDRiSS as has been discussed in 
the previous sections, there is one essential upstream task required 
before ReDRiSS can be implemented by preventive SCRM. This up-
stream task addresses both the identification of disaster risks that 
might threaten the functioning of a P-SC and of logistical decision prob-
lems that must be solved to manage a caused P-SC disturbance in this 
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regard. Based on the results of this upstream task, disaster-caused 
logistical decision problems can be filtered whose solutions should be 
analytically supported by ReDRiSS.  
It has been outlined in this research contribution that disaster risks in 
general refer to the category of low probability high impact risks. Alt-
hough these risks are characterized by a particular criticality as they 
are likely to trigger severe consequences when they occur, risk man-
agement typically provides instruments/tools to process (recurring) 
high probability low impact risks (Chopra & Sodhi 2004).  
It should therefore be the scope of future research to develop an inno-
vative approach of risk management that is tailored to deal with disas-
ter risks. With respect to the standard (cyclically-ordered) risk man-
agement approach as has been outlined in chapter 3 (Hölscher 1999; 
Rosenkranz & Missler-Behr 2005; Zsidisin & Ritchie 2008; DHS 2010; 
ICDRM/GWU 2010) the identification of disaster risks should be trig-
gered by the critical consequences within a P-SC that impact its func-
tioning. Rather than predicting possible disaster events from scratch 
and subsequently analyzing their consequences, these critical conse-
quences as well as the logistical decision problems that must be solved 
for their eradication should be analyzed first. By backtracking from 
these critical consequences, relevant disaster risks that might cause 
the critical consequence can then be identified to concretize the deci-
sion environment to be handled by ReDRiSS. 
The research contribution has been part of the research program “civil 
security research” and the announcement of “securing food SCs” which 
was funded by the BMBF.29 From a superior perspective, the well-
functioning of SCs in general is essential to ensure the provision of 
supplies for the population in a community or society. This is in partic-
ular crucial when SCs steer the provision of public safety critical sup-
plies (e.g. water, foodstuff). These SCs have been denoted P-SCs in this 
research contribution and they are part of the CI network in a commu-
                                               
29 The research project SEAK has been funded within this announcement (see chapter 6). 
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nity or society. ReDRiSS has been developed to aid decision-makers 
when the sound provision of public safety critical supplies is threat-
ened as a disaster disturbs the smooth functioning of a P-SC. In the 
case of a disaster-caused P-SC disturbance, the dilemma might be that, 
due to the disaster, public safety critical supplies are in short supply 
while the demands of the population increase.  
It should be the scope of future research to analyze possibilities of 
adapting ReDRiSS to support decision-makers of SCs of further 
branches in the management of disaster-caused disturbances. As op-
posed to P-SC disturbances, internal decision-makers bear responsibil-
ity in this regard. This is because these SCs steer the provision of sup-
plies that might not necessarily impact public safety. External decision-
makers might therefore rather not intervene. The dilemma that has 
been mentioned above in terms of a simultaneous increase in demand 
and decrease in the offer of supplies in the aftermath of a disaster does 
not typically arise in such a case. Despite these differences, decision-
making in reactive SCCM is basically challenged to handle the same 
conditions within the disaster-affected decision environment. It has 
been one objective of this research contribution to strengthen the rele-
vance of BCM to deal with P-SC disturbances. The next step of research 
must be the adaptation of ReDRiSS to be used not just within the BCM 
of P-SCs but also within the BCM of SCs of other branches. 
Beside these two major directions for future research, further, mostly 
technical aspects of ReDRiSS should be addressed as it has already 
been outlined in the critical appraisal in section 7.1. Those aspects 
mainly refer to validations of ReDRiSS via case studies and field tests 
and to the reduction of computational effort when applying its analyti-
cal methodology in disaster response. Further extensions refer to the 
consideration of uncertain planning variables in order to simulate is-
sues of coordination and collaboration of the involved stakeholders 
and to the in-depth analysis of the degree of pessimism of the decision-
makers. 
ReDRiSS has been prototypically implemented within two case studies. 
These prototypes have been implemented within the programming 
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platforms MATLAB30 (case study 1 and 2) and Python31 (case study 2). 
Particularly modules of robustness measurement and sensitivity anal-
yses have been thereby standardized (by MATLAB) to be used within 
both cases. The reason therefore is that robustness measurement is the 
same in its process in each application. In contrast, further parts of 
ReDRiSS (two-stage scenario technique, stress test) depend on the 
implemented optimization model and the steered specification and re-
specification processes and, thus, vary across the applications. Hence, 
future research should intensify efforts in standardizing these parts to 
provide the basis for an efficient customization/implementation of 
ReDRiSS across various decision situations. 
                                               
30 For further information, see: http://de.mathworks.com/products/matlab/ 
31 For further information, see: https://www.python.org/ 
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In recent years research efforts in the field of disaster management 
have been intensified. This is motivated by a significant increase in 
both natural and man-made disasters in the past decades (Cookson 
2011). Apart from direct impacts (e.g. deaths, injuries), a disaster 
might affect the functioning of supply chains (SCs). Such a disaster-
caused SC disturbance might trigger an unavailability of supplies to be 
provided for the population. This is crucial, in particular when supplies 
are products or services that must meet the basic needs of the popula-
tion (e.g. foodstuff, water, health care). The terms public safety critical 
supplies and public safety critical supply chains (P-SCs) are used in this 
research contribution to express the relevance of such supplies and 
their underlying SCs for public safety. P-SCs are part of the critical in-
frastructure (CI) network in a community or society. Basically, it must 
be the scope of the two subdivisions of supply chain management 
(SCM), preventive supply chain risk management (SCRM) and reactive 
supply chain crisis management (SCCM), to protect the functioning of 
P-SCs in times of disasters.  
Preventive SCRM is targeted at proactively handling disaster risks in 
the pre-disaster phase. Two stereotypical risk categories can be distin-
guished: high probability low impact risks and low probability high 
impact risks. Disaster risks refer to the latter category (Chopra & Sodhi 
2004; Kleindorfer & Saad 2005; Oke & Gopalakrishnan 2009). As there 
is a practically unlimited number of possible specifications of disasters 
(e.g. types, sources, consequences), they have been described as almost 
unpredictable and uncontrollable (Charles et al. 2010; Johnson 2013). 
Instruments/tools of standard risk management are appropriate to 
handle high probability low impact risks as they are the ones that typi-
cally recur (Chopra & Sodhi 2004). Their ability to manage disaster 
risks (e.g. by statistical analysis) is, however, futile if they continue to 
predict something that cannot be predicted (Taleb et al. 2009).  
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The estimation of the consequences of a disaster by reactive SCCM in 
the immediate post-disaster phase (disaster response) is challenged by 
the characteristics of the disaster-affected environment. Information 
about the sources of an occurring disaster and its resulting conse-
quences is typically sparse or lacking. Even the information available 
might be heterogeneous in terms of format, quality, and uncertainty 
(Wybo & Lonka 2003; Comes et al. 2011). Moreover, the state of a dis-
aster-affected environment is described as evolving continuously. De-
cision-makers are under pressure to make their decision quickly. This 
may cause cognitive overload to occur and biases to be reinforced 
(Maule et al. 2000; Ariely & Zakay 2001; Comes et al. 2012). Despite 
these challenges, decision-makers are forced to operate quickly in dis-
aster response to maintain or recover the availability of public safety 
critical supplies. 
There are different possible severity levels of a disaster-caused P-SC 
disturbance. This research contribution focusses on an either disrupt-
ed or destructed P-SC. The relevant criterion of this distinction is the 
time required to restore the functioning of the disturbed P-SC. In the 
case of a disruption, the provision of public safety critical supplies by 
the affected P-SC itself can be typically recovered or maintained within 
the timeframe of disaster response. Nevertheless, efforts of reactive 
SCCM are needed to strengthen its functioning (e.g. by conducting 
business continuity plans). The management of a P-SC disruption is 
usually the task of internal decision-makers. They are located in the 
companies of the disturbed P-SC. In the case of destruction, the provi-
sion of public safety critical supplies by the affected P-SC itself cannot 
be typically recovered within the short timeframe of disaster response. 
Thus, the need arises for reactive SCCM to compensate the destruction 
by establishing logistical replacement structures from scratch. These 
structures must temporarily take over the provision of public safety 
critical supplies (e.g. humanitarian relief SCs). External decision-
makers bear responsibility in this regard. They are located outside the 
disturbed P-SC and refer to companies of further P-SCs, companies of 
SCs of other branches, or (independent) public authorities. External 
8 Summary 
235 
decision-makers must intervene when a P-SC disturbance cannot be 
handled by the internal decision-makers. 
The reactive management of both disaster-caused P-SC disruptions 
and destructions in disaster response goes together with the need for 
solving logistical decision problems (e.g. planning of resource alloca-
tion, transportation, or facility location). To aid both internal and ex-
ternal decision-makers of reactive SCCM, this research contribution 
suggests strengthening the focus on post-disaster DSSs. Basically, DSSs 
are software-based tools that assist the decision-making process 
(Pearson & Shim 1995; Mattiussi 2012). The establishment of a DSS 
requires efforts of preventive SCRM. Rather than predicting disasters 
to proactively reduce disaster risks, the task of preventive SCRM must 
be the implementation/customization of the DSS to a specific decision 
situation in order to estimate and manage consequences of the disaster 
ex post. This can be understood as an innovative measure of disaster 
risk reduction. In fact, the availability of a DSS mitigates the threat of 
mismanagement in disaster response.  
This research contribution develops a DSS that is denoted ReDRiSS 
(Reactive Disaster and supply chain Risk decision Support System). 
The crucial requirement of ReDRiSS is to analytically process a logisti-
cal decision problem while taking into account the characteristics of a 
disaster-affected decision environment (which comprises all elements 
of the environment whose state might influence decision-making). A 
lack of information about the disaster and its consequences triggers, 
from a decision theoretic perspective, a state of uncertainty in terms of 
ignorance. Moreover, the state of the decision environment might 
change dynamically over time. Such dynamic developments have been 
described as a property of a complex system in literature (Snowden & 
Boone 2007; Flach 2012).  
ReDRiSS includes an analytical methodology that combines methods of 
operations research (OR) and management sciences (MS) referring to 
mathematical programming, decision theory, and scenario techniques. 
This analytical methodology is integrated into a framework that com-
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prises four parts (A to D) and nine processing steps (1 to 9). Part A 
describes the process of implementing and customizing ReDRiSS to be 
prepared for a specific post-disaster decision situation. The conduction 
of part A is, thus, the task of preventive SCRM in the pre-disaster phase. 
Part B (two-stage scenario technique), part C (stress test), and part D 
(robustness measurement) comprise processing steps that must be 
applied by reactive SCCM in disaster response. 
The main objective of ReDRiSS is to provide a robust decision recom-
mendation for the decision-makers. Thereby, robustness refers to the 
feature of the decision recommendation to perform stably under dif-
ferent states of the uncertain and complex decision environment. 
These states are specified by scenarios. Scenario techniques have been 
proven as appropriate to handle decision situations under ignorance. 
ReDRiSS includes a two-stage scenario technique to additionally con-
struct scenarios that explore dynamic developments in the decision 
environment (in terms of complexity). Widespread possibilities of such 
dynamic developments exist which can never be completely explored 
by scenario construction. Therefore, the focus of ReDRiSS is on the 
simulation of dynamic developments that are directly related to the 
main disaster. Those have been described as most crucial in disaster 
management and refer to both secondary disasters in the aftermath of 
the main disaster (e.g. earthquake aftershocks) and socioeconomic 
changes (e.g. demand fluctuations due to population movements) (Pre-
lipcean & Boscoianu 2011; Hoyos et al. 2015). 
Each constructed scenario describes a state of the disaster-affected 
decision environment. An optimization model is formulated to solve 
the underlying logistical decision problem. The decision environment 
and, thus, the structure of scenarios are directly defined by the optimi-
zation model’s parameters. Thereby, a distinction is made between 
parameters whose specifications can be deterministically defined by 
processing information that is provided by the decision-makers (plan-
ning variables) and parameters whose specifications depend on the 
disaster-caused consequences (environmental variables). Each scenar-
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io includes the deterministic specifications of the planning variables 
and one developed specification per environmental variable. Hence, 
the exploration of effects of uncertainty and complexity by ReDRiSS is 
always associated with the specifications of the environmental varia-
bles.  
The two-stage scenario technique prescribes the construction of two 
scenario categories. Prognostic scenarios (stage 1) are constructed to 
process ignorance caused by sparse and lacking information in disaster 
response. They are targeted at highlighting probable and expected 
states of the decision environment. Based on the constructed prognos-
tic scenarios, a set of optimization sub-models is formulated and each 
of them is solved deterministically by applying an appropriate exact 
algorithm or heuristic. Thus, a breadth of alternatives is generated that 
can be further analyzed. Each generated alternative has been thereby 
proven as advantageous to solve the logistical decision problem in at 
least one of the prognostic scenarios.  
Hypothetical scenarios (stage 2) are constructed to explore the effects 
of complexity facing the decision environment. In fact, a hypothetical 
scenario simulates a dynamic development within the decision envi-
ronment that is caused by a critical event. ReDRiSS provides the oppor-
tunity to simulate either alternative-specific, scenario-specific, or ge-
neric dynamic developments, and combinations of these possibilities. 
An alternative-specific dynamic development assumes that one of the 
generated alternatives is hypothetically implemented to the decision 
environment; a scenario-specific dynamic development simulates 
changes within a prognostic scenario; a generic dynamic development 
provides a new state of the decision environment from scratch. In this 
way, ReDRiSS can be used to capture dynamic developments by a cus-
tomized set of hypothetical scenarios per alternative. Each set, thus, 
includes alternative specific critical and unexpected states of the deci-
sion environment. 
Each alternative is stress tested in each prognostic and (customized) 
hypothetical scenario by using the respective optimization sub-models. 
8 Summary 
238 
The result of the stress test is one outcome per alternative and scenar-
io. This outcome refers to the indicator of regret. Basically, the regret 
constitutes in ReDRiSS the difference between the objective function 
value(s) of the tested alternative in a scenario-specific optimization 
sub-model and the best objective function value(s) that can be 
achieved in this sub-model by any other of the generated alternatives. 
The regret is used to determine the stability of an alternative across 
the scenarios compared to all further alternatives. The obtained data 
set of regret values provides the basis for robustness measurement.  
The procedure of measuring robustness of alternatives via the ob-
tained regret data derives from the Hodge-Lehmann decision rule. 
According to the basic idea of this decision rule, decision-makers either 
perform neutrally or pessimistically in their principle risk aversion 
which is generically assumed because decision-makers operate at the 
interface of disaster operations management (DOM) and SCM. Robust-
ness measurement integrates the inter- and intra-scenario degrees of 
pessimism whose values are directly steered by the decision-makers. 
The first determines to what degree robustness is measured based on 
prognostic scenarios (neutral decision-makers) and on hypothetical 
scenarios (pessimistic decision-makers). The latter defines whether 
each obtained set of regret data (across all prognostic scenarios and 
hypothetical scenarios) should be evaluated based on the expected 
regret (neutral decision-makers) or on the worst regret (pessimistic 
decision-makers) of this set. Transparency and trust of the decision-
makers increases as they obtain the opportunity to influence the deci-
sion-making process by adjusting their degree of pessimism. 
The applicability of ReDRiSS is illustrated by two case studies. Those 
consider different types of disasters (earthquake, pandemic), logistical 
decision problems (facility location planning, resource allocation plan-
ning), decision-makers (association of NGOs, food retail company), and 
dynamic developments in the decision environment (secondary disas-
ters in terms of earthquake aftershocks, socioeconomic changes in 
terms of fluctuating demands). 
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Case study 1 refers to a decision situation arising in the field of human-
itarian logistics where an earthquake causes a destruction of preexist-
ing health care P-SCs in Haiti. An association of non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) (external decision-maker) intervenes by establish-
ing a humanitarian health care SC from scratch to temporarily 
compensate the destructed P-SCs. Within this establishment, the logis-
tical decision problem arises of building quick rotation warehouses. 
These warehouses are required to store medicine or medical equip-
ment. The scope of ReDRiSS is to support the decision-makers in iden-
tifying five robust locations of these warehouses. ReDRiSS processes 
ignorance in terms of an unknown intensity of the earthquake affecting 
the states of the road network and the distribution of health-care de-
mands of the population. Furthermore, the decision environment is 
prone to secondary disasters in terms of earthquake aftershocks that 
might restrict the appropriacy of the identified locations. The bi-
objective unconstrained facility location problem (BOUFLP) (optimiza-
tion model) is adapted to the decision situation to identify the loca-
tions by trading-off the required costs to serve people (objective of 
efficiency) and the possible coverage of people needing health care 
(objective of effectiveness). In total, 256 prognostic scenarios, 31 al-
ternatives, and 26 hypothetical scenarios per alternative (in total 806 
hypothetical scenarios) are constructed and generated in the course of 
the ReDRiSS application. The results highlight three totally robust 
warehouse locations and two locations whose robustness depends on 
the degree of pessimism adjusted by the decision-makers. 
In case study 2, ReDRiSS supports the business continuity management 
(BCM) of a food retail company (internal decision-makers) that owns 
stores (consumer markets and self-service warehouses) in Berlin, 
Germany. A flu pandemic that spreads in the middle-eastern part of 
Europe causes a large-scale staff absence within the food retail compa-
ny. ReDRiSS is applied to develop a robust allocation of the available 
staff members to the stores for the scope of one day. As a store must 
employ a minimum number of staff members to be operated smoothly, 
several stores must be closed. The resource allocation problem is re-
8 Summary 
240 
stricted by fluctuating customer food demands due to the flu pandemic. 
Those are hard to predict because of diseased people changing their 
purchasing behavior. An optimization model is developed to allocate 
staff members by ensuring low purchasing distances of customers. By 
following this optimization calculus, the chance increases that the cus-
tomers make their purchases despite being diseased which, in turn, 
reduces the losses of profit of the food retail company. 100 prognostic 
scenarios and 200 hypothetical scenarios are constructed to highlight 
various patterns of customer food demand fluctuations. The robust 
decision recommendation shows that in particular the smaller con-
sumer markets are opened by the minimum required number of staff 
members in districts of Berlin with a high density of population. In 
turn, the larger self-service warehouses are mainly closed. They are 
just then opened when the underlying district is characterized by a low 
density of stores of competing food retail companies. 
The research contribution reveals two major directions of future re-
search. Firstly, innovative approaches of risk management are re-
quired that are tailored to deal with disaster risks (low probability 
high impact risks). They must operationalize the preliminary step of 
implementing/ customizing ReDRiSS by preventive SCRM. In fact, deci-
sion situations must be identified that might arise in the course of a  
P-SC disturbance and that should receive analytical support by  
ReDRiSS. The research contribution focusses on P-SCs to provide pub-
lic safety critical supplies for the population. Therefore, it should sec-
ondly be the scope of future research to analyze possibilities of adapt-
ing ReDRiSS to be used by reactive SCCM of companies of SCs of further 
branches. Beside these two future research directions, further valida-
tions of ReDRiSS via case studies and field tests are required and tech-
nical aspects should be improved to reduce computational effort when 
applying its analytical methodology within the short timeframe of dis-
aster response. 
  
Appendix 
A. Additional data of case study 1 
A.1 Country-specific information of Haiti 
Table A-1: Haiti in 2012 (IHSI 2012) (1/2) 
Arrondissement Largest city Département 
IATA 
code 
Population 
2012 
(absolute) 
Population 
2012 
(relative) 
1 Jérémie Jérémie Grand Anse JEE 227,333 2.18% 
2 Les Cayes Les Cayes Sud CYA 330,454 3.17% 
3 Port-Salut Arniquet Sud PST 70,471 0.68% 
4 Jacmel Jacmel Sud-Est JAK 323,252 3.10% 
5 Port-au-Prince Port-au-Prince Ouest PAP 2,633,874 25.29% 
6 Gonâve Anse-à-Galets Ouest LGN 83,099 0.80% 
7 Lascahboas Belladère Centre BEL 160,977 1.55% 
8 Hinche Hinche Centre HIN 252,837 2.43% 
9 Saint-Raphaël Pignon Nord PGN 162,104 1.56% 
10 Cap Haïtien Cap Haïtien Nord CAP 340,598 3.27% 
11 Fort-Liberté Fort-Liberté Nord-Est FLT 57,862 0.56% 
12 Ouanaminthe Ouanaminthe Nord-Est OAN 139,791 1.34% 
13 Môle-Saint-Nicolas Jean-Rabel Nord-Ouest MSN 234,368 2.25% 
14 Port-de-Paix Port-de-Paix Nord-Ouest PAX 321,265 3.09% 
15 Gros-Morne Gros-Morne Artibonite ANR 219,813 2.11% 
16 Anse-d´Hainault Dame-Marie Grand Anse - 94,020 0.90% 
17 Chardonnières Les Anglais Sud - 74,828 0.72% 
18 Côteaux Côteaux Sud - 55,940 0.54% 
19 Corail Pestel Grand Anse - 125,548 1.21% 
20 Baradères Baradères Nippes - 44,911 0.43% 
21 Aquin Aquin Sud - 207,873 2.00% 
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Table A-2: Haiti in 2012 (IHSI 2012) (2/2) 
Arrondissement Largest city Département 
IATA 
code 
Population 
2012 
(absolute) 
Population 
2012 
(relative) 
22 Anse-à-Veau L'Asile Nippes - 146,617 1.41% 
23 Miragoâne Miragoâne Nippes - 135,346 1.30% 
24 Bainet Bainet Sud-Est - 129,588 1.24% 
25 Léogâne Léogâne Ouest - 486,007 4.67% 
26 Belle-Anse Belle-Anse Sud-Est - 150,858 1.45% 
27 Croix-des-Bouquets Croix-des-Bouquets Ouest - 453,111 4.35% 
28 Arcahaie Arcahaie Ouest - 189,479 1.82% 
29 Mirebalais Mirebalais Centre - 184,040 1.77% 
30 Saint-Marc Saint-Marc Artibonite - 422,765 4.06% 
31 Dessalines Dessalines Artibonite - 394,038 3.78% 
32 Cerca-la-Source Thomassique Centre - 114,284 1.10% 
33 Gonaïves Gonaïves Artibonite - 432,018 4.15% 
34 Marmelade Marmelade Artibonite - 179,952 1.73% 
35 Saint-Louis-du-Nord Saint-Louis-du-Nord Nord-Ouest - 139,869 1.34% 
36 Borgne Borgne Nord - 111,464 1.07% 
37 Plaisance Plaisance Nord - 117,983 1.13% 
38 Limbé Limbé Nord - 101,348 0.97% 
39 Acul-du-Nord Acul-du-Nord Nord - 123,253 1.18% 
40 Trou-du-Nord Trou-du-Nord Nord-Est - 109,745 1.05% 
41 
Grande-Rivière-du-
Nord 
Grande-Rivière-du-
Nord 
Nord - 61,661 0.59% 
42 Vallières Mombin-Crochu Nord-Est - 68,568 0.66% 
    Total 10,413,212 100% 
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A.2 Road and waterway distances of neighbored arrondissements 
Table A-3: Road and waterway distances [km] (1/3) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 100 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 67 98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 53 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 0 0 0 77 77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 102 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 28 0 0 0 
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 25 0 0 0 0 
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 18 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A-4: Road and waterway distances [km] (2/3) 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
1 0 49 0 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 98 56 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 53 77 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 77 19 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 48 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 0 0 0 0 70 0 21 47 85 0 0 0 0 
22 0 0 0 0 0 46 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 0 0 86 61 0 0 0 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 0 86 0 0 0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 0 0 
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 0 
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 0 
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A-5: Road and waterway distances [km] (3/3) 
 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 57 0 102 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 
9 0 0 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 18 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 30 25 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 0 86 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 86 0 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 89 35 0 0 34 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 0 0 34 0 0 53 0 0 53 0 0 0 0 0 
34 0 0 58 0 53 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 
37 0 0 0 0 53 29 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 22 0 14 0 0 0 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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A.3 Linear distances of arrondissements 
Table A-6: Linear distances [km] (1/3) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 0 64 61 174 189 134 244 229 224 235 265 271 166 197 
2 64 0 16 129 155 117 217 211 214 236 260 261 194 216 
3 61 16 0 144 170 132 232 226 229 250 274 276 204 228 
4 174 129 144 0 40 76 103 115 131 171 176 170 194 192 
5 189 155 170 40 0 66 65 76 92 135 137 131 173 165 
6 134 117 132 76 66 0 111 97 97 123 143 145 119 123 
7 244 217 232 103 65 111 0 39 63 107 91 79 183 161 
8 229 211 226 115 76 97 39 0 24 70 62 55 147 124 
9 224 214 229 131 92 97 63 24 0 46 48 48 127 101 
10 235 236 250 171 135 123 107 70 46 0 40 55 105 69 
11 265 260 274 176 137 143 91 62 48 40 0 18 144 108 
12 271 261 276 170 131 145 79 55 48 55 18 0 158 124 
13 166 194 204 194 173 119 183 147 127 105 144 158 0 39 
14 197 216 228 192 165 123 161 124 101 69 108 124 39 0 
15 190 199 212 161 132 96 129 92 70 50 88 101 58 34 
16 34 82 73 203 221 167 277 262 258 267 298 305 194 227 
17 40 52 40 179 201 155 261 251 250 266 293 298 204 233 
18 50 31 18 160 184 143 246 238 239 258 284 287 204 231 
19 37 39 45 138 155 104 212 200 198 214 241 245 160 186 
20 54 34 46 121 138 91 197 187 187 206 231 234 160 183 
21 87 39 54 92 116 84 179 175 179 205 226 226 177 194 
22 80 40 55 96 117 78 178 172 175 199 221 222 167 185 
23 112 76 91 63 81 50 142 138 143 172 190 190 158 169 
24 153 106 120 25 60 74 124 133 145 183 192 187 192 195 
25 158 123 138 33 32 44 95 96 107 144 154 151 161 160 
26 222 178 193 50 44 108 74 101 123 168 161 151 216 206 
27 200 167 182 51 13 74 53 67 85 130 128 121 175 165 
28 170 146 161 60 33 38 74 67 76 113 123 121 141 135 
29 214 188 204 81 42 81 30 36 56 102 97 90 162 145 
30 158 151 165 100 76 37 98 73 66 87 110 114 97 93 
31 182 176 190 115 83 60 87 55 43 63 85 90 98 83 
32 246 225 240 121 81 113 26 21 41 83 66 54 167 142 
33 176 179 193 137 109 72 113 79 61 60 92 102 70 57 
34 209 207 221 144 110 93 94 56 33 30 58 68 95 68 
35 206 222 234 191 161 124 153 115 92 58 97 113 51 12 
36 214 225 237 180 148 119 133 95 72 36 75 90 71 34 
37 203 206 220 153 120 95 108 71 48 32 67 79 81 54 
38 215 220 233 165 131 109 113 75 52 22 60 74 85 52 
39 222 224 238 163 128 111 107 69 45 14 51 64 94 61 
40 245 241 255 163 125 124 88 53 33 24 21 33 126 92 
41 230 227 241 155 118 111 89 52 28 18 36 47 112 80 
42 239 228 242 139 100 111 60 26 15 48 37 35 138 110 
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Table A-7: Linear distances [km] (2/3) 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
1 190 34 40 50 37 54 87 80 112 153 158 222 200 170 
2 199 82 52 31 39 34 39 40 76 106 123 178 167 146 
3 212 73 40 18 45 46 54 55 91 120 138 193 182 161 
4 161 203 179 160 138 121 92 96 63 25 33 50 51 60 
5 132 221 201 184 155 138 116 117 81 60 32 44 13 33 
6 96 167 155 143 104 91 84 78 50 74 44 108 74 38 
7 129 277 261 246 212 197 179 178 142 124 95 74 53 74 
8 92 262 251 238 200 187 175 172 138 133 96 101 67 67 
9 70 258 250 239 198 187 179 175 143 145 107 123 85 76 
10 50 267 266 258 214 206 205 199 172 183 144 168 130 113 
11 88 298 293 284 241 231 226 221 190 192 154 161 128 123 
12 101 305 298 287 245 234 226 222 190 187 151 151 121 121 
13 58 194 204 204 160 160 177 167 158 192 161 216 175 141 
14 34 227 233 231 186 183 194 185 169 195 160 206 165 135 
15 0 221 223 218 173 167 173 165 144 166 130 172 131 102 
16 221 0 36 57 66 83 113 108 142 181 189 251 232 203 
17 223 36 0 22 52 65 88 85 121 156 170 228 213 188 
18 218 57 22 0 46 53 69 68 105 136 153 209 197 173 
19 173 66 52 46 0 18 52 44 76 117 123 186 166 138 
20 167 83 65 53 18 0 35 26 59 99 107 169 150 123 
21 173 113 88 69 52 35 0 11 38 69 85 141 129 108 
22 165 108 85 68 44 26 11 0 37 74 85 145 129 106 
23 144 142 121 105 76 59 38 37 0 45 49 110 93 71 
24 166 181 156 136 117 99 69 74 45 0 39 73 72 70 
25 130 189 170 153 123 107 85 85 49 39 0 67 44 32 
26 172 251 228 209 186 169 141 145 110 73 67 0 42 76 
27 131 232 213 197 166 150 129 129 93 72 44 42 0 38 
28 102 203 188 173 138 123 108 106 71 70 32 76 38 0 
29 112 247 232 217 182 167 151 149 113 100 67 67 32 45 
30 62 192 184 174 132 122 119 113 86 104 68 119 79 44 
31 49 215 209 199 157 147 143 138 110 122 85 123 82 55 
32 111 279 267 253 216 202 188 186 151 140 106 98 70 80 
33 25 208 206 199 155 148 151 143 121 141 105 150 109 78 
34 38 242 238 230 186 177 176 170 143 154 116 146 106 85 
35 30 236 241 238 192 189 198 189 171 195 159 201 160 132 
36 26 246 248 243 198 192 197 190 168 187 149 186 145 120 
37 24 236 234 227 183 175 177 170 145 161 123 158 117 93 
38 29 248 247 240 196 188 190 183 158 173 135 167 127 105 
39 38 254 252 245 201 193 193 187 161 173 135 163 124 104 
40 69 278 273 264 221 212 207 202 172 177 139 154 118 107 
41 55 263 259 250 207 198 194 189 160 168 129 150 112 98 
42 81 272 264 253 212 201 192 188 156 155 118 126 92 87 
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Table A-8: Linear distances [km] (3/3) 
 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 
1 214 158 182 246 176 209 206 214 203 215 222 245 230 239 
2 188 151 176 225 179 207 222 225 206 220 224 241 227 228 
3 204 165 190 240 193 221 234 237 220 233 238 255 241 242 
4 81 100 115 121 137 144 191 180 153 165 163 163 155 139 
5 42 76 83 81 109 110 161 148 120 131 128 125 118 100 
6 81 37 60 113 72 93 124 119 95 109 111 124 111 111 
7 30 98 87 26 113 94 153 133 108 113 107 88 89 60 
8 36 73 55 21 79 56 115 95 71 75 69 53 52 26 
9 56 66 43 41 61 33 92 72 48 52 45 33 28 15 
10 102 87 63 83 60 30 58 36 32 22 14 24 18 48 
11 97 110 85 66 92 58 97 75 67 60 51 21 36 37 
12 90 114 90 54 102 68 113 90 79 74 64 33 47 35 
13 162 97 98 167 70 95 51 71 81 85 94 126 112 138 
14 145 93 83 142 57 68 12 34 54 52 61 92 80 110 
15 112 62 49 111 25 38 30 26 24 29 38 69 55 81 
16 247 192 215 279 208 242 236 246 236 248 254 278 263 272 
17 232 184 209 267 206 238 241 248 234 247 252 273 259 264 
18 217 174 199 253 199 230 238 243 227 240 245 264 250 253 
19 182 132 157 216 155 186 192 198 183 196 201 221 207 212 
20 167 122 147 202 148 177 189 192 175 188 193 212 198 201 
21 151 119 143 188 151 176 198 197 177 190 193 207 194 192 
22 149 113 138 186 143 170 189 190 170 183 187 202 189 188 
23 113 86 110 151 121 143 171 168 145 158 161 172 160 156 
24 100 104 122 140 141 154 195 187 161 173 173 177 168 155 
25 67 68 85 106 105 116 159 149 123 135 135 139 129 118 
26 67 119 123 98 150 146 201 186 158 167 163 154 150 126 
27 32 79 82 70 109 106 160 145 117 127 124 118 112 92 
28 45 44 55 80 78 85 132 120 93 105 104 107 98 87 
29 0 71 65 40 93 81 139 121 94 102 98 88 84 61 
30 71 0 25 92 38 57 91 84 59 73 75 90 76 81 
31 65 25 0 75 28 34 79 66 39 51 52 65 52 58 
32 40 92 75 0 99 74 133 112 89 92 84 63 66 36 
33 93 38 28 99 0 35 54 48 28 41 47 72 56 75 
34 81 57 34 74 35 0 60 41 15 22 19 37 22 44 
35 139 91 79 133 54 60 0 23 46 42 51 81 70 100 
36 121 84 66 112 48 41 23 0 28 21 29 59 48 78 
37 94 59 39 89 28 15 46 28 0 14 19 47 32 58 
38 102 73 51 92 41 22 42 21 14 0 10 41 29 58 
39 98 75 52 84 47 19 51 29 19 10 0 32 20 50 
40 88 90 65 63 72 37 81 59 47 41 32 0 16 28 
41 84 76 52 66 56 22 70 48 32 29 20 16 0 31 
42 61 81 58 36 75 44 100 78 58 58 50 28 31 0 
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A.4 Stress test 1 results 
Table A-9: Promising alternatives 
Promising alternative Health care facility locations 
Maximal aggregated regret 
across prognostic scenarios 
?̃?1 = 𝑎321 [5, 8, 9, 10, 12] 0.373 
?̃?2 = 𝑎307 [5, 8, 10, 11, 12] 0.41 
?̃?3 = 𝑎287 [5, 9, 10, 11, 12] 0.436 
?̃?4 = 𝑎175 [6, 8, 10, 12, 15] 0.458 
?̃?5 = 𝑎301 [5, 8, 10, 12, 15] 0.458 
?̃?6 = 𝑎302 [5, 8, 10, 12, 14] 0.459 
?̃?7 = 𝑎303 [5, 8, 10, 12, 13] 0.459 
?̃?8 = 𝑎371 [5, 7, 8, 10, 12] 0.459 
?̃?9 = 𝑎427 [5, 6, 8, 10, 12] 0.459 
?̃?10 = 𝑎721 [4, 5, 8, 10, 12] 0.459 
?̃?11 = 𝑎1051 [3, 5, 8, 10, 12] 0.459 
?̃?12 = 𝑎1546 [2, 5, 8, 10, 12] 0.459 
?̃?13 = 𝑎2261 [1, 5, 8, 10, 12] 0.459 
?̃?14 = 𝑎176 [6, 8, 10, 12, 14] 0.47 
?̃?15 = 𝑎637 [4, 6, 8, 10, 12] 0.479 
?̃?16 = 𝑎155 [6, 9, 10, 12, 15] 0.484 
?̃?17 = 𝑎281 [5, 9, 10, 12, 15] 0.484 
?̃?18 = 𝑎156 [6, 9, 10, 12, 14] 0.485 
?̃?19 = 𝑎157 [6, 9, 10, 12, 13] 0.485 
?̃?20 = 𝑎282 [5, 9, 10, 12, 14] 0.485 
?̃?21 = 𝑎283 [5, 9, 10, 12, 13] 0.485 
?̃?22 = 𝑎356 [5, 7, 9, 10, 12] 0.485 
?̃?23 = 𝑎412 [5, 6, 9, 10, 12] 0.485 
?̃?24 = 𝑎706 [4, 5, 9, 10, 12] 0.485 
?̃?25 = 𝑎1036 [3, 5, 9, 10, 12] 0.485 
?̃?26 = 𝑎1531 [2, 5, 9, 10, 12] 0.485 
?̃?27 = 𝑎2246 [1, 5, 9, 10, 12] 0.485 
?̃?28 = 𝑎622 [4, 6, 9, 10, 12] 0.491 
?̃?29 = 𝑎177 [6, 8, 10, 12, 13] 0.491 
?̃?30 = 𝑎1447 [2, 6, 9, 10, 12] 0.493 
?̃?31 = 𝑎511 [4, 8, 10, 12, 15] 0.504 
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Table A-10: Significant scenarios 
 𝑠1
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠2
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠3
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠4
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠5
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠6
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠7
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠8
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠9
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠10
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠11
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠12
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 𝑠13
𝑠𝑖,?̃?𝑏 
?̃?1 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠11
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠16
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠79
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠248
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠256
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠15
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?2 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠11
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠79
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠51
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠83
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠16
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?3 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠51
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠248
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠115
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠83
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠56
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?4 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠40
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠39
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠208
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠240
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠207
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠38
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠144
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠239
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠206
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠105
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?5 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠105
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠153
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠249
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠106
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠161
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠218
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠17
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?6 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠105
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠153
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠249
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠210
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?7 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠105
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠153
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠210
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠249
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?8 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠105
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠153
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠249
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?9 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠105
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠153
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠11
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?10 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠105
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠153
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠11
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?11 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠105
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠153
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠11
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?12 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠105
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠153
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠11
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?13 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠105
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠153
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠11
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?14 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠79
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠152
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠151
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠88
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠208
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠40
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠207
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠16
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠78
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠150
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠87
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?15 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠79
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠78
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠88
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠179
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠168
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠240
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠167
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠112
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠87
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠208
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠96
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?16 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠240
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠239
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠238
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠40
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠237
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠39
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠208
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠48
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠236
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠207
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?17 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠106
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠114
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠249
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠234
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠154
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠33
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠177
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠153
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?18 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠152
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠240
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠151
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠239
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠238
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠208
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠150
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠237
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠88
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠207
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?19 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠152
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠240
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠151
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠239
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠179
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠184
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠88
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠208
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠183
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠79
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠238
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?20 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠234
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠114
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠106
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠154
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠242
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?21 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠234
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠154
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠114
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠179
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠106
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?22 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠154
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠234
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠114
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠179
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?23 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠234
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠154
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠51
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠248
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?24 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠234
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠154
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠51
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠115
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?25 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠234
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠154
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠51
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠179
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?26 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠234
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠154
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠51
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠179
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?27 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠226
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠233
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠178
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠130
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠250
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠234
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠162
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠154
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠51
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠131
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠146
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠179
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?28 𝑠240
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠239
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠238
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠179
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠237
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠112
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠236
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠168
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠111
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠167
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠235
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?29 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠79
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠216
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠152
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠88
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠208
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠78
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠151
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠215
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠207
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠184
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠40
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?30 𝑠80
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠237
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠240
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠79
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠236
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠238
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠239
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠88
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠179
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠208
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠207
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠78
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 
?̃?31 𝑠48
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠47
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠112
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠240
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠111
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠239
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠238
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠46
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠110
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠237
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠225
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠40
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
 𝑠184
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔
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A.5 Aftershock epicenter locations 
Table A-11: Aftershock epicenter arrondissements in hypothetical scenarios (1/2) 
 𝑠1,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠2,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠3,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠4,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠5,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠6,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠7,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠8,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠9,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠10,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠11,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠12,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠13,1
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 
?̃?1 1 1 16 24 1 1 24 1 1 1 1 16 1 
?̃?2 1 1 1 1 1 24 1 1 1 16 1 1 1 
?̃?3 1 1 1 24 1 18 1 1 16 1 1 1 1 
?̃?4 1 1 1 1 1 18 1 24 1 1 18 1 28 
?̃?5 1 24 28 18 1 16 1 28 24 1 16 1 1 
?̃?6 1 28 1 16 1 18 1 1 24 24 16 1 1 
?̃?7 1 28 1 1 1 16 24 18 1 1 24 1 16 
?̃?8 1 37 1 1 24 18 1 1 16 1 24 1 16 
?̃?9 1 28 1 1 1 16 24 1 18 1 1 1 1 
?̃?10 1 1 1 1 1 16 28 1 18 1 1 1 28 
?̃?11 28 4 13 42 28 13 24 13 18 28 15 15 24 
?̃?12 28 28 13 42 28 13 24 13 18 28 15 15 24 
?̃?13 28 4 13 42 28 13 24 13 20 20 20 20 24 
?̃?14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
?̃?15 1 1 1 1 1 28 1 18 1 1 1 1 1 
?̃?16 1 18 18 18 1 18 18 1 1 1 18 1 1 
?̃?17 1 18 1 7 24 1 16 16 18 1 1 24 1 
?̃?18 1 1 18 1 18 1 18 1 1 1 18 1 1 
?̃?19 1 1 1 18 1 18 24 24 1 1 24 1 18 
?̃?20 1 1 18 16 24 18 1 1 1 1 28 1 1 
?̃?21 1 1 18 24 16 1 18 1 1 1 1 24 28 
?̃?22 1 18 1 24 1 1 16 1 1 18 1 1 24 
?̃?23 1 1 18 24 1 16 18 1 1 1 1 1 1 
?̃?24 1 1 18 28 1 16 18 1 1 1 1 1 1 
?̃?25 28 28 18 24 13 13 18 7 28 34 13 8 24 
?̃?26 28 28 18 24 13 13 18 7 28 34 13 8 24 
?̃?27 28 28 20 24 13 13 20 7 20 24 13 8 24 
?̃?28 18 1 18 18 28 18 1 1 18 1 1 1 18 
?̃?29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 24 1 
?̃?30 13 18 18 13 18 18 28 18 13 24 13 13 13 
?̃?31 1 1 1 18 1 18 18 1 1 18 1 1 28 
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Table A-12: Aftershock epicenter arrondissements in hypothetical scenarios (2/2) 
 𝑠1,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠2,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠3,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠4,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠5,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠6,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠7,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠8,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠9,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠10,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠11,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠12,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 𝑠13,2
ℎ𝑦𝑝,?̃?𝑏 
?̃?1 8 5 8 10 5 8 8 10 5 5 5 5 5 
?̃?2 11 8 10 8 5 10 5 5 5 10 10 5 5 
?̃?3 11 10 9 10 10 9 5 10 10 5 5 5 5 
?̃?4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 12 
?̃?5 10 10 12 8 10 15 10 8 5 10 10 10 10 
?̃?6 8 12 8 8 12 8 10 10 10 10 8 10 10 
?̃?7 8 12 12 8 10 8 10 8 10 10 10 10 8 
?̃?8 8 12 8 10 10 8 8 10 8 5 10 10 8 
?̃?9 8 12 8 10 8 8 10 5 8 10 5 10 10 
?̃?10 8 12 8 10 8 8 10 5 8 10 10 10 10 
?̃?11 8 12 8 10 8 8 10 5 8 10 10 10 10 
?̃?12 8 12 8 10 8 8 10 5 8 10 10 10 10 
?̃?13 8 12 8 10 8 8 10 5 8 10 10 10 10 
?̃?14 6 8 6 6 10 6 10 10 8 6 6 10 6 
?̃?15 6 6 8 6 6 10 6 10 6 10 6 10 10 
?̃?16 12 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 
?̃?17 12 9 10 10 10 10 10 15 10 5 10 15 10 
?̃?18 12 6 10 6 10 6 10 10 10 10 10 6 10 
?̃?19 12 6 6 10 6 10 10 10 6 10 10 6 10 
?̃?20 12 10 9 10 10 10 12 10 10 10 10 14 10 
?̃?21 12 10 9 10 10 12 10 10 5 10 10 5 10 
?̃?22 12 9 10 10 9 10 10 5 10 10 10 5 5 
?̃?23 12 10 9 10 9 9 10 10 5 10 5 10 5 
?̃?24 12 10 9 10 9 9 10 10 5 10 5 10 5 
?̃?25 12 10 9 10 9 9 10 10 5 10 5 10 5 
?̃?26 12 10 9 10 9 9 10 10 5 10 5 10 5 
?̃?27 12 10 9 10 9 9 10 10 5 10 5 10 5 
?̃?28 6 12 6 10 10 10 10 6 10 6 10 6 10 
?̃?29 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 8 8 10 10 
?̃?30 6 10 10 6 10 10 12 10 6 10 6 6 6 
?̃?31 10 10 15 10 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 15 
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A.6 Stress test 2 results 
Table A-13: Stress test 2 results 
Promising 
alternative 
Regret in prognostic scenarios Regret in hypothetical scenarios Robustness 
value Expected Maximum Expected Maximum  
?̃?1 0.418 0.731 0.466 0.700 0.515 
?̃?2 0.444 0.908 0.557 0.713 0.565 
?̃?3 0.450 0.752 0.609 0.736 0.551 
?̃?4 0.507 1.000 0.723 1.000 0.673 
?̃?5 0.214 1.000 0.501 1.000 0.477 
?̃?6 0.370 1.000 0.637 1.000 0.582 
?̃?7 0.409 1.000 0.678 1.000 0.609 
?̃?8 0.471 1.000 0.662 1.000 0.648 
?̃?9 0.517 1.000 0.640 1.000 0.676 
?̃?10 0.484 1.000 0.656 1.000 0.656 
?̃?11 0.488 1.000 0.641 1.000 0.658 
?̃?12 0.471 1.000 0.613 1.000 0.646 
?̃?13 0.500 1.000 0.656 1.000 0.666 
?̃?14 0.663 1.000 0.722 0.887 0.755 
?̃?15 0.688 1.000 0.708 0.913 0.775 
?̃?16 0.540 1.000 0.753 0.914 0.682 
?̃?17 0.243 1.000 0.531 0.864 0.475 
?̃?18 0.673 1.000 0.768 0.863 0.759 
?̃?19 0.712 1.000 0.716 0.870 0.783 
?̃?20 0.376 1.000 0.591 0.778 0.549 
?̃?21 0.415 1.000 0.630 0.804 0.579 
?̃?22 0.453 1.000 0.597 0.782 0.599 
?̃?23 0.523 1.000 0.669 0.851 0.658 
?̃?24 0.490 1.000 0.652 0.813 0.630 
?̃?25 0.495 1.000 0.594 0.778 0.625 
?̃?26 0.477 1.000 0.590 0.803 0.618 
?̃?27 0.507 1.000 0.627 0.803 0.638 
?̃?28 0.699 1.000 0.765 0.902 0.782 
?̃?29 0.702 1.000 0.778 0.895 0.783 
?̃?30 0.774 1.000 0.787 0.945 0.838 
?̃?31 0.513 1.000 0.742 0.938 0.668 
 
 
 
Appendix 
254 
A.7 Sensitivity analyses 
Table A-14: Sensitivities of preferences of objectives 
𝑤𝑒𝑧1 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
𝑤𝑒𝑧2 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
?̃?17 0.458 0.464 0.469 0.475 0.481 0.486 0.492 0.502 0.530 0.559 0.588 
?̃?5 0.400 0.426 0.451 0.477 0.503 0.528 0.554 0.579 0.605 0.630 0.656 
?̃?1 0.692 0.632 0.571 0.515 0.468 0.437 0.415 0.395 0.391 0.387 0.385 
?̃?20 0.634 0.606 0.577 0.549 0.520 0.493 0.474 0.470 0.470 0.469 0.468 
?̃?3 0.728 0.668 0.609 0.551 0.504 0.461 0.426 0.391 0.365 0.346 0.328 
?̃?2 0.706 0.659 0.612 0.565 0.523 0.492 0.462 0.438 0.430 0.435 0.440 
?̃?21 0.669 0.639 0.609 0.579 0.550 0.520 0.497 0.482 0.468 0.453 0.438 
?̃?6 0.617 0.605 0.594 0.582 0.571 0.559 0.547 0.536 0.524 0.513 0.501 
?̃?22 0.716 0.677 0.638 0.599 0.560 0.538 0.519 0.499 0.480 0.460 0.441 
?̃?7 0.650 0.636 0.622 0.609 0.595 0.581 0.567 0.553 0.539 0.526 0.512 
 
Table A-15: Sensitivities of preferences of objectives 
𝑤𝑒𝑧1 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
𝑤𝑒𝑧2 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
?̃?17 0.394 0.435 0.475 0.515 0.556 0.596 0.636 0.677 0.717 0.757 0.798 
?̃?5 0.371 0.424 0.477 0.530 0.583 0.636 0.689 0.741 0.794 0.847 0.900 
?̃?1 0.480 0.498 0.515 0.532 0.550 0.567 0.584 0.601 0.619 0.636 0.653 
?̃?20 0.501 0.525 0.549 0.573 0.597 0.621 0.645 0.669 0.693 0.717 0.741 
?̃?3 0.511 0.531 0.551 0.571 0.591 0.611 0.631 0.651 0.671 0.691 0.711 
?̃?2 0.536 0.551 0.565 0.580 0.594 0.609 0.623 0.638 0.652 0.667 0.681 
?̃?21 0.532 0.556 0.579 0.603 0.627 0.651 0.674 0.698 0.722 0.745 0.769 
?̃?6 0.496 0.539 0.582 0.625 0.668 0.712 0.755 0.798 0.841 0.884 0.927 
?̃?22 0.562 0.581 0.599 0.617 0.635 0.654 0.672 0.690 0.709 0.727 0.745 
?̃?7 0.527 0.568 0.609 0.649 0.690 0.731 0.772 0.813 0.854 0.895 0.936 
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Table A-16: Sensitivities of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism (1/4) 
?̃?17 
𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.973 0.966 0.960 0.953 0.946 0.940 0.933 0.926 0.920 0.913 0.906 
0.1 0.912 0.906 0.899 0.892 0.886 0.879 0.872 0.866 0.859 0.852 0.846 
0.2 0.852 0.845 0.838 0.832 0.825 0.818 0.812 0.805 0.798 0.792 0.785 
0.3 0.791 0.785 0.778 0.771 0.765 0.758 0.751 0.745 0.738 0.731 0.725 
0.4 0.731 0.724 0.717 0.711 0.704 0.697 0.691 0.684 0.677 0.671 0.664 
0.5 0.670 0.663 0.657 0.650 0.643 0.637 0.630 0.623 0.617 0.610 0.603 
0.6 0.609 0.603 0.596 0.590 0.583 0.576 0.570 0.563 0.556 0.550 0.543 
0.7 0.549 0.542 0.536 0.529 0.522 0.516 0.509 0.502 0.496 0.489 0.482 
0.8 0.488 0.482 0.475 0.468 0.462 0.455 0.448 0.442 0.435 0.428 0.422 
0.9 0.428 0.421 0.414 0.408 0.401 0.395 0.388 0.381 0.375 0.368 0.361 
1 0.367 0.361 0.354 0.347 0.341 0.334 0.327 0.321 0.314 0.307 0.301 
?̃?5 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 1.000 0.990 0.980 0.970 0.960 0.950 0.940 0.930 0.920 0.910 0.900 
0.1 0.937 0.927 0.917 0.907 0.897 0.887 0.877 0.867 0.857 0.847 0.837 
0.2 0.874 0.864 0.854 0.844 0.834 0.824 0.814 0.804 0.794 0.784 0.774 
0.3 0.811 0.801 0.791 0.781 0.771 0.761 0.751 0.741 0.732 0.722 0.712 
0.4 0.748 0.738 0.729 0.719 0.709 0.699 0.689 0.679 0.669 0.659 0.649 
0.5 0.686 0.676 0.666 0.656 0.646 0.636 0.626 0.616 0.606 0.596 0.586 
0.6 0.623 0.613 0.603 0.593 0.583 0.573 0.563 0.553 0.543 0.533 0.523 
0.7 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.530 0.520 0.510 0.500 0.490 0.480 0.470 0.460 
0.8 0.497 0.487 0.477 0.467 0.457 0.447 0.437 0.427 0.417 0.407 0.397 
0.9 0.434 0.424 0.414 0.404 0.394 0.384 0.374 0.364 0.354 0.344 0.334 
1 0.371 0.361 0.351 0.341 0.331 0.321 0.311 0.301 0.291 0.281 0.271 
?̃?1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.725 0.720 0.716 0.711 0.706 0.702 0.697 0.692 0.688 0.683 0.678 
0.1 0.700 0.695 0.691 0.686 0.681 0.677 0.672 0.667 0.663 0.658 0.653 
0.2 0.675 0.670 0.666 0.661 0.656 0.652 0.647 0.642 0.637 0.633 0.628 
0.3 0.650 0.645 0.640 0.636 0.631 0.626 0.622 0.617 0.612 0.608 0.603 
0.4 0.625 0.620 0.615 0.611 0.606 0.601 0.597 0.592 0.587 0.583 0.578 
0.5 0.600 0.595 0.590 0.586 0.581 0.576 0.572 0.567 0.562 0.558 0.553 
0.6 0.575 0.570 0.565 0.561 0.556 0.551 0.546 0.542 0.537 0.532 0.528 
0.7 0.549 0.545 0.540 0.535 0.531 0.526 0.521 0.517 0.512 0.507 0.503 
0.8 0.524 0.520 0.515 0.510 0.506 0.501 0.496 0.492 0.487 0.482 0.478 
0.9 0.499 0.495 0.490 0.485 0.481 0.476 0.471 0.467 0.462 0.457 0.452 
1 0.474 0.470 0.465 0.460 0.455 0.451 0.446 0.441 0.437 0.432 0.427 
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Table A-17: Sensitivities of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism (2/4) 
?̃?20 
𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.956 0.952 0.948 0.944 0.941 0.937 0.933 0.929 0.926 0.922 0.918 
0.1 0.906 0.902 0.898 0.894 0.891 0.887 0.883 0.880 0.876 0.872 0.868 
0.2 0.856 0.852 0.848 0.845 0.841 0.837 0.833 0.830 0.826 0.822 0.818 
0.3 0.806 0.802 0.798 0.795 0.791 0.787 0.783 0.780 0.776 0.772 0.768 
0.4 0.756 0.752 0.748 0.745 0.741 0.737 0.734 0.730 0.726 0.722 0.719 
0.5 0.706 0.702 0.699 0.695 0.691 0.687 0.684 0.680 0.676 0.672 0.669 
0.6 0.656 0.652 0.649 0.645 0.641 0.637 0.634 0.630 0.626 0.622 0.619 
0.7 0.606 0.602 0.599 0.595 0.591 0.588 0.584 0.580 0.576 0.573 0.569 
0.8 0.556 0.553 0.549 0.545 0.541 0.538 0.534 0.530 0.526 0.523 0.519 
0.9 0.506 0.503 0.499 0.495 0.491 0.488 0.484 0.480 0.476 0.473 0.469 
1 0.456 0.453 0.449 0.445 0.442 0.438 0.434 0.430 0.427 0.423 0.419 
?̃?3 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.749 0.746 0.744 0.741 0.739 0.736 0.733 0.731 0.728 0.726 0.723 
0.1 0.725 0.722 0.720 0.717 0.714 0.712 0.709 0.707 0.704 0.702 0.699 
0.2 0.700 0.698 0.695 0.693 0.690 0.688 0.685 0.683 0.680 0.678 0.675 
0.3 0.676 0.674 0.671 0.669 0.666 0.664 0.661 0.659 0.656 0.653 0.651 
0.4 0.652 0.650 0.647 0.645 0.642 0.639 0.637 0.634 0.632 0.629 0.627 
0.5 0.628 0.626 0.623 0.620 0.618 0.615 0.613 0.610 0.608 0.605 0.603 
0.6 0.604 0.601 0.599 0.596 0.594 0.591 0.589 0.586 0.584 0.581 0.578 
0.7 0.580 0.577 0.575 0.572 0.570 0.567 0.565 0.562 0.559 0.557 0.554 
0.8 0.556 0.553 0.551 0.548 0.546 0.543 0.540 0.538 0.535 0.533 0.530 
0.9 0.532 0.529 0.526 0.524 0.521 0.519 0.516 0.514 0.511 0.509 0.506 
1 0.507 0.505 0.502 0.500 0.497 0.495 0.492 0.490 0.487 0.485 0.482 
?̃?2 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.869 0.866 0.863 0.859 0.856 0.853 0.850 0.847 0.844 0.841 0.838 
0.1 0.832 0.829 0.825 0.822 0.819 0.816 0.813 0.810 0.807 0.804 0.800 
0.2 0.795 0.791 0.788 0.785 0.782 0.779 0.776 0.773 0.770 0.766 0.763 
0.3 0.757 0.754 0.751 0.748 0.745 0.742 0.739 0.736 0.732 0.729 0.726 
0.4 0.720 0.717 0.714 0.711 0.708 0.705 0.702 0.698 0.695 0.692 0.689 
0.5 0.683 0.680 0.677 0.674 0.671 0.668 0.664 0.661 0.658 0.655 0.652 
0.6 0.646 0.643 0.640 0.637 0.634 0.630 0.627 0.624 0.621 0.618 0.615 
0.7 0.609 0.606 0.603 0.599 0.596 0.593 0.590 0.587 0.584 0.581 0.578 
0.8 0.572 0.569 0.565 0.562 0.559 0.556 0.553 0.550 0.547 0.544 0.541 
0.9 0.535 0.531 0.528 0.525 0.522 0.519 0.516 0.513 0.510 0.507 0.503 
1 0.497 0.494 0.491 0.488 0.485 0.482 0.479 0.476 0.473 0.469 0.466 
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Table A-18: Sensitivities of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism (3/4) 
?̃?21 
𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.961 0.957 0.954 0.950 0.947 0.943 0.940 0.936 0.933 0.930 0.926 
0.1 0.914 0.910 0.907 0.904 0.900 0.897 0.893 0.890 0.886 0.883 0.879 
0.2 0.867 0.864 0.860 0.857 0.853 0.850 0.846 0.843 0.839 0.836 0.832 
0.3 0.820 0.817 0.813 0.810 0.806 0.803 0.800 0.796 0.793 0.789 0.786 
0.4 0.774 0.770 0.767 0.763 0.760 0.756 0.753 0.749 0.746 0.742 0.739 
0.5 0.727 0.723 0.720 0.716 0.713 0.709 0.706 0.703 0.699 0.696 0.692 
0.6 0.680 0.677 0.673 0.670 0.666 0.663 0.659 0.656 0.652 0.649 0.645 
0.7 0.633 0.630 0.626 0.623 0.619 0.616 0.612 0.609 0.605 0.602 0.599 
0.8 0.586 0.583 0.579 0.576 0.573 0.569 0.566 0.562 0.559 0.555 0.552 
0.9 0.540 0.536 0.533 0.529 0.526 0.522 0.519 0.515 0.512 0.508 0.505 
1 0.493 0.489 0.486 0.482 0.479 0.475 0.472 0.469 0.465 0.462 0.458 
?̃?6 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 1.000 0.993 0.985 0.978 0.971 0.964 0.956 0.949 0.942 0.935 0.927 
0.1 0.950 0.942 0.935 0.928 0.921 0.913 0.906 0.899 0.891 0.884 0.877 
0.2 0.899 0.892 0.885 0.877 0.870 0.863 0.856 0.848 0.841 0.834 0.827 
0.3 0.849 0.841 0.834 0.827 0.820 0.812 0.805 0.798 0.791 0.783 0.776 
0.4 0.798 0.791 0.784 0.776 0.769 0.762 0.755 0.747 0.740 0.733 0.726 
0.5 0.748 0.741 0.733 0.726 0.719 0.712 0.704 0.697 0.690 0.683 0.675 
0.6 0.697 0.690 0.683 0.676 0.668 0.661 0.654 0.647 0.639 0.632 0.625 
0.7 0.647 0.640 0.632 0.625 0.618 0.611 0.603 0.596 0.589 0.582 0.574 
0.8 0.597 0.589 0.582 0.575 0.567 0.560 0.553 0.546 0.538 0.531 0.524 
0.9 0.546 0.539 0.532 0.524 0.517 0.510 0.503 0.495 0.488 0.481 0.474 
1 0.496 0.488 0.481 0.474 0.467 0.459 0.452 0.445 0.438 0.430 0.423 
?̃?22 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.956 0.953 0.949 0.945 0.942 0.938 0.934 0.931 0.927 0.923 0.919 
0.1 0.913 0.909 0.905 0.902 0.898 0.894 0.890 0.887 0.883 0.879 0.876 
0.2 0.869 0.865 0.862 0.858 0.854 0.850 0.847 0.843 0.839 0.836 0.832 
0.3 0.825 0.821 0.818 0.814 0.810 0.807 0.803 0.799 0.796 0.792 0.788 
0.4 0.781 0.778 0.774 0.770 0.767 0.763 0.759 0.756 0.752 0.748 0.744 
0.5 0.738 0.734 0.730 0.727 0.723 0.719 0.715 0.712 0.708 0.704 0.701 
0.6 0.694 0.690 0.686 0.683 0.679 0.675 0.672 0.668 0.664 0.661 0.657 
0.7 0.650 0.646 0.643 0.639 0.635 0.632 0.628 0.624 0.621 0.617 0.613 
0.8 0.606 0.603 0.599 0.595 0.592 0.588 0.584 0.580 0.577 0.573 0.569 
0.9 0.563 0.559 0.555 0.551 0.548 0.544 0.540 0.537 0.533 0.529 0.526 
1 0.519 0.515 0.511 0.508 0.504 0.500 0.497 0.493 0.489 0.486 0.482 
Appendix 
258 
Table A-19: Sensitivities of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism (4/4) 
?̃?7 
𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 1.000 0.994 0.987 0.981 0.974 0.968 0.961 0.955 0.948 0.942 0.936 
0.1 0.953 0.946 0.940 0.933 0.927 0.920 0.914 0.908 0.901 0.895 0.888 
0.2 0.905 0.899 0.892 0.886 0.880 0.873 0.867 0.860 0.854 0.847 0.841 
0.3 0.858 0.852 0.845 0.839 0.832 0.826 0.819 0.813 0.807 0.800 0.794 
0.4 0.811 0.804 0.798 0.791 0.785 0.779 0.772 0.766 0.759 0.753 0.746 
0.5 0.763 0.757 0.751 0.744 0.738 0.731 0.725 0.718 0.712 0.705 0.699 
0.6 0.716 0.710 0.703 0.697 0.690 0.684 0.677 0.671 0.665 0.658 0.652 
0.7 0.669 0.662 0.656 0.649 0.643 0.637 0.630 0.624 0.617 0.611 0.604 
0.8 0.621 0.615 0.609 0.602 0.596 0.589 0.583 0.576 0.570 0.564 0.557 
0.9 0.574 0.568 0.561 0.555 0.548 0.542 0.536 0.529 0.523 0.516 0.510 
1 0.527 0.520 0.514 0.508 0.501 0.495 0.488 0.482 0.475 0.469 0.462 
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B.  Additional data of case study 2 
B.1 Structure of Berlin 
Table B-1: Structure of Berlin in 2012 (provided by the SEAK project; Statistik 
Berlin Brandenburg 2012; Nielsen 2013) 
District 
Density of population 
[1/km2] 
Area [km2] 
Density of stores 
[1/km2] 
I Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf 5,043 64.72 0.7 
II Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 13,554 20.16 1.4 
III Lichtenberg 5,134 52.29 0.6 
IV Marzahn-Hellersdorf 4,149 61.47 0.6 
V Mitte 9,032 39.47 1 
VI Neukölln 7,249 44.93 1.1 
VII Pankow 3,731 103.1 0.5 
VIII Reinickendorf 2,839 89.46 0.5 
IX Spandau 2,507 91.91 0.3 
X Steglitz-Zehlendorf 2,920 102.5 0.5 
XI Tempelhof-Schöneberg 6,324 53.09 1.1 
XII Treptow-Köpenick 1,481 168.42 0.2 
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B.2 Alternatives 
Table B-2: Alternatives and staff allocations (1/3) 
 Store 1 Store 2 Store 3 Store 4 Store 5 Store 6 Store 7 Store 8 Store 9 Store 10 
𝑎1 42 90 0 0 33 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎2 42 90 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎3 42 91 0 0 36 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎4 38 78 0 0 26 26 0 42 55 0 
𝑎5 42 90 0 0 33 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎6 42 90 0 0 31 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎7 42 90 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎8 42 91 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎9 42 91 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎10 42 90 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎11 42 90 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎12 38 79 0 0 26 26 0 42 55 0 
𝑎13 42 90 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎14 42 89 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎15 42 90 0 0 33 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎16 42 90 0 0 33 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎17 42 90 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎18 42 91 0 0 35 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎19 37 78 0 0 26 26 0 42 55 0 
𝑎20 42 90 0 0 31 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎21 42 89 0 0 33 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎22 37 79 0 0 26 26 0 42 55 0 
𝑎23 42 90 0 0 31 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎24 42 91 0 0 33 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎25 42 91 0 0 33 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎26 42 91 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎27 42 88 0 0 38 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎28 42 89 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎29 42 91 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎30 42 89 0 0 34 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎31 37 78 0 0 26 26 0 42 55 0 
𝑎32 42 90 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎33 42 89 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎34 42 89 0 0 33 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎35 42 90 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎36 42 90 0 0 31 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎37 42 90 0 0 31 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎38 42 89 0 0 35 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎39 42 91 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎40 42 90 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎41 37 79 0 0 26 26 0 42 55 0 
𝑎42 40 91 0 0 32 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎43 42 89 0 0 37 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎44 42 80 0 0 33 26 0 42 0 0 
𝑎45 38 78 0 0 26 26 0 42 55 0 
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Table B-3: Alternatives and staff allocations (2/3) 
 Store 11 Store 12 Store 13 Store 14 Store 15 Store 16 Store 17 Store 18 Store 19 Store 20 
𝑎1 55 0 26 27 33 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎2 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎3 55 0 26 27 31 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎4 55 0 26 26 27 0 34 35 26 26 
𝑎5 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎6 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎7 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 41 26 26 
𝑎8 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎9 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎10 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎11 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎12 55 0 26 26 27 0 33 35 26 26 
𝑎13 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎14 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎15 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎16 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎17 55 0 26 28 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎18 55 0 26 27 30 0 39 39 26 26 
𝑎19 55 0 26 26 28 0 33 36 26 26 
𝑎20 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎21 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎22 55 0 26 26 27 0 34 35 26 26 
𝑎23 55 0 26 27 33 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎24 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎25 55 0 26 27 33 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎26 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎27 55 0 26 28 34 0 37 39 26 26 
𝑎28 55 0 26 27 33 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎29 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 39 26 26 
𝑎30 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎31 55 0 26 26 28 0 34 35 26 26 
𝑎32 55 0 26 27 33 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎33 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎34 55 0 26 28 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎35 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 41 26 26 
𝑎36 55 0 26 27 32 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎37 55 0 26 27 33 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎38 55 0 26 27 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎39 55 0 26 27 33 0 39 40 26 26 
𝑎40 55 0 26 27 31 0 38 41 26 26 
𝑎41 55 0 26 26 28 0 34 35 26 26 
𝑎42 55 0 26 29 34 0 40 41 26 26 
𝑎43 55 0 26 28 31 0 40 39 26 26 
𝑎44 55 0 26 28 32 0 38 40 26 26 
𝑎45 55 0 26 26 28 0 33 35 26 26 
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Table B-4: Alternatives and staff allocations (3/3) 
 Store 21 Store 22 Store 23 Store 24 Store 25 Store 26 Store 27 Store 28 Store 29 
𝑎1 0 26 26 38 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎2 0 26 26 39 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎3 0 26 26 37 39 26 0 0 42 
𝑎4 0 26 26 26 36 26 0 0 42 
𝑎5 0 26 26 39 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎6 0 26 26 40 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎7 0 26 26 39 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎8 0 26 26 38 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎9 0 26 26 39 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎10 0 26 26 38 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎11 0 26 26 39 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎12 0 26 26 26 36 26 0 0 42 
𝑎13 0 26 26 40 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎14 0 26 26 39 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎15 0 26 26 38 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎16 0 26 26 38 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎17 0 26 26 39 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎18 0 26 26 39 39 26 0 0 42 
𝑎19 0 26 26 26 36 26 0 0 42 
𝑎20 0 26 26 39 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎21 0 26 26 39 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎22 0 26 26 26 36 26 0 0 42 
𝑎23 0 26 26 39 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎24 0 26 26 38 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎25 0 26 26 35 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎26 0 26 26 38 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎27 0 26 26 36 39 26 0 0 42 
𝑎28 0 26 26 38 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎29 0 26 26 39 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎30 0 26 26 37 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎31 0 26 26 26 36 26 0 0 42 
𝑎32 0 26 26 39 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎33 0 26 26 40 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎34 0 26 26 38 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎35 0 26 26 38 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎36 0 26 26 40 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎37 0 26 26 39 41 26 0 0 42 
𝑎38 0 26 26 38 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎39 0 26 26 37 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎40 0 26 26 40 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎41 0 26 26 26 35 26 0 0 42 
𝑎42 0 26 26 35 39 26 0 0 42 
𝑎43 0 26 26 36 39 26 0 0 42 
𝑎44 0 26 26 38 40 26 0 0 42 
𝑎45 0 26 26 26 36 26 0 0 42 
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B.3 Stress test 2 results 
Table B-5: Stress test 2 results (1/2) 
Alternative 
Regret in prognostic scenarios Regret in hypothetical scenarios Robustness 
value Expected Maximum Expected Maximum 
𝑎1 0.194 0.634 0.409 0.870 0.610 
𝑎2 0.171 0.665 0.388 0.859 0.598 
𝑎3 0.319 0.785 0.494 0.933 0.698 
𝑎4 0.100 0.535 0.253 0.890 0.558 
𝑎5 0.179 0.712 0.430 0.877 0.622 
𝑎6 0.192 0.659 0.403 0.847 0.599 
𝑎7 0.193 0.690 0.430 0.904 0.636 
𝑎8 0.119 0.680 0.407 0.963 0.643 
𝑎9 0.172 0.646 0.426 1.000 0.674 
𝑎10 0.120 0.698 0.402 0.853 0.590 
𝑎11 0.112 0.650 0.383 0.855 0.582 
𝑎12 0.106 0.579 0.286 0.894 0.572 
𝑎13 0.174 0.617 0.385 0.868 0.598 
𝑎14 0.125 0.671 0.392 1.000 0.659 
𝑎15 0.190 0.745 0.416 1.000 0.684 
𝑎16 0.117 0.628 0.418 1.000 0.659 
𝑎17 0.186 0.647 0.421 0.928 0.640 
𝑎18 0.324 0.680 0.436 0.923 0.673 
𝑎19 0.120 0.567 0.327 0.915 0.593 
𝑎20 0.128 0.692 0.377 0.834 0.577 
𝑎21 0.193 0.734 0.508 1.000 0.703 
𝑎22 0.099 0.532 0.308 0.969 0.608 
𝑎23 0.145 0.687 0.440 1.000 0.675 
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Table B-6: Stress test 2 results (2/2) 
Alternative 
Regret in prognostic scenarios Regret in hypothetical scenarios Robustness 
value Expected Maximum Expected Maximum 
𝑎24 0.191 0.813 0.441 0.939 0.666 
𝑎25 0.220 0.788 0.433 1.000 0.698 
𝑎26 0.183 0.695 0.396 1.000 0.674 
𝑎27 0.594 1.000 0.543 1.000 0.819 
𝑎28 0.144 0.710 0.383 0.846 0.589 
𝑎29 0.188 0.517 0.383 0.851 0.583 
𝑎30 0.160 0.680 0.473 0.888 0.629 
𝑎31 0.104 0.551 0.305 0.885 0.569 
𝑎32 0.181 0.655 0.430 0.857 0.607 
𝑎33 0.124 0.623 0.356 0.866 0.581 
𝑎34 0.212 0.647 0.469 0.987 0.685 
𝑎35 0.180 0.705 0.418 0.893 0.627 
𝑎36 0.129 0.644 0.662 1.000 0.714 
𝑎37 0.200 0.698 0.416 0.933 0.649 
𝑎38 0.219 0.628 0.398 0.917 0.635 
𝑎39 0.150 0.725 0.541 1.000 0.700 
𝑎40 0.227 0.733 0.558 1.000 0.721 
𝑎41 0.117 0.928 0.444 1.000 0.691 
𝑎42 0.561 1.000 0.563 1.000 0.816 
𝑎43 0.474 0.922 0.657 1.000 0.810 
𝑎44 0.204 0.626 0.546 1.000 0.704 
𝑎45 0.111 0.564 0.432 1.000 0.655 
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B.4 Sensitivity analyses 
Table B-7: Sensitivities of the inter-scenario degree of pessimism 
𝑤𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
𝑤𝑒ℎ𝑦𝑝 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
?̃?17 0.230 0.277 0.324 0.371 0.418 0.465 0.511 0.558 0.605 0.652 0.699 
?̃?5 0.238 0.286 0.333 0.380 0.427 0.475 0.522 0.569 0.617 0.664 0.711 
?̃?1 0.248 0.294 0.341 0.387 0.433 0.480 0.526 0.572 0.619 0.665 0.711 
?̃?20 0.297 0.337 0.377 0.417 0.457 0.497 0.537 0.577 0.617 0.657 0.697 
?̃?3 0.274 0.318 0.362 0.406 0.450 0.494 0.538 0.581 0.625 0.669 0.713 
?̃?2 0.273 0.317 0.361 0.405 0.449 0.493 0.538 0.582 0.626 0.670 0.714 
?̃?21 0.287 0.329 0.372 0.414 0.456 0.499 0.541 0.583 0.626 0.668 0.710 
?̃?6 0.314 0.353 0.392 0.432 0.471 0.510 0.550 0.589 0.628 0.668 0.707 
?̃?22 0.294 0.336 0.379 0.421 0.463 0.506 0.548 0.590 0.633 0.675 0.717 
?̃?7 0.254 0.303 0.351 0.399 0.448 0.496 0.545 0.593 0.642 0.690 0.738 
 
Table B-8: Sensitivities of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism (1/4) 
𝑎4 
𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.783 0.739 0.694 0.650 0.605 0.560 0.516 0.471 0.427 0.382 0.338 
0.1 0.770 0.726 0.681 0.637 0.592 0.547 0.503 0.458 0.414 0.369 0.324 
0.2 0.757 0.713 0.668 0.623 0.579 0.534 0.490 0.445 0.401 0.356 0.311 
0.3 0.744 0.700 0.655 0.610 0.566 0.521 0.477 0.432 0.388 0.343 0.298 
0.4 0.731 0.687 0.642 0.597 0.553 0.508 0.464 0.419 0.375 0.330 0.285 
0.5 0.718 0.674 0.629 0.584 0.540 0.495 0.451 0.406 0.361 0.317 0.272 
0.6 0.705 0.660 0.616 0.571 0.527 0.482 0.438 0.393 0.348 0.304 0.259 
0.7 0.692 0.647 0.603 0.558 0.514 0.469 0.425 0.380 0.335 0.291 0.246 
0.8 0.679 0.634 0.590 0.545 0.501 0.456 0.411 0.367 0.322 0.278 0.233 
0.9 0.666 0.621 0.577 0.532 0.488 0.443 0.398 0.354 0.309 0.265 0.220 
1 0.653 0.608 0.564 0.519 0.475 0.430 0.385 0.341 0.296 0.252 0.207 
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Table B-9: Sensitivities of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism (2/4) 
𝑎31 
𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.785 0.744 0.704 0.663 0.622 0.582 0.541 0.501 0.460 0.419 0.379 
0.1 0.772 0.731 0.690 0.650 0.609 0.568 0.528 0.487 0.447 0.406 0.365 
0.2 0.758 0.718 0.677 0.636 0.596 0.555 0.514 0.474 0.433 0.393 0.352 
0.3 0.745 0.704 0.664 0.623 0.582 0.542 0.501 0.460 0.420 0.379 0.339 
0.4 0.731 0.691 0.650 0.609 0.569 0.528 0.488 0.447 0.406 0.366 0.325 
0.5 0.718 0.677 0.637 0.596 0.555 0.515 0.474 0.434 0.393 0.352 0.312 
0.6 0.705 0.664 0.623 0.583 0.542 0.501 0.461 0.420 0.380 0.339 0.298 
0.7 0.691 0.651 0.610 0.569 0.529 0.488 0.447 0.407 0.366 0.326 0.285 
0.8 0.678 0.637 0.597 0.556 0.515 0.475 0.434 0.393 0.353 0.312 0.272 
0.9 0.664 0.624 0.583 0.543 0.502 0.461 0.421 0.380 0.339 0.299 0.258 
1 0.651 0.610 0.570 0.529 0.489 0.448 0.407 0.367 0.326 0.285 0.245 
𝑎12 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.799 0.757 0.714 0.672 0.629 0.587 0.544 0.501 0.459 0.416 0.374 
0.1 0.785 0.743 0.700 0.657 0.615 0.572 0.530 0.487 0.445 0.402 0.360 
0.2 0.771 0.728 0.686 0.643 0.601 0.558 0.516 0.473 0.431 0.388 0.345 
0.3 0.757 0.714 0.672 0.629 0.587 0.544 0.502 0.459 0.416 0.374 0.331 
0.4 0.743 0.700 0.658 0.615 0.572 0.530 0.487 0.445 0.402 0.360 0.317 
0.5 0.728 0.686 0.643 0.601 0.558 0.516 0.473 0.431 0.388 0.346 0.303 
0.6 0.714 0.672 0.629 0.587 0.544 0.502 0.459 0.416 0.374 0.331 0.289 
0.7 0.700 0.658 0.615 0.572 0.530 0.487 0.445 0.402 0.360 0.317 0.275 
0.8 0.686 0.643 0.601 0.558 0.516 0.473 0.431 0.388 0.346 0.303 0.260 
0.9 0.672 0.629 0.587 0.544 0.502 0.459 0.416 0.374 0.331 0.289 0.246 
1 0.658 0.615 0.572 0.530 0.487 0.445 0.402 0.360 0.317 0.275 0.232 
𝑎20 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.791 0.759 0.728 0.696 0.664 0.632 0.600 0.568 0.536 0.504 0.472 
0.1 0.775 0.743 0.711 0.679 0.647 0.615 0.583 0.551 0.519 0.487 0.455 
0.2 0.758 0.726 0.694 0.662 0.630 0.598 0.566 0.534 0.502 0.470 0.438 
0.3 0.741 0.709 0.677 0.645 0.613 0.581 0.549 0.517 0.485 0.453 0.421 
0.4 0.724 0.692 0.660 0.628 0.596 0.564 0.532 0.500 0.468 0.436 0.404 
0.5 0.707 0.675 0.643 0.611 0.579 0.547 0.515 0.483 0.451 0.419 0.387 
0.6 0.690 0.658 0.626 0.594 0.562 0.530 0.498 0.466 0.434 0.402 0.370 
0.7 0.673 0.641 0.609 0.577 0.545 0.513 0.481 0.449 0.417 0.385 0.353 
0.8 0.656 0.624 0.592 0.560 0.528 0.496 0.464 0.432 0.400 0.368 0.336 
0.9 0.639 0.607 0.575 0.543 0.511 0.479 0.447 0.415 0.383 0.351 0.319 
1 0.622 0.590 0.558 0.526 0.494 0.462 0.430 0.398 0.366 0.335 0.303 
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Table B-10: Sensitivities of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism (3/4) 
𝑎33 
𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.793 0.758 0.722 0.686 0.650 0.615 0.579 0.543 0.508 0.472 0.436 
0.1 0.778 0.743 0.707 0.671 0.635 0.600 0.564 0.528 0.493 0.457 0.421 
0.2 0.763 0.728 0.692 0.656 0.620 0.585 0.549 0.513 0.478 0.442 0.406 
0.3 0.748 0.713 0.677 0.641 0.606 0.570 0.534 0.498 0.463 0.427 0.391 
0.4 0.733 0.698 0.662 0.626 0.591 0.555 0.519 0.483 0.448 0.412 0.376 
0.5 0.718 0.683 0.647 0.611 0.576 0.540 0.504 0.468 0.433 0.397 0.361 
0.6 0.704 0.668 0.632 0.596 0.561 0.525 0.489 0.454 0.418 0.382 0.346 
0.7 0.689 0.653 0.617 0.581 0.546 0.510 0.474 0.439 0.403 0.367 0.331 
0.8 0.674 0.638 0.602 0.566 0.531 0.495 0.459 0.424 0.388 0.352 0.316 
0.9 0.659 0.623 0.587 0.552 0.516 0.480 0.444 0.409 0.373 0.337 0.302 
1 0.644 0.608 0.572 0.537 0.501 0.465 0.429 0.394 0.358 0.322 0.287 
𝑎11 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.794 0.761 0.728 0.694 0.661 0.628 0.595 0.562 0.529 0.496 0.463 
0.1 0.777 0.744 0.711 0.678 0.645 0.612 0.579 0.546 0.513 0.480 0.447 
0.2 0.761 0.728 0.695 0.662 0.629 0.596 0.563 0.530 0.497 0.464 0.431 
0.3 0.745 0.712 0.679 0.646 0.613 0.580 0.547 0.514 0.481 0.448 0.415 
0.4 0.729 0.696 0.663 0.630 0.597 0.564 0.531 0.498 0.465 0.432 0.399 
0.5 0.713 0.680 0.647 0.614 0.581 0.548 0.515 0.482 0.449 0.416 0.383 
0.6 0.697 0.664 0.631 0.598 0.565 0.532 0.499 0.466 0.433 0.399 0.366 
0.7 0.681 0.648 0.615 0.582 0.549 0.516 0.482 0.449 0.416 0.383 0.350 
0.8 0.665 0.632 0.599 0.565 0.532 0.499 0.466 0.433 0.400 0.367 0.334 
0.9 0.648 0.615 0.582 0.549 0.516 0.483 0.450 0.417 0.384 0.351 0.318 
1 0.632 0.599 0.566 0.533 0.500 0.467 0.434 0.401 0.368 0.335 0.302 
𝑎29 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.750 0.718 0.685 0.652 0.620 0.587 0.554 0.522 0.489 0.456 0.424 
0.1 0.741 0.708 0.675 0.642 0.610 0.577 0.544 0.512 0.479 0.446 0.414 
0.2 0.731 0.698 0.665 0.633 0.600 0.567 0.535 0.502 0.469 0.436 0.404 
0.3 0.721 0.688 0.655 0.623 0.590 0.557 0.525 0.492 0.459 0.427 0.394 
0.4 0.711 0.678 0.646 0.613 0.580 0.548 0.515 0.482 0.449 0.417 0.384 
0.5 0.701 0.668 0.636 0.603 0.570 0.538 0.505 0.472 0.440 0.407 0.374 
0.6 0.691 0.659 0.626 0.593 0.561 0.528 0.495 0.462 0.430 0.397 0.364 
0.7 0.681 0.649 0.616 0.583 0.551 0.518 0.485 0.453 0.420 0.387 0.355 
0.8 0.672 0.639 0.606 0.574 0.541 0.508 0.475 0.443 0.410 0.377 0.345 
0.9 0.662 0.629 0.596 0.564 0.531 0.498 0.466 0.433 0.400 0.367 0.335 
1 0.652 0.619 0.586 0.554 0.521 0.488 0.456 0.423 0.390 0.358 0.325 
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Table B-11: Sensitivities of the intra-scenario degree of pessimism (4/4) 
𝑎28 
𝜆ℎ𝑦𝑝  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.805 0.773 0.740 0.708 0.675 0.643 0.611 0.578 0.546 0.514 0.481 
0.1 0.788 0.756 0.723 0.691 0.658 0.626 0.594 0.561 0.529 0.497 0.464 
0.2 0.771 0.739 0.706 0.674 0.641 0.609 0.577 0.544 0.512 0.480 0.447 
0.3 0.754 0.722 0.689 0.657 0.624 0.592 0.560 0.527 0.495 0.463 0.430 
0.4 0.737 0.705 0.672 0.640 0.607 0.575 0.543 0.510 0.478 0.446 0.413 
0.5 0.720 0.688 0.655 0.623 0.591 0.558 0.526 0.493 0.461 0.429 0.396 
0.6 0.703 0.671 0.638 0.606 0.574 0.541 0.509 0.476 0.444 0.412 0.379 
0.7 0.686 0.654 0.621 0.589 0.557 0.524 0.492 0.459 0.427 0.395 0.362 
0.8 0.669 0.637 0.604 0.572 0.540 0.507 0.475 0.442 0.410 0.378 0.345 
0.9 0.652 0.620 0.587 0.555 0.523 0.490 0.458 0.426 0.393 0.361 0.328 
1 0.635 0.603 0.570 0.538 0.506 0.473 0.441 0.409 0.376 0.344 0.311 
𝑎10 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.806 0.775 0.743 0.712 0.680 0.649 0.617 0.586 0.554 0.523 0.491 
0.1 0.789 0.757 0.726 0.694 0.663 0.631 0.600 0.568 0.537 0.505 0.474 
0.2 0.772 0.740 0.709 0.677 0.646 0.614 0.582 0.551 0.519 0.488 0.456 
0.3 0.754 0.723 0.691 0.660 0.628 0.597 0.565 0.534 0.502 0.471 0.439 
0.4 0.737 0.705 0.674 0.642 0.611 0.579 0.548 0.516 0.485 0.453 0.422 
0.5 0.720 0.688 0.657 0.625 0.594 0.562 0.530 0.499 0.467 0.436 0.404 
0.6 0.702 0.671 0.639 0.608 0.576 0.545 0.513 0.482 0.450 0.419 0.387 
0.7 0.685 0.653 0.622 0.590 0.559 0.527 0.496 0.464 0.433 0.401 0.370 
0.8 0.668 0.636 0.605 0.573 0.541 0.510 0.478 0.447 0.415 0.384 0.352 
0.9 0.650 0.619 0.587 0.556 0.524 0.493 0.461 0.430 0.398 0.367 0.335 
1 0.633 0.601 0.570 0.538 0.507 0.475 0.444 0.412 0.381 0.349 0.318 
𝑎19 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔  
0 0.810 0.769 0.728 0.687 0.646 0.605 0.564 0.523 0.481 0.440 0.399 
0.1 0.797 0.756 0.715 0.674 0.632 0.591 0.550 0.509 0.468 0.427 0.386 
0.2 0.783 0.742 0.701 0.660 0.619 0.578 0.537 0.496 0.455 0.413 0.372 
0.3 0.770 0.729 0.688 0.647 0.606 0.565 0.523 0.482 0.441 0.400 0.359 
0.4 0.757 0.716 0.674 0.633 0.592 0.551 0.510 0.469 0.428 0.387 0.346 
0.5 0.743 0.702 0.661 0.620 0.579 0.538 0.497 0.456 0.414 0.373 0.332 
0.6 0.730 0.689 0.648 0.607 0.565 0.524 0.483 0.442 0.401 0.360 0.319 
0.7 0.717 0.675 0.634 0.593 0.552 0.511 0.470 0.429 0.388 0.347 0.305 
0.8 0.703 0.662 0.621 0.580 0.539 0.498 0.456 0.415 0.374 0.333 0.292 
0.9 0.690 0.649 0.607 0.566 0.525 0.484 0.443 0.402 0.361 0.320 0.279 
1 0.676 0.635 0.594 0.553 0.512 0.471 0.430 0.389 0.347 0.306 0.265 
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